STRATEGIC ORIENTATION,CAPABILITIES, AND PERFORMANCE IN MANUFACTURER — 3PL RELATIONSHIPS

This study examines how two dimensions of strategic orientation (customer and competitor orientation) influence logistics and market performance. Two capabilities, operational flexibility and collaboration, are studied. Data were collected from manufacturers working with third party logistics providers. The findings suggest that customer and competitor orientations have different influences upon performance when leveraged through the capabilities. Competitor orientation, while having a detrimental direct effect on logistics performance, appears to be the better strategic approach, when supported with operational flexibility since it results in enhanced logistics (efficiency) and market (effectiveness) performance. Customer orientation, on the other hand, greatly improves logistics performance, i.e., internal efficiency.     

Cyber-coordinating Mechanism and Strategic Management Accounting

Based on the analysis of the need of a new coordinating mechanism in cyber-value chain, this paper puts forward a cyber-coordinating mechanism, which is a mechanism between market mechanism and firm hierarchical mechanism. It is the theoretical basic point for setting up the system of Strategic Management Accounting in cyber-value chain. This paper conducts the model of Strategic Management Accounting based on cyber-coordinating mechanism, and presents evidence from a case study that was conducted to understand the impact of disintegration on original suppliers and of reintegration on new suppliers in order to support our cyber-coordinating mechanism hypothesis and the application value of the new model of strategic management accounting in cyber-value chain.     

A theory of global strategic alliances: The case of the global auto industry

The theory articulated in this paper suggests that the desire to reduce demand and competitive uncertainty are two separate, important motives for alliance formation. Taking this as a starting point, we predict the configuration of horizontal alliances that we might expect to observe within an industry when firms experience these uncertainties to different degrees. An empirical test of this theory using data from the global auto industry yields results consistent with the view (1) that alliances are a device for reducing both the uncertainties that arise from unpredictable demand conditions and those that arise from competitive interdependence, and (2) that variation of demand uncertainty and competitive uncertainty across firms explains differentials in both the intensity and structure of their horizontal alliance activity.     

Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

A dynamic approach to the analysis of strategic alliances

The increasing trend in strategic alliance formation between major firms around the world, has prompted researchers from various disciplines to look at this phenomenon in great detail. In this paper, we review alternate approaches in the literature in this area. We then propose a non-linear dynamic approach to study the formation of competitive strategic alliances and contrast it with the traditional game-theoretic approach. The pros and cons of these two approaches are discussed with reference to a competitive alliance scenario. Dynamic models have significant managerial implications as they enable us to investigate ‘if-then’ type scenarios and project the impact of different strategies.     

A strategic human resource perspective of firm competitive behavior

Embedded within firms are unique stores of intangible human assets that likely influence the way firms compete. We argue that the human and social capital of a firm, particularly at the upper echelon and board of director (BOD) levels, contribute to the firm's awareness of the competitive environment and its motivation and ability to undertake numerous, complex, and forceful competitive actions. We also suggest that the firm's executive compensation systems moderate the effects of these intangible human assets on firm competitive behavior. By examining how human capital, intra-firm social capital, and executive compensation influence firm competitive behavior, we advance a strategic HRM perspective of firm competitive behavior and outline several implications for future research.     

Infrastructure provision and international market share rivalry

The paper examines a model of strategic infrastructure investment. Two oligopolistic firms compete on home and foreign product markets for market shares. The national governments support the firms in the market rivalry by providing cost reducing public infrastructure services that are financed out of taxing an input used in the production process. It is shown, that infrastructure policy can be used as an instrument for strategic trade policy. However, governments are facing the problem of balancing the burden of taxation and the benefits of infrastructures. The theoretical model also raises some critical issues with respect to the policy relevance of recent empirical infrastructure research.     

战略无形资产、商誉与企业持续竞争优势

本文运用“资源基础论”分析了战略无形资产与企业持续竞争优势和超额利润之间的关系,论述了现行财务会计模式对战略无形资产信息的综合反映形式。认为商誉是现行财务会计模式对企业持续竞争优势的综合反映形式,其本质是在现行财务会计模式下无法单独入账的企业战略无形资产,商誉的性质实际上是战略无形资产性质的外在综合表现,外购商誉的本质是被收购企业未入账的战略无形资产,外购商誉的会计处理应该依据并购后被收购企业战略无形资产价值的增减变动情况来决定。     

独立董事、战略审计与公司绩效

关于独立董事与公司绩效呈现弱相关关系的一个假说性解释是:独立董事对于作为关键绩效驱动因素的公司战略管理过程参与不足。独立董事积极参与公司战略管理的功能定位是战略监督与评价,而战略审计作为正式的战略监督与评价程序,是独立董事深入公司战略管理过程以提高其绩效贡献的有效途径。本文认为,在我国推行独立董事战略审计制度,必须解决独立董事人数与比例、审计委员会设置、独立董事来源与结构以及激励与权益保护等相关问题。