场外交易市场法律监管制度设计的博弈分析

利用博弈论分析方法,对影响场外交易市场建设的监管制度、交易制度、信息披露、市场准入等进行分析,认为我国场外交易市场法律监管制度设计应从提高场外交易市场的法律地位着手,合理界定市场主体准入与退出标准,制定与场外交易市场特点相适应的信息披露制度,审慎引入做市商制度,建立顺畅的转板机制,采用灵活性、动态化的监管方式。     

基于信息不对称视角的小微企业融资难博弈分析

小微企业在创造就业机会、维护社会稳定以及活跃市场经济等方面发挥着巨大的作用.但是,由于小微企业经营规模小、自有资产少、抗风险能力差等原因,其很难通过银行等金融机构获得有效贷款.从信息不对称视角分析小微企业的逆向选择和道德风险对银行放贷的影响,结果表明：为解决小微企业融资困境,应加强诚信教育,传播信用知识;搭建信息平台,互通信用信息;提升评级质量,公布评级结果;促进银企沟通,建立服务平台.     

中小企业应收账款质押融资模式中的道德风险研究

应收账款质押融资作为供应链金融较常见的融资模式,是解决中小企业融资难的有效途径。该模式的风险因素包括信用风险、道德风险、法律风险和行业风险。其中道德风险主要由银企之间信息不对称引起。博弈论分析表明,道德风险受核心企业的监督意愿、银行和核心企业的监督成本以及对违约企业的惩罚力度的影响。     

NAFTA as a Means of Raising Rivals' Costs

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was designed to reduce tariff rates between Mexico, Canada and the U.S.A. over a period of ten years. However, lower tariff rates are only available to firms that comply with complicated and costly NAFTA filing regulations. Such regulations raise costs of small firms relative to large firms in a domestic industry which engages in trade between NAFTA countries. This implication of NAFTA regulations can lead to increased concentration in domestic industries, an hypothesis which can be tested as the transition period comes to an end. Finally, our model suggests an explanation for why the levels of trade from the U.S.A. to Mexico have been lower than general expectations.     

地方政府维稳绩效的前期考核——以T县“矛盾纠纷排查调处”机制为例

"矛盾纠纷排查调处"工作考核作为地方政府维稳的前期考核,是理解政府维稳行为的重要角度。文章主要以T县为例,介绍了矛盾纠纷排查调处考核的基本内容,分析了考核的侧重点,探讨了考核结果的合理性问题,进而提出采用淘汰赛模式来解释考核结果。文章据此对中国地方政府之间的竞争问题,得出了一个基本判断,即在锦标赛模式下,地方政府的主要动机是获得奖励,故努力争先;在淘汰赛模式下,地方政府的主要动机是避免惩罚,故重在避免落后。     

Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism

It is well known that the Nash equilibrium in network routing games can have strictly higher cost than the optimum cost. In Stackelberg routing games, where a fraction of flow is centrally-controlled, a natural problem is to route the centrally-controlled flow such that the overall cost of the resulting equilibrium is minimized.We consider the scenario where the network administrator wants to know the minimum amount of centrally-controlled flow such that the cost of the resulting equilibrium solution is strictly less than the cost of the Nash equilibrium. We call this threshold the Stackelberg threshold and prove that for networks of parallel links with linear latency functions, it is equal to the minimum of the Nash flows on links carrying more optimum flow than Nash flow.Our approach also provides a simpler proof of characterization of the minimum fraction that must be centrally controlled to induce the optimum solution.     

空间双寡头竞争下的创新扩散——基于博弈论的模型

关于创新空间扩散的研究一直没有关注空间竞争对于创新采纳的影响.本文在双人博弈的框架下构建了一个空间双寡头竞争模型,假定厂商已经拥有关于创新的信息,单纯地考察空间竞争对于创新采纳的影响.结果表明,即使同质的厂商同时获得了创新的信息,在竞争的作用下,创新的采纳很少会同时进行.先采纳者具有先发优势,且随着运费率的下降,先发优势愈发得以强化.本文还分析了空间竞争和技术扩散反梯度现象间的关系,结论是空间竞争至少是反梯度现象产生的一个原因.     

从多哈回合中止看多边贸易谈判机制的效率

本文主要探讨了多边贸易谈判机制存在的必要性、经济学本质,及其顺利运行的前提条件。     

An information-based adaptive strategy for resource exploitation in competitive scenarios

Given an exploitation problem, in which a number of agents compete for a limited renewable resource, the optimal harvesting strategy depends on the ratio between resource availability and exploitation effort. For scarce resource a purely competitive, greedy strategy outperforms a more collaborative approach based on the Collective Intelligence, while for more abundant resource the opposite holds. The rationale for this behaviour lies in the amount of information each strategy is able to provide and a combined strategy is possible according to which agents choose dynamically the most informative strategy according to a minimum entropy criterion. This approach, which provides best performance for both under and over-exploited scenarios, can be used to monitor the resource status for management purposes and is effective in both centralised and decentralised decision making.     

网络游戏市场消费现状分析

文章利用2004年6月西安市网络游戏消费市场调查的数据，分析西安网络游戏的市场现状和目前网络游戏市场的不足，并针对网络运营商、开发商和网吧经营者提出一些建议，以促进网络游戏市场的健康发展。