Domestic and international strategic interactions in environment policy formation

Summary. In this paper, we establish the most possilbe general formulation of the technology governing carbon-gas emission, giving rise to global external diseconomies, and ty to explore into the strategic interactions,both domestic and international, when an individual country decides on the environmental policies. Through the comparison among emission taxes, quotas, and standard in the perfectly competitive private economies, we find that the first two policies are equivalent but they are different in effects by virtue of what we may call the tax-exemption effect of emission standards. Such a difference in the policy effect further affects the other country's welfare through the global externalities, amplified through whether the government can precommit to either the emission tax or the emission standard. Received: January 16, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The authors thank the valuable comments by an anonymous referee. Ministry of Education and Science for its financial support is also greatly acknowledged. Correspondence to:K. Kiyono     

Extensive-form games and strategic complementarities

I prove the subgame-perfect equivalent of the basic result for Nash equilibria in normal-form games of strategic complements: the set of subgame-perfect equilibria is a nonempty, complete lattice—in particular, subgame-perfect Nash equilibria exist. For this purpose I introduce a device that allows the study of the set of subgame-perfect equilibria as the set of fixed points of a correspondence. My results are limited because extensive-form games of strategic complementarities turn out—surprisingly—to be a very restrictive class of games.     

国际战略联盟及其相关理论研究

就国际战略联盟的定义规范、与其他合作形式的区别及其相关的理论进行分析 ,指出多角度、跨学科地研究国际战略联盟是非常必要的。     

Strategic trading and learning about liquidity

Many practitioners point out that the speculative profits of institutional traders are eroded by the difficulty in gauging the price impact of their trades. In this paper, we develop a model of strategic trading where speculators face such a dilemma because of incomplete information about time-varying market liquidity. Unlike the competitive market makers that they trade against, informed traders do not know the distribution of liquidity (“noise”) trades. Instead, they have to learn about liquidity from past prices and trading volume. This learning implies that strategic trades and market statistics such as informational efficiency are path-dependent on past market outcomes. Our paper also has normative implications for practitioners.     

Organizational resources enabling service responsiveness: Evidence from Greece

This article examines the implementation of relationship marketing strategy based on a sample of business-to-business firms operating in Greece. Organizational resources, including a focus on learning and flexibility/adaptation in strategic planning, are demonstrated to be antecedents of effective relationship marketing strategies. The possession of these resources lead to superior customer performance (as measured by customer satisfaction and loyalty) and, ultimately, superior financial performance (as measured by profit levels, profit margin, and ROI). Our results provide support for the development of organizational resources that foster and enable relationship marketing in business-to-business environments since such resources are linked with improved firm performance.     

The contingent value of marketing strategy innovativeness for product development performance in Chinese new technology ventures

This study extends research on entrepreneurial behavior by investigating the relationship between the marketing strategy innovativeness (MSI) and new product performance in technology-based new ventures in China. Specifically, premised on contingent resource-based view we argue that MSI is a firm capability that must be bundled with external managerial relationships and be deployed in the appropriate environment to ensure its success. We found that the team's extra industry relationships and market dynamism enhanced the impact of MSI on new product performance. In contrast, top management team's intraindustry relationships, financial relationships, and technology dynamism hindered the impact of MSI on new product performance.     

Competitive strategies,innovation, and firm performance: an empirical study in a developing economy environment

This paper studies the relationships between competitive strategies, innovation, and firm performance within the context of Turkish manufacturing companies. The data were collected from top management of the firms via Computer Assistant Telephone Interviewing method. One hundred and forty manufacturing firms operating in various sectors including textile, automotive supply, computer and electronics provide the basis for this empirical research. In order to test our model, we employ structural equation modelling using partial least squares. The results show that competitive strategies such as cost-leadership and differentiation can lead to innovation, which, in turn, increase firm performance. Managers implement cost-leadership and differentiation strategies to take part in competitive market conditions; however, they should put additional importance on innovation that plays a significant role as a bridge between competitive strategies and firm performance.     

The geometry of voting power: Weighted voting and hyper-ellipsoids

Suppose legislators represent districts of varying population, and their assembly's voting rule is intended to implement the principle of one person, one vote. How should legislators' voting weights appropriately reflect these population differences? An analysis requires an understanding of the relationship between voting weight and some measure of the influence that each legislator has over collective decisions. We provide three new characterizations of weighted voting that embody this relationship. Each is based on the intuition that winning coalitions should be close to one another. The locally minimal and tightly packed characterizations use a weighted Hamming metric. Ellipsoidal separability employs the Euclidean metric: a separating hyper-ellipsoid contains all winning coalitions, and omits losing ones. The ellipsoid's proportions, and the Hamming weights, reflect the ratio of voting weight to influence, measured as Penrose–Banzhaf voting power. In particular, the spherically separable rules are those for which voting powers can serve as voting weights.     

互联网能力与知识能力交互效应对知识创造绩效的传导机制:一个被中介的调节效应模型

整合资源基础观、知识基础观和动态能力理论，探讨互联网背景下互联网能力、知识能力两种企业内部因素交互作用对知识创造绩效的影响过程，尤其关注了具有前瞻性与反应性特征的战略柔性在这一过程中的重要作用，从而构建了一个被中介的调节效应模型。基于我国399家企业调研数据发现，互联网能力、知识能力均对战略柔性有显著正向影响；互联网能力与知识能力的交互作用通过战略柔性的中介机制促进企业知识创造绩效提升，即存在被中介的调节效应。在理论上，丰富了资源基础观和知识基础观在组织竞争优势构建方面的前因研究，在实践上，为处于互联网背景下的企业有效提升知识创造绩效提供了实践参考。     

Robustness to strategic uncertainty

We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.