全文获取类型
收费全文 | 8822篇 |
免费 | 560篇 |
国内免费 | 20篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 1299篇 |
工业经济 | 359篇 |
计划管理 | 1230篇 |
经济学 | 4139篇 |
综合类 | 211篇 |
运输经济 | 21篇 |
旅游经济 | 27篇 |
贸易经济 | 562篇 |
农业经济 | 607篇 |
经济概况 | 947篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 19篇 |
2023年 | 118篇 |
2022年 | 78篇 |
2021年 | 148篇 |
2020年 | 378篇 |
2019年 | 398篇 |
2018年 | 232篇 |
2017年 | 332篇 |
2016年 | 275篇 |
2015年 | 300篇 |
2014年 | 654篇 |
2013年 | 802篇 |
2012年 | 617篇 |
2011年 | 898篇 |
2010年 | 611篇 |
2009年 | 577篇 |
2008年 | 551篇 |
2007年 | 585篇 |
2006年 | 429篇 |
2005年 | 312篇 |
2004年 | 202篇 |
2003年 | 184篇 |
2002年 | 85篇 |
2001年 | 48篇 |
2000年 | 50篇 |
1999年 | 72篇 |
1998年 | 88篇 |
1997年 | 88篇 |
1996年 | 68篇 |
1995年 | 27篇 |
1994年 | 33篇 |
1993年 | 15篇 |
1992年 | 4篇 |
1991年 | 1篇 |
1990年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 1篇 |
1985年 | 19篇 |
1984年 | 29篇 |
1983年 | 25篇 |
1982年 | 16篇 |
1981年 | 5篇 |
1980年 | 8篇 |
1979年 | 10篇 |
1978年 | 7篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有9402条查询结果,搜索用时 0 毫秒
101.
Klaus Kultti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):721-728
We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. 相似文献
102.
Flavio Toxvaerd 《Journal of Economic Theory》2006,129(1):252-272
In most industries, ranging from information systems development to construction, an overwhelming proportion of projects are delayed beyond estimated completion time. This fact constitutes somewhat of a puzzle for existing theory. The present paper studies project delays and optimal contracts under moral hazard in a setting with time to build. Within this setup, project delays are found to be most likely to happen at early stages of development and intimately connected to the degree of commitment of the procurer and the class of contracts that can be enforced. The first-best, optimal spot contracting and optimal long-term contract scenarios are analyzed, as well as commonly encountered additional constraints on the long-term contract. 相似文献
103.
Entry deterrence and innovation in durable-goods monopoly 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper investigates the efficiency of innovation investments in a durable-goods monopoly when a potential entrant threatens to innovate as well. We show that the durability of the good endows the monopolist with the power to discourage rival innovation since current sales alter the demand for a new generation of the good. The equilibrium is therefore determined not only by the incentive for intertemporal price discrimination in durable-goods monopoly, but also by the incumbent's concern for maintaining the technological leadership. We demonstrate that entry deterrence followed by no innovation always implies underinvestment in innovation. 相似文献
104.
Arthur J. Robson 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(1):1-22
Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Queen effect. The selection pressure to reduce a small amount of noise is less than that to increase recall. 相似文献
105.
Isabel Pardo García 《International Advances in Economic Research》2005,11(4):459-467
The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic and social cohesion in the European Union. There are different factors to
explain the convergence process and besides, empirical findings are not conclusive. To the European Union, GDP per head interregional
differences have decreased for certain periods but it has remained unchanged or even increased for others periods. The second
report on the economic and social cohesion indicates that some decades are necessary to eliminate regional differences. These
differences in regional GDP are mainly explained by differences in their productive structures, degree of innovate activity,
communications structures, which depend on the relative level of transport infrastructures, and manpower qualifications. This
analysis allows us to obtain some conclusions to the economic policies and the social cohesion.
A preliminary version of this paper was presented in the 57th International Atlantic Conference, held in Lisbon, Portugal,
March 10–14, 2004. 相似文献
106.
Charles J. Corbett Frank J. C. Debets Luk N. Van Wassenhove 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(3):287-305
Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable. 相似文献
107.
Tariffs, licensing and market structure 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that exclusive owners of an advanced technology are always better off when producing as a monopolist than when competing against another firm. Competition against a less-efficient firm weakens the power that a host country can exert on the incumbent in the form of its tariff policy. We show that this gives a motive for a monopolist to license its technology to another foreign firm. A host country gains more from increased competition if it can induce the foreign incumbent to transfer technology to the host country firm. We show that the host country can do so by tariff commitment. We also discuss the implications of bargaining under licensing and Bertrand competition in the product market. Hence, this paper qualifies and extends the recent work of Kabiraj and Marjit [Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer. European Economic Review 47, 113-124]. 相似文献
108.
In this paper, we analyze the pattern of employment adjustment using a rich panel of Norwegian plants. The data suggest that the frequency of episodes of zero net employment changes is inversely related to plant size. We develop and estimate a simple “q” model of labor demand, allowing for the presence of fixed, linear and quadratic components of adjustment costs. The econometric evidence supports the existence of purely fixed components, unrelated to plant size. As a result, the range of inaction is wider for smaller plants. The quadratic component of costs is also always important. In most specifications fixed costs are higher for employment contractions. The quadratic component is higher during employment contractions compared to expansions for small plants, while this is not true for larger plants. 相似文献
109.
Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities. 相似文献
110.
Dutta et al. (Econometrica 69 (2001) 1013) (Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton—DJLeB) initiate the study of manipulation of voting procedures by a candidate who withdraws from the election. A voting procedure is candidate stable if this is never possible. We extend the DJLeB framework by allowing: (a) the outcome of the procedure to be a set of candidates; (b) some or all of the voters to have weak preference orderings of the candidates. When there are at least three candidates, any strongly candidate stable voting selection satisfying a weak unanimity condition is characterized by a serial dictatorship. This result generalizes Theorem 4 of DJLeB. 相似文献