The Laspeyres-Paradox: tax overshifting in nineteenth century Prussia

Following the seminal work of the late nineteenth century economist Etienne Laspeyres I analyse the incidence of the Prussian milling and slaughter tax shortly before its repeal in 1875. A comparison of flour prices in cities which levied this tax with those that did not reveals unusually strong tax overshifting. Modern theories explain overshifting of a specific tax with quality improvements or imperfect competition. In pursuing these ideas I find that it was rather large surplus costs induced by tax collection and monitoring that caused unusually large excess burdens. The reason why the tax remained basically unchanged for more than half a century is that the urban bourgeoisie successfully prevented its repeal, as the alternative would have been the introduction of municipal direct taxes (rent-seeking behaviour).

Local government centralization and corporate ESG performance: Evidence from China’s county-to-district reform

As a city–county consolidation with Chinese characteristics, China’s county-to-district (CtD) reform transfers a county’s autonomy to a city, thereby strengthening the administrative, decision-making, fiscal and other powers of the prefecture-level municipal government, which effectively enables the centralization of local governments. Based on this exogenous quasi-natural experiment, we use a difference-in-differences (DID) approach to empirically examine the impact of prefecture-level municipal government centralization on companies’ ESG performance. The results show that municipal government centralization can significantly promote corporate ESG performance, which represents environmental protection, social responsibility and corporate governance behavior. The mechanism analysis also shows that the CtD reform can address market segmentation, alleviate policy uncertainty and reduce rent-seeking, which further improves ESG performance.