社会偏好、奖惩机制与公共品的有效供给——基于一种实验方法的研究

文章利用实验经济学研究方法,对加入了不同奖惩机制的公共品实验中被试的自愿捐献额变化情况及其效果进行了比较与分析,并结合被试的个体社会偏好异质性的特征得出了以下结论：首先,引入外部强加的奖励机制对于提高整体合作水平有积极作用,而对于由被试自主选择第三方监督的惩罚机制则没有这种效果;其次,搭便车者和条件合作者的合作程度在引入外部强加的奖励机制后有了显著提高,而自主的监督惩罚机制则没有发现效果;第三,引入外部强加的奖励机制可以提高被试的整体收益。这些结论对于我们改进现实中公共品的供给管理具有重要意义。     

领导、追随与人类合作秩序的维持

领导-追随模式可能是维持人类合作秩序的重要机制。基于历史和演化博弈的视角,本文对相关跨学科文献进行了系统的梳理,分析显示在人类社会的各个时期,领导力都在维持社会的合作秩序中承担了核心角色。结合合作演化的研究成果分析表明,领导通过惩罚机制和日益建构起来的等级制统治可以帮助群体克服搭便车难题;利他性惩罚本质上表现为领导惩罚,合作的组织更普遍地表现为领导下的合作;同时,来自实验经济学的大量公共物品实验证据,也支持领导-追随模式可以显著地提高社会困境问题中合作水平的观点。     

A coordination mechanism through relational contract in a two-echelon supply chain

To promote social responsibilities of transnational corporation within the present world where such necessary corporation is seriously missing, this paper explores issues of decision-making and coordination of such a two-echelon supply chain that consists of a contract supplier and a dominant manufacturer. Considering the main reasons behind the lack of social responsibilities of multinational corporations, this work develops a model with punishment. Based on this model, we obtain the optimal decision for the supply-chain members under either decentralized decision-making or centralized decision-making. And we analyze whether the penalty rate will have an impact on the input of corporate social responsibility and how it will affect the self-interests of supply chain members. Ultimately, by exploring the decision variables of companies that practice stronger corporate social responsibility, we compare and analyze our models to draw several interesting and practically useful conclusions.     

信息披露监管的外部性——同行信息传递与市场学习

本文使用2001—2008年中国A股上市公司为样本,以信息披露违规公司的处罚公告为切入点,从信息披露监管外部性的角度,研究信息披露监管的有效性。实证结果表明,同行竞争者对处罚公告产生显著的信息传递效应,并且信息传递效应的程度与公司会计信息质量显著正相关,这说明监管当局对违规公司查处的信息披露监管产生了显著的外部性,并且这种外部性与会计信息质量显著正相关。同时,本文还发现会计信息质量的改进与同行公司对处罚公告的市场反应显著负相关,说明信息披露监管的外部性对公司信息披露行为有显著影响,使同行公司管理者在这一过程中产生了显著的市场学习行为。本文丰富了信息披露监管及其外部性的相关理论,并对上市公司信息披露监管具有重要的参考价值。     

Crime and social norms

In this paper, we develop a general equilibrium model of crime. It is shown that law and norms are substitutes in achieving a stable equilibrium. Here we offer a new interpretation of different theories of social norms in the context of crime and deterrence. The law and economics theory is presented as an opportunism-limiting approach to norms whereas the evolutionary theory is presented as an opportunity cost approach.Received: January 2003, Accepted: July 2003, JEL Classification: D59, K14, K42Paper presented at the 3rd annual meeting of SPIE Portuguese Association for Research in Economics, June 22-23, 1998, Braga and at the 15th annual meeting of the European Association of Law and Economics, September 24-26, 1998, Utrecht. I am grateful to two referees and the editor for helpful comments that much improved the paper, and to Dorothea Kübler, Eric Posner, Dieter Schmidtchen, and Stergios Skaperdas for suggestions that much improved this paper, and to Kelly Markva for research assistantship. The author acknowledges the financial support of FCT, Lisbon, Portugal. Part of this paper was written while the author visited Stanford Law School. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Crime,punishment, and consumer protection

Criminal law is perhaps society’s strongest technique of formal censure. By labelling an activity as “criminal” we attach to it a special stigma. Despite this, the United Kingdom (UK) has a long history of criminalising conduct that lacks the seriousness we might expect that label to involve. One area where criminal sanctions have been commonly used in the UK is consumer protection. This article argues that it is time to reconsider the role of criminal law in consumer protection and considers how alternative regimes may better-protect the consumer from business wrongdoing.

论我国公司犯罪刑罚体系的完善——以中美公司犯罪刑罚方法比较为视角

我国刑法对公司犯罪只规定了罚金刑一种刑罚方法,这种单一的刑罚配置不能对公司犯罪起到惩罚和教育作用。我国可以借鉴美国公司犯罪刑罚体系的做法,通过完善罚金刑,增设多种附加刑的方式,对我国公司犯罪刑罚种类作出修改和完善。     

An investment game with third-party intervention

This paper explores the effect of the possibility of third-party intervention on behavior in a variant of the Berg et al. [Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., McCabe, K., 1995. Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–142] “Investment Game”. A third-party's material payoff is not affected by the decisions made by the other participants, but this person may choose to punish a responder who has been overly selfish. The concern over this possibility may serve to discipline potentially selfish responders. We also explore a treatment in which the third party may also choose to reward a sender who has received a low net payoff as a result of the responder's action. We find a strong and significant effect of third-party punishment in both punishment regimes, as the amount sent by the first mover is more than 60% higher when there is the possibility of third-party punishment. We also find that responders return a higher proportion of the amount sent to them when there is the possibility of punishment, with this proportion slightly higher when reward is not feasible. Finally, third parties punish less when reward is feasible, but nevertheless spend more on the combination of reward and punishment when these are both permitted than on punishment when this is the only choice for redressing material outcomes.     

Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: Experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore

This paper examines cultural differences in individual decision-making in a corruption game. We define culture as an individual's accumulated experience, shaped by the social, institutional, and economic aspects of the environment in which the individual lives. Based on experiments run in Australia (Melbourne), India (Delhi), Indonesia (Jakarta) and Singapore, we find that there is a greater variation in the propensities to punish corrupt behavior than in the propensities to engage in corrupt behavior across cultures. Consistent with the existing corruption indices, the subjects in India exhibit a higher tolerance of corruption than the subjects in Australia. However, the subjects in Singapore have a higher tolerance and the subjects in Indonesia have much lower tolerance of corruption than expected. We conjecture that this is due to the nature of the recent institutional changes in these two countries. We also vary our experimental design to examine the impact of the perceived cost of bribery and find that the results are culture-specific.     

Dispelling misconceptions and providing guidelines for leader reward and punishment behavior

One unfortunate consequence of the focus on “charismatic,” “transformational,” and “visionary” leader behaviors during the past few decades has been the tendency to diminish the importance that transactional leadership behaviors have on leadership effectiveness. We say that this is unfortunate because recent research has shown that transactional leadership, in the form of contingent reward and punishment behaviors, can have substantial effects on a variety of important employee attitudes, perceptions, and measures of job performance. Therefore, in this article we discuss some possible reasons why transactional leadership has been relegated to a lesser role than transformational leadership, summarize the research that indicates the importance of leader contingent reward and punishment behavior to leadership effectiveness, and identify some of the mechanisms that these forms of leadership behavior work through to influence employee attitudes and behaviors. Following this, we address ten misconceptions managers often have regarding the administration of rewards and punishments, and provide some recommendations about how leaders can improve their effectiveness in administering recognition and discipline in organizational settings.