浅谈医院无形资产的管理

在当今时代，无形资产已成为一项重要的经济资源。本文探讨了医院无形资产的性质、特征及核算内容等，指出医院管理者应提高对无形资产的认识，采取具体有效的管理措施，充分发挥无形资产的巨大威力。     

ERP中工资管理子系统的解决方案研究与实现

提出典型中小制造企业信息化建设中ERP系统整体解决方案,分析了定单式中小企业ERP系统中工资管理子系统与其它子系统的联系、系统体系结构和系统开发实现的关键技术,并重点讨论了基于B/S架构ERP系统中工资管理子系统开发中的一些关键技术.     

把地勘单位推向市场的深层次思考

把地勘单位推向市场是地勘业体制改革的必然选择。只有把地勘单位全面推入商品市场、要素市场、特别是产权交易市场,才能从根本上解决地勘单位营运的激励机制和约束机制。把地勘单位推向市场的实质是把地勘单位塑造为具有“四自”能力的市场主体。为此,必须全面转换地勘单位的经营机制,逐步割断其对国家的依赖关系,使其自主选择市场,立足市场。要进一步深化改革目前不彻底、不完善的两权分离,从不对称性两权分离状态走向对称性两权分离状态。     

小规模企业审计报告对内控制度的考虑

该文从《会计法》对会计信息质量要求出发,阐述建立健全内控制度对保证会计资料真实完整的重要性。指出小规模企业内控制度建立和执行中存在的问题,结合注册会计师审计实务中对内控制度审计的实际情况,对照财政部关于企业内部会计控制的建立、测试、评价的有关规定,提出小规模企业内控制度评价结果对审计报告意见类型具有决定性影响的观点。     

发展特许连锁经营,促进城乡居民就业

本依据我国近年来特许连锁经营发展的形势，阐述了特许连锁经营在民间投资和就业发展上的特有功效，提出了利用特许连锁经营促进我国城乡就业的观点，并指出了需要进一步完善的政策和措施。     

我国超市发展的现状及对策

文章以即将加入WTO ,世界一些知名的经销商将更多地进入中国市场为背景 ,分析了现阶段我国超市经营中存在的问题 ,提出了相应的对策。     

Efficient markets and Bayes’ rule

Summary. A series of financial anomalies motivated the development of new theories that modify the rational expectations ideal. Two possibilities have been systematically explored. The literature on behavioral finance relaxes the assumption that agents form beliefs according to the laws of probability and assume, instead, that simpler heuristic rules are used. Another stream of the literature assumes that agents process information according to Bayes rule, but do not posses sufficient information to know the true data generating process. In this paper, Bayesian and Behavioral agents coexist and trade in a standard dynamic asset pricing model. A long-standing conjecture is demonstrated. It is shown that, under suitable assumptions, Bayesian agents drive Behavioral, non-Bayesian agents out of the market. Hence, asset prices are eventually determined under the Bayesian paradigm.Received: 3 June 2004, Revised: 17 September 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D83.Preliminary versions have circulated under the titles Markets Favor Bayesian Models and Market Selection of Empirical Models under Limited Information. I thank Larry Blume, David Easley, Larry Epstein, Armando Gomes, Bruce Hansen, Lars Hansen, Richard Kihlstrom, Grace Koo, George Mailath, Werner Ploberger, Andrew Postlewaite and Shakeeb Khan for useful comments. I also thank participants at the NBER GE meetings, Evolutionary Finance conference in Zurich, Latin American Meetings of the Econometric Society, Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, the Instituto de Matematica Pura e Aplicada, the theory seminar at Brown, Chicago, Harvard-MIT, Minnesota, Penn and Wisconsin. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the National Science Foundation Grant SES 0109650.     

A simple search model of money with heterogeneous agents and partial acceptability

Summary. Simple search models have equilibria where some agents accept money and others do not. We argue such equilibria should not be taken seriously. This is unfortunate if one wants a model with partial acceptability. We introduce heterogeneous agents and show partial acceptability arises naturally and robustly. There can be multiple equilibria with different degrees of acceptability. Given the type of heterogeneity we allow, the model is simple: equilibria reduce to fixed points in [0,1]. We show that with other forms of heterogeneity equilibria are fixed points in set space, and there is no method to reduce this to a problem in R¹.Received: 4 September 2002, Revised: 23 September 2002JEL Classification Numbers: C78, E40.A. Shevchenko, R. Wright: We thank seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, Indiana University, Purdue University, University of Toronto, the 2002 Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at Vanderbilt University, and the 2001 Conference on Economic Dynamics at the University of Essex. The National Science Foundation and the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland provided financial support. Braz Ministerio de Camargo and Gabriel Camera provided some helpful suggestions. Correspondence to: R. Wright     

Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Summary. This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Received: October 9, 2001; revised version: April 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Licun Xue, Joseph Greenberg and the participants of PET 2000 for very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable comments. The paper has been previously circulated under the title Binding Agreements.     

Human–capital investment and the wage gap

Summary. According to empirical studies, the wage differential by skills evolved non–monotonically in the past decades although the relative supply of skilled labor steadily increased. The present paper provides a theoretical explanation for this finding. In our setting, technological change intertemporally alters the human–capital investment incentives of heterogeneous individuals. As a consequence of changing incentives, the time path of the relative wage is U–shaped while there is a rise in the share of skilled workers. Received: November 28, 2000; revised version: January 30, 2001