论中国软件外包产业与CMM的是与非

中国软件外包产业对CMM的追求不能盲目、不能神化,但也不能完全排斥,而应借鉴CMM的方法,改进软件企业的管理,提高软件开发水平,以提高我国软件在国际市场上的竞争力。     

生态法治对债券融资成本的影响——基于我国环保法庭设立的准自然实验

实现经济增长和“双碳”生态目标相协调的高质量发展,既需要在全面绿色转型中充分发挥金融市场重要的资源配置导向作用,也离不开强有力的生态环境法治保障。本文基于我国中级人民法院环保法庭设立的准自然实验,运用渐进三重差分方法检验生态法治建设对我国信用债券融资成本的影响。研究发现,环保法庭设立后,当地高污染行业企业面临环境政策转型风险,其债券融资成本相对低污染行业企业显著增加。本文提出并验证了中级环保法庭设立的诉讼风险效应、维权监督效应、经营成本效应和决策制约效应。进一步分析发现,环保法庭设立对债券融资成本的影响在法律环境更好、政府环境治理激励更强的样本中更大。在考虑环保法庭设立内生性等稳健性检验后,主要结论依然成立。本文补充了地区环境司法能力提升促进资本市场绿色导向功能的经验证据,拓宽了“法与金融”的研究视角,为生态法治建设和市场主导下的经济绿色转型提供了有益启示。     

流动性过剩、通货膨胀与货币政策

当前经济下滑的基本原因是人民币升值,而人民币升值的主要原因是对通货膨胀的预期和对流动性过剩的估计有偏差.当前宏观调控的主要任务是保持经济稳定增长.宏观调控政策应定位于平衡的财政政策和稳健的货币政策组合.财政应当量入为出,收支平衡,努力压减行政支出;货币应当稳定汇率,调整利息,以便引导和控制信贷规模,调整贷款结构.     

现实政府供给公共物品的困惑——从公共物品供给效率的考察

以一个仁慈的、完全信息型政府供给公共物品的效率标准模型为基准,就不同预算约束下公共物品政府供给的效率及原因进行分析.比较不同预算约束、经济人假设情况下政府供给的效率.在经济人政府假设下,不论软预算约束还是硬预算约束,政府提供公共物品都存在效率问题:会出现过多和过少的供给,从而产生公共物品的供给浪费或不足,政府难以提供最适的公共物品水平.     

从美国次贷危机看金融创新与金融监管的关系

2007年爆发的美国次贷危机,是一场在高度证券化和高度衍生产品化的金融体系中,由金融创新所引发、因货币政策和政府监管失误所造成的系统性金融危机。本文通过美国次贷危机中暴露出来的金融创新与金融监管问题,提出了加强对金融创新监管的对策。     

Financial regulation and securitization: Evidence from subprime loans

We examine the consequences of existing regulations on the quality of mortgage loans originations in the originate-to-distribute (OTD) market. The information asymmetries in the OTD market can lead to moral hazard problems on the part of lenders. We find, using a plausibly exogenous source of variation in the ease of securitization, that the quality of loan origination varies inversely with the amount of regulation: more regulated lenders originate loans of worse quality. We interpret this result as a possible evidence that the fragility of lightly regulated originators’ capital structure can mitigate moral hazard. In addition, we find that incentives which require mortgage brokers to have ‘skin in the game’ and stronger risk management departments inside the bank partially alleviate the moral hazard problem in this setting. Finally, having more lenders inside a mortgage pool is associated with higher quality loans, suggesting that sharper relative performance evaluation made possible by more competition among contributing lenders can also mitigate the moral hazard problem to some extent. Overall, our evidence suggests that market forces rather than regulation may have been more effective in mitigating moral hazard in the OTD market. The findings caution against policies that impose stricter lender regulations which fail to align lenders’ incentives with the investors of mortgage-backed securities.     

Bank Competition and Financial Stability

Under the traditional “competition-fragility” view, more bank competition erodes market power, decreases profit margins, and results in reduced franchise value that encourages bank risk taking. Under the alternative “competition-stability” view, more market power in the loan market may result in higher bank risk as the higher interest rates charged to loan customers make it harder to repay loans, and exacerbate moral hazard and adverse selection problems. The two strands of the literature need not necessarily yield opposing predictions regarding the effects of competition and market power on stability in banking. Even if market power in the loan market results in riskier loan portfolios, the overall risks of banks need not increase if banks protect their franchise values by increasing their equity capital or engaging in other risk-mitigating techniques. We test these theories by regressing measures of loan risk, bank risk, and bank equity capital on several measures of market power, as well as indicators of the business environment, using data for 8,235 banks in 23 developed nations. Our results suggest that—consistent with the traditional “competition-fragility” view—banks with a higher degree of market power also have less overall risk exposure. The data also provides some support for one element of the “competition-stability” view—that market power increases loan portfolio risk. We show that this risk may be offset in part by higher equity capital ratios.

环境约束下地区工业生产率增长的异质性研究

采用SML指数法测算1998—2008年全国各地区环境约束下的工业TFP指数,进而采用PSTR模型探索工业TFP变化及地区差异的原因。实证分析表明,TFP增长已成为我国工业增长的重要驱动力,技术进步是工业TFP增长的源泉,相对效率的改善十分微弱,而近年来我国的环保努力和国际金融危机分别对工业TFP增长率形成了正向和反向的冲击。PSTR回归分析显示各地区环境约束下的工业TFP增长具有明确的异质性,多个解释变量对工业TFP增长的影响在模型的高、低体制下具有显著的差异。     

Trading Prior to the Disclosure of Material Information: Evidence from Regulation Fair Disclosure Form 8‐Ks*

Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) Form 8‐K filings provide a venue where managers release information to the market as a whole that they designate as being material. Using this setting, we study trading patterns immediately prior to the public disclosure of material information. We offer three main results. First, using both intraday and daily trading data, we find abnormal trading volume of 21 percent (13 percent) in the hour (day) prior to the public disclosure, respectively. Second, we find that this pre‐disclosure abnormal trading volume is concentrated in firms that are smaller, have more growth opportunities, issue fewer voluntary disclosures, and have weaker external monitoring. Finally, we find that this pre‐disclosure volume is concentrated in subsamples in which the information relates to a firm's material contracts, a firm holds investor/analyst conferences, and there is insider trading activity in a firm's shares. Our results do not concentrate in a small number of firms or industries, and do not appear to be explained by the form through which managers first release the material information (e.g., Form 8‐K, press release, website posting, or social media). Our results are also robust to controlling for the firm's other filings and peer filings that occur around the disclosure. Overall, the trading patterns we document may show that, inconsistent with the spirit of Reg FD, a subset of investors trade on information managers deem material prior to its broad, public release.     

基于食品营养与食品安全监管并重的应用分析

随着生活水平的不断提升,人们逐渐认识到了健康的重要性,对于食品安全的关注也越来越高。本文简要阐述了食品营养与食品安全监管的现状,通过了解其存在的不足,提出将两者结合应用的有效措施,致力于更好地提升食品安全,为人们的健康饮食提供一定的保障。