Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

控股股东行为、资产专用性与企业成长性——来自云南白药的案例研究

本文以云南白药为案例,探讨了资产专用性对控股股东行为的影响。研究发现控股股东可以为上市公司提供控股股东专有或者控制的地理位置、品牌资产、购销网络渠道、研发技术、人力资本、物质资源等特殊资产,从而使得这些资产具有资产专用性。由于这种专用资产的投入,使得控股股东与上市公司之间产生了捆绑效应,捆绑效应抑制了使契约关系中断的控股股东的机会主义行为,控股股东与上市公司形成了一种协作局面,这种协作对于上市公司的成长具有重要的影响。然而,受到捆绑效应影响的控股股东行为与企业的成长性之间并非是一种理想的单调函数关系,有时会表现出捆绑效应失灵的特征,由此本文提出了公司治理变量在专用资产对控股股东行为的捆绑效应和企业成长性之间的调节作用。     

投资者保护、大股东持股比例与现金持有量

以2005～2011年沪深两市A股391家上市公司为样本研究投资者保护、大股东持股比例和现金持有量的关系,研究结果表明,大股东持股比例与现金持有量间呈倒"U"型关系。进一步按照投资者保护程度的高低对样本进行分组,研究发现,当大股东持股比例小于48%时,投资者保护程度高的组,大股东持股比例和现金持有量呈显著正相关关系;当大股东持股比例大于48%时,投资者保护程度高的组,大股东持股比例和现金持有量呈显著负相关关系。     

Choosing the Right Metrics to Maximize Profitability and Shareholder Value

There is an ever-present need for managers to justify marketing expenditures to the firm. This can only be done when we can establish a direct link between marketing metrics and future customer value and firm performance. In this article, we assess the marketing literature with regard to marketing metrics. Subsequently, we develop a framework that identifies key metrics that firms should focus on that can give a firm a better picture of how they got to where they are now and insights towards how they can continue to grow into the future. We then identify several organizational challenges that need to be addressed in order for firms to build the capabilities of collecting the right data, measuring the right metrics, and linking those metrics to customer value and firm performance. Finally, we offer guidelines for future research with regard to marketing metrics to help firms establish successful marketing strategies, measure marketing effectiveness, and justify marketing expenditures to top management.     

大股东掏空与支持:来自中国上市公司的实证检验

国内外现有关于大股东掏空的研究,或孤立研究掏空问题,或虽结合支持研究但其背景依据不适合中国。为此,笔者针对中国上市公司广泛存在的融资限制,借鉴性引入投资对现金流敏感度分析思路,对我国上市公司控股大股东的掏空和支持行为进行了实证检验,研究结果提供了我国上市公司控股大股东掏空和支持行为的经验证据,同时也验证了Friedman等(2003)关于掏空和支持是对称的观点。     

Reexamining dual-class stock

Snapchat’s initial public offering, which provided shares with no voting rights, is a culmination of the growing trend of dual-class shares. It contradicts the precept of one-share, one-vote that is essential for corporate democracy. Snapchat’s action caused an uproar among influential investors. In January 2017, a coalition of the world’s biggest money managers, which together control more than $17 trillion in assets, demanded a total ban on dual-class shares. We reason that the increasing prominence of dual-class stock is explained by the confluence of three economic trends: the growing importance of intangible investments, the rise of activist investors, and the decline of staggered boards and poison pills. A dual-class structure offers immunity against proxy contests initiated by short-term investors. It enables managers to ignore capital market pressures and to avoid myopic actions such as cutting research and development, which hurt companies in the long term. Thus, a dual-class structure is optimal in certain scenarios. We put forth alternatives to dual-class structure that enable managers to maintain control while retaining focus on sustainable value creation.     

When the CEO is ill: Keeping quiet or going public?

CEOs represent the pinnacle of leadership in organizations. In addition to power and prestige, constant media scrutiny and pressures to exceed past levels of firm performance are often associated with this role. Although CEOs may rely on other top managers for input regarding operational decisions and long-term planning, the outcomes of strategic initiatives rest solely on their shoulders. Moreover, how CEOs are depicted in the press can greatly affect public opinion about their organizations. In recent years, CEO health and health concerns have made headlines for such well-known companies as McDonald's, Clorox, Pilgrim's Pride, and EarthLink. In this article we discuss the ramifications of disclosure and non-disclosure of serious CEO health issues, and their potential impact on shareholder wealth and succession planning. We conclude by offering a few thoughts about the future direction of CEO health.     

中国中心城市第二住宅的地理空间分布特征

1990年代后期第二住宅在中国大量兴起,并成为一种社会风潮。大量涌现的第二住宅对其发生地产生了复杂的社会、经济影响,最为突出的是拉动房价上涨,使得矛盾原本就比较突出的住房问题进一步恶化。文章从第二住宅研究的障碍、难点着手,首先分析了国内发展和研究的状况,随后对西方和国内发展状况和空间布局研究动向进行了剖析。在此基础上,采用补偿理论对中国第二住宅的空间分布特征进行假设性分析,认为中心城市第二住宅的发育与首位度具有密切的关系,并且存在向内城集聚的倾向。这一研究结论可以作为政策制定和其它研究的参考。     

政策偏向、省会首位度与城市规模分布

2010年后,部分省份强化了提升省内中心城市首位度的政策导向,这种以行政手段提升首位度的做法,会对城镇格局以及居民福利产生怎样的影响?本文基于量化空间模型,将影响城市规模的因素分解为生产率、用地指标、用地结构、就业机会、外生舒适度与住房有效供给率等维度,利用反事实方法评估了提升首位度的相关政策对居民福利、GDP以及城市规模分布的影响。研究发现:①当省级层面给予省会及副省级城市更多用地指标时,可以在提高这些城市首位度的同时提升总体GDP水平,但会导致均衡时居民福利水平有所降低;②GDP与福利的非同步变动,源于户籍制度影响下人口要素与土地要素的空间错配,即省会及副省级城市人口集聚不足而一般地级市用地约束加强;③若降低落户门槛或消除省内城市间住房有效供给率的差异,均能使GDP与福利水平同时提高,且城市规模分布向Zipf定律收敛。为此,以提升经济密度为导向,以渐进的户籍改革为手段推动人口向省会及副省级城市集聚,多管齐下提高省会及副省级城市住房有效供给水平,是优化城市规模分布、实现新型城镇化高质量发展的关键。     

产权性质、第一大股东与代理成本

通过分析产权性质、第一大股东持股比例与代理成本之间的关系,实证研究结果发现产权性质对于代理成本有着显著影响,其中国有企业与非国有企业相比,代理成本显著较低。在此基础上,分别研究了第一大股东持股比例对于代理成本的影响,结论显示在国有企业中,无论使用营业管理费用率还是资产周转率作为代理变量,第一大股东持股比例均与代理成本负相关,而非国有企业仅在以资产周转率为代理变量时有着显著的负相关关系。