中国非金融企业债券市场监管的博弈论分析

本文分析了中国非金融企业债券监管的现状,归纳总结出我国监管模式的主要特征,然后运用博弈论分析方法,分析中国非金融企业债券监管模式的市场效率,重点分析了分工监管模式的利弊以及信息披露制度对非金融企业债券市场效率的影响。     

Market discipline in international banking regulation: Keeping the playing field level

The focus of this article is the debt market as a powerful disciplinarian source for large and complex banking organizations around the world. We empirically study the interactions between reinforcing banks’ market discipline and preserving a level playing field in international banking. Our approach consists of conducting cross-country comparisons of the secondary market prices sensitivity to market measures of bank risk (traditional and financial strength ratings). The results are generally consistent with the market discipline paradigm. However, much progress still needs to be made (especially in Japan and certain European countries) in order to make the level playing field principle compatible with the reinforcement of market discipline on an international level.     

我国商业银行次级债信用评级的应用分析

作为改革的重要一步,我国商业银行现在被允许发行次级债。次级债在我国还是一个新生事物,是在我国银行业全面对外开放最后期限将至,而国内银行资本严重不足的情况下出现的,商业银行通过发行次级债,能够较快地补充资本金,是一种市场化的好办法。信用评级已经有近百年的历史,目前在西方国家的银行次级债发行中的应用已经十分广泛。本文针对商业银行次级债的外部信用评级进行了研究。并提出了建立和完善信用评级体系来规范我国商业银行次级债发行,保护投资者利益的一些建议和措施。     

Credit agency regulation and the impact of credit ratings in the international bond market

The use of credit ratings in financial and other legal documents — both in the USA and Europe —, has led to a situation in which the major rating agencies have become (largely unwilling) participants in the legislative process. This situation has become partly formalized in the US (and is being repeated elsewhere in the European Union, Eastern Europe and Latin America) through the creation of officially ‘recognized’ agencies whose ratings now carry the imprimatur of the Securities and Exchange Commission. The purpose of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the necessity for formal legal status to be sustained in the market for bond credit ratings. In this context, the criteria for a credible rating agency are examined and evidence is provided on one element of the criteria which is under-researched: namely, the impact of the ratings in the market place. The influence of rating agencies in international capital markets is assessed through an analysis of the impact of ratings on the yields of bonds, represented by a comprehensive sample of actively traded debt. The sample contains analysis of ratings introductions on both new and seasoned debt and also examines the impact of ratings revisions. It is concluded that official recognition has no market-based role and it is argued that ratings are used by regulators because of the success of the major agencies in performing their market function.     

常州市企业债券发行特点及经验借鉴

常州市是发行企业债券成绩显著的城市之一,本文对其企业债券发行的担保方式、发行规模和发行主体等方面的特点和经验做法进行总结,以期为其他城市发行企业债券提供参考。     

美国金融危机成因分析及对我国的警示

美国金融危机引发全球金融市场动荡。这场金融危机从美国的房地产市场开始,以惊人的速度蔓延,波及信贷市场、资本市场,对全球尤其是西方金融机构和金融市场造成重大冲击,短期内升级为全球金融风暴。我国目前正处于资产价格上涨、信贷投放过度的经济环境之中,美国的金融危机给我国敲响了警钟。本文通过描述此次危机的发展脉络,在分析美国金融危机背景的基础之上,从强化房地产按揭贷款业务风险管理、审慎推进资产证券化等六个方面得出了对我国的警示。     

我国上市公司可转换债券发行的财富效应研究

本文运用事件研究方法对可转换债券的发行是否具有财富效应进行了实证分析,结果表明我国上市公司可转换债券的发行不具有明显的财富效应。这一结果与国外的多数相关研究有较大差别,本文对此进行了探讨。     

未预期货币政策与企业债券信用利差——基于固浮利差分解的研究

本文利用固息债与浮息债利差将货币政策分解成预期和未预期部分,进而探讨未预期货币政策对企业债券市场信用利差所产生的动态影响与非对称效应。实证结果表明:第一,未预期货币政策对企业债券信用利差的影响更为显著;第二,在经济周期的繁荣时期,未预期货币政策对企业债券信用利差的作用更大;第三,对比不同期限的企业债,货币政策对中长期企业债信用利差的作用更为显著,而对短期的影响较小。     

可转换债券首发日股价效应研究

本文对我国可转换债券首发日的股价效应进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,可转债首发日存在显著非零的股价效应。这表明市场对可转债融资行为的反应有一个过程,并非董事会拟发行可转债公告后市场就已经消化了公告的内容。本文的回归结果表明,可转债首发日异常收益与流通股比例显著负相关。这说明,首发日显著为负的累积异常收益）,可由流通股比例来解释,流通股比例越大的公司,首发日异常收益越小,即负得越多,反之亦然。     

Tariff retaliation versus financial compensation in the enforcement of international trade agreements

We analyze whether financial compensation is preferable to the WTO's current dispute settlement system that permits injured member countries to impose retaliatory tariffs. We show that, ex-post, monetary fines are more efficient than tariffs in terms of granting compensation to injured parties but fines suffer from an enforcement problem since they must be paid by the violating country. If fines must ultimately be supported by the threat of tariffs, they fail to yield a more cooperative outcome than the use of tariffs alone. Furthermore, the exchange of bonds between symmetric countries also does not improve enforcement relative to retaliatory tariffs.