第一大股东持股的区间效应——基于上市公司的实证分析

实证结果表明,第一大股东对公司绩效同时存在激励效应和壁垒效应,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效呈显著的N型相关关系,即在第一大股东持股占据绝对控股地位(40%)之前,第一大股东的持股具有积极的治理功能;超过了这个区间,大股东的持股对公司绩效则具有消极作用;而随着第一大股东持股的进一步上升(65%以上),控股股东吸取个人利益的动力又会弱化,大股东股权的增加又会导致公司绩效的增加。此外,第一大股东性质对权益激励的影响也因第一大股东持股区间的不同而异,仅在20%~40%这个区间范围内,国家股与公司绩效呈现负相关关系且结果并不显著,而在其他的区间范围,国家股的持有与公司成长性呈现显著的正相关。     

Pursuing shareholder value: The rhetoric of James Hardie

In this paper we analyse the media release by James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL) announcing the establishment of a separate entity to fund current and future asbestos litigation claims using the interpretive tool of rhetorical criticism. At the centre of the corporate reorganisation which alienated asbestos-related liabilities from the corporate group was the concept of shareholder value. This concept was presented as an unequivocal rationale to persuade the public that the reorganisation would resolve the asbestos liability issue and benefit both shareholders and legitimate asbestos claimants alike. Accounting is implicated by the use of accounting concepts such as assets and liabilities to persuade stakeholders of the financial viability of the new entity. These concepts were presented as objective and unproblematic without consideration of the nuances of accounting measurement, recognition and disclosure criteria.

Using an organisational discourse analysis framework, the media release is ‘dismantled’ to expose the rhetorical strategies used to create particular understandings and to privilege certain interests. The analysis demonstrates the power of a single textual artefact to harness and influence strategic possibilities and serve an organisational strategy.     

股改对流通股股东财富影响的实证研究

我国股市的二元制结构在长期中对证券市场造成了很多的困扰,其中最大的问题是使得证券二级市场的风险增高,从而流通股股东承担着相对过高的成本.2005年4月开始,股权改革开始坚决地实施,本文就股改的结果做出实证检验,发现在股改改后的一段时间里流通股股东利益得到了补偿,并且股改的对价方案对流通股股东的利益影响是最大的.     

剩余索取权分配的理论依据比较研究

剩余索取权的分配是企业治理结构中一个重要的问题,它关系到企业的治理效率和企业目标的实现。股东至上理论和利益相关者理论对这个问题作出了各自的回答,然而,长期利益共同体理论却以资产专有性为依据,认为核心要素才是剩余索取权的分配主体,同时这个主体既可能是一元的,也可能是多元的,从而建构了一个介于两者之间的理论构想。     

有限责任公司之名义股东法律地位探析

有限责任公司的名义股东是因实际出资人隐名出资而形成的具备股东形式要件但未实际出资的主体.就名义股东的法律地位认定问题,理论界有实质说、形式说和内外区别说三种观点,这三种观点都各持理由但也都存在着难以克服的缺陷.<公司法司法解释(三)>为解决部分问题提供了依据,但在理论上仍应从外观主义的角度入手,符合外观主义的适用条件时...     

Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

The widespread practice of earnings management adversely impacts the quality of financial reports and increases information asymmetries between owners and managers. The present study investigates the effect of shareholder activism (as expressed by the proxy proposals sponsored by shareholders), and monitoring by the largest institutional owner on earnings management. Our longitudinal analyses indicate that the number of shareholder proposals received by firms is positively related to subsequent earnings management, yet concurrently, monitoring by the largest institutional owners is negatively related to earnings management. Our findings shed light on the equivocal results reported by prior research regarding the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, on one hand, and ownership monitoring and performance, on the other.     

CEO turnover and shareholder wealth: Evidence from CEO power in Taiwan

This paper investigates the relationship between CEO turnovers and shareholder wealth and/or the volatility of firm performance, and examines whether CEO power matters in this relationship. Successors tend to possess less power than predecessors. The announcement effects of CEO turnovers present higher abnormal returns for turnovers in which predecessors and successors share a similar power level and a lower volatility for turnovers in which successors have less power. Volatility is lower and liquidity is higher when CEO turnovers involve successors with less power.     

Protective governance choices and the value of acquisition activity

Protective governance structure is often viewed as costly to minority shareholders who bear the costs of opportunism by entrenched managers. A less common view is that protective governance encourages value-enhancing initiative, allowing risk-averse managers to pursue projects they would otherwise forgo. To assess these views we examine the acquisition decisions of S&P 500 firms between 1994 and 2005 and document two entrenching dimensions of governance: founding family presence and larger boards with more inside directors. We find that family firms destroy value when they acquire, consistent with an agency cost explanation for acquisitions. In contrast, firms with large boards and more insiders are more likely to acquire and to create value when they do acquire. These results are consistent with benefits to managerial initiative when managers are insulated from discipline. Finally, we find no systematic evidence that shareholder right limiting provisions either facilitate managerial entrenchment or lead to wealth losses through acquisition activity.     

道义论自由主义正义观的救治——迈克尔·桑德尔的正义理论

美国哈佛大学教授迈克尔.桑德尔在对以约翰.罗尔斯为代表的当代道义论自由主义正义观的批判中建构起"内在于善"的正义理论。内在于善的正义理论力倡:建基于善的正义并非优先于善,在社会诸美德词典式排序中也非占据首要位置,这种正义理论的哲学人类学基础是构成性或主体间、主体内的自我观,社会正义的分配原则只能是以社群为道德基础的差异原则。