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51.
In this paper, we analyze a multiple winner rent-seeking contest where the number of winners is set by a self-interested regulator. The winners receive a license to compete in a market. The structure of competition in the market influences the number of winners through the preferences of the regulator. The model indicates that Cournot competitors can be better off than firms that are able to collude on output determination. 相似文献
52.
In intergroup contests a manager advises and motivates her group’s members. Her rewards often depend on the subsequent contest expenditure of the members. I test whether such incentives undermine the credibility and effectiveness of a manager’s efforts. In the different experimental treatments the managers either benefit from very high or low expenditure or get a predetermined payment. The results show that different management incentives shape the expenditure of the group members even if managers have an advisory role only. However, group members follow recommendations more closely if management compensation is not linked to contest expenditures. 相似文献
53.
Pamela?Schmitt Robert?Shupp Kurtis?Swope John?CadiganEmail author 《Economics of Governance》2004,5(3):187-211
This paper develops and experimentally tests a model in which a players effort affects the probability of winning a contest in both the current and future periods. Theory predicts that rent-seeking effort will be shifted forward from later to earlier periods, with no change in overall rent-seeking expenditures relative to the static contest. Experimental results indicate a significant shift forward when carryover is present and that the amount shifted is directly related to the carryover rate. Finally, although experimental expenditures are greater than the equilibrium predictions, overall rent-seeking effort in the carryover contests is lower than in similar static contests.Received: 15 September 2003, Accepted: 15 June 2004 JEL Classification:
D72, C91
Correspondence to: JohnCadigan 相似文献
54.
Johannes Münster 《Economic Theory》2007,32(2):333-352
This paper models the trade-off between production and appropriation in the presence of simultaneous inter- and intra-group
conflicts. The model exhibits a ‘group cohesion effect’: if the contest between the groups becomes more decisive, the players
devote fewer resources to the intra-group conflict. Moreover, there is also a ‘reversed group cohesion effect’: if the intra-group
contests become less decisive, the players devote more resources to the inter-group contest. The model also sheds new light
on normative questions. I derive exact conditions for when dividing individuals into more groups leads to more productive
and less appropriative activities. Moreover, I show that there is an optimal size of the organization which is determined
by a trade-off between increasing returns to scale in production and increasing costs of appropriative activities.
I want to thank Paul Heidhues, Kai Konrad, Thomas Kittsteiner, Klaas Staal, an anonymous referee, and in particular Dan Kovenock
for very helpful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors are mine. Financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft
through SFB/TR 15 is gratefully acknowledged. 相似文献
55.
Summary. We characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria for symmetric rent-seeking contests in which the contest success function is homogeneous of degree zero. The equilibrium strategies have a simple form. We give sufficient conditions for existence of an equilibrium.Received: 11 February 2003, Revised: 27 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D72.
Correspondence to: Andrew J. YatesWe thank Douglas Nelson, Jac Heckelman, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献
56.
论我国信访制度的困境及对策 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
信访制度作为我国一项具有悠久历史源渊和社会基础的制度,在现实生活中发挥着重要作用。但随着改革开改的深入发展,利益关系和社会格局的不断调整,一些深层次的矛盾和冲突进一步加剧。同时,由于人们的民主和法律意识日益增强,从而导致信访高峰、信访寻租等现象的发生。只有将信访制度改革与整个社会现行制度体系结合起来,信访问题才可能得到根本解决,从而走出信访制度运行过程中的困境。 相似文献
57.
This paper analyzes a dynamic lobbying model in which two antagonistic lobbies compete with each other for a prize over two
time periods that are linked through status quo bias. The attacker has to decide whether to attempt an attack on the status
quo already in the first period or whether to wait. We identify how the attacker’s behavior in the dynamic model differs from
that in a comparable static model. Two antagonistic effects are the “option value effect” that is similar to the real option
effect in the theory of investment decisions under uncertainty; and a “defender discouragement effect” that often makes change
cheaper to achieve than in a comparable static model.
相似文献
58.
Kofi O. Nti 《European Journal of Political Economy》1998,14(4):769-781
We study contest performance by focusing on the per capita payoffs of the contestants in an important class of asymmetric two-group contests. The group with the higher valuation has a greater chance of winning the contest whenever the rent-seeking technology is increasing and concave. We note that equilibrium efforts and payoffs per capita are uniquely defined and can be subjected to a comparative statics analysis. We show that payoff per capita for a group increases with its own valuation but decreases with the valuation of the opposing group. Per capita payoff for a group increases with its population. 相似文献
59.
This paper extends the analysis of the n-player all-pay auction with complete information to cover the case of m≤n prizes, valued in weakly decreasing order, but symmetrically across players. We provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium distributions for this class of auctions and provide an exact expression for the expected revenue generated. 相似文献
60.
通过建立的寻租博弈模型从微观视角对西部地区地方政府和企业行为与污水排放量的关系展开探讨可知,由于地方政府和企业之间有一定的利益共融性,寻租现象可能存在。对西部各省面板数据进行实证分析可知,寻租程度和西部污水排放量存在着正相关关系。 相似文献