民营化、国有化与中国国有银行改革

国有银行自上世纪70年代中期以来出现了民营化的国际趋势,一些国家因此发生了银行危机.而此前全球曾有过国有化浪潮.虽然国有银行效率比民营银行低,但经验研究却表明,国有银行与银行危机之间没有或很少有因果关系;而且由于有政府信誉担保不易发生挤兑.中国国有银行改革过程实际上是政府逐步放弃控制权的过程,但切不可因效率而忽视金融稳定;简单地依靠所有权变更无法解决国有银行脆弱性问题;而且,与境外战略投资者合作时要谨防金融主权失控风险.     

提高借贷资本效率综论

我国借贷资本效率不断下降,金融机构贷款和货币供应量大幅度增加.但仍不足以扭转通货紧缩趋势,其原因是多方面的,其中最重要的原因是单一的融资形式和融资渠道,造成社会资本循环周转阻滞.不能仅靠增加贷款量和货币供应量来解决通货紧缩问题,而应该综合治理,特别是要发展、完善金融市场,发展多种融资形式,盘活货币资本存量,用好增量,提高借贷资本效率,使货币和信贷在促进经济增长中发挥更好的作用.     

我国再保险公司效率测度研究——基于三阶段DEA模型的分析

利用三阶段 DEA 模型对我国再保险市场上的8家再保险公司2007~2012年的效率进行研究,发现就整体而言其纯技术效率较高,但是由于规模效率较低导致其技术效率不高;规模的不经济是造成其资源浪费、技术效率较低的原因,而不是因为经营管理水平较差。从公司性质的角度来看,外资再保险公司的规模效率要远远差于中资再保险公司,而其纯技术效率与中资再保险公司无显著性差异。     

污染排放约束下中国农业水资源效率的区域差异与影响因素

应用数据包络分析（DEA）构建了非径向方向性距离函数模型,采用全要素水资源效率的测度思路,对污染排放约束下中国分省及区域的农业水资源效率进行了测度,并采用Bootstrap断尾回归模型对污染排放下农业水资源效率的影响因素进行了实证研究。2011年、2012年全国农业平均用水效率分别为0.693、0.671,全国一半以上的省份未达到生产前沿。在八大区域中,北部沿海和黄河中游地区的农业水资源效率最高,西北和东北地区的农业水资源效率处于低水平。在诸多影响因素中,农田水利建设和环境规制对于提升我国农业水资源效率具有显著的促进作用,而水资源丰裕程度对其则具有显著的负面影响。     

Water pricing and water allocation in israel

Marginal valuation of water is complicated because water authorities in most countries do not equate prices across users. Standard analyses imply that unequal valuation of water by users is inefficient and that economic efficiency can be improved by equating prices after accounting for transportation costs. Such inefficiencies are usually explained by the influence of political interest groups. We suggest alternatively that motivations such as food self-sufficiency, ideological settlement objectives, equity, and long run considerations may take precedence over short-run economic efficiency in Israeli water markets. If so, new peace accords, water projects, and water price equalization appear to have important complementary effects when exploited in combination.     

欧盟紧凑型荧光灯生态设计要求比较分析与应对

本文介绍了欧盟新颁法规《非定向型家用灯的生态设计要求》中对紧凑型荧光灯光效能、功能性和信息等3个方面的生态设计要求,并比较了这些生态设计要求与我国国家标准的差异,提出了出口企业和检验检疫部门的应对措施。     

Do capital requirements affect cost efficiency? Evidence from China

This paper contributes to the debate on the effect of capital requirements on cost efficiency. We study the relation between capital ratio and cost efficiency for Chinese banks over the period 2004–2009, taking advantage of the profound regulatory changes in capital requirements that occurred during this period to measure the exogenous impact of an increase in the capital ratio on banks’ cost efficiency. We find that such an increase has a positive effect on cost efficiency, the size of which depends to an extent on the bank's ownership type. Our results therefore suggest that capital requirements can improve cost efficiency.     

管理黑洞与超执行力组织研究

对管理黑洞进行重新释义,并尝试从管理能量流和信息流的角度来阐明组织的三个特性和管理的时序性促成管理黑洞的形成;然后通过建立数学模型,求出影响管理黑洞扩散的因素;最后提出了建立超执行力组织来防治管理黑洞的思想.     

Efficiency in Crime Prevention: A Study of Lisbon’s Police Precincts

This article analyses the technical efficiency of Lisbon’s police precincts by evaluating their relative performance. It starts from the assumption that there is time‐varying efficiency and uses a stochastic cost‐frontier model to generate efficiency scores. Indeed, this efficiency model is thoroughly investigated. However, the results are found to be at best mixed, because the model reveals low efficiency and time‐unvarying scores. To increase efficiency, this article advocates an improvement of top management procedures, based on a governance‐environment framework.     

Deregulation with consensus

We analyze the problem of eliminating an inefficient regulation, such as protection, in a dynamic model in which there is incomplete information and unanimous approval from all parties involved is necessary. Existing firms have heterogeneous cost, and efficiency requires some of them to shut down when the inefficient regulation is eliminated. The government can set up a revelation mechanism, giving subsidies and requiring firms to exit the market at a given time depending on the information collected. Under full commitment the optimal policy prescribes that some inefficient firms remain active and are subsidized. The optimal policy takes a simple form, with at most two times at which the firms are allowed to exit. We are very grateful to Matt Mitchell whose comments substantially improved the paper.