商业银行引入战略投资者定价行为分析

本文主要分析了商业银行引入战略投资者时,战略投资者与商业银行对所参股的定价问题。通过分析,得出在不同边际成本条件下,商业银行股份的定价在边际成本不变条件下战略投资者所支付的价格高于城市商业银行股份的实际价值,该价格会落在一定的价格区间内,而在边际成本可变的条件下战略投资者和城市商业银行将会达成一个最优定价,当存在投资限制时战略投资者往往会选择投资至最高上限。     

高技术企业联盟所有权配置动态博弈与实证研究

高技术企业通过联盟可以获得技术诀窍,分享合作剩余,但所有权配置对联盟合作绩效产生重要影响。不完全合同框架下的动态博弈模型与实证分析表明,拥有控制权是企业披露诀窍的基本条件,企业的诀窍披露和努力投入决策会因所有权结构的不同发生改变,这对探索联盟科学治理途径,提高企业合作创新绩效具有重要启示和指导意义。     

制造产业集群内企业利益分配博弈分析

通过分析制造产业集群合作机制,将博弈论中合作博弈的基本理论和方法应用于制造产业集群内企业的利益分配中,在基于多人合作博弈的传统Shapley值分析方法基础上,建立考虑投资额、风险以及技术创新等多种因素对利益分配结果影响的新模型,得到了一种新的利益分配方法,实证结果表明,建立的新模型更科学、更合理,同时合理的利益分配有助于制造产业集群稳定发展.     

Price matching and product differentiation strategies considering showrooming

Showrooming, a phenomenon in which customers use brick-and-mortar stores to assess products and then purchase them from online retailers (o-retailers) for lower prices, is considered a great threat to traditional retailers (t-retailers). To combat showrooming, many t-retailers have executed price matching which enables customers to pay o-retailers' lower prices for the identical product. To avoid direct competition with t-retailers who execute price matching, many o-retailers have begun to sell differentiated products from t-retailers, which weakens the information advantage to customers from practicing showrooming. Motivated by these observations, we construct a duopoly game, where a t-retailer and an o-retailer sell products in a same category, to study the profitabilities of product differentiation and price matching in the context of showrooming. The results show that in the scenario without price matching, the o-retailer is likely to benefit from product differentiation only when the o-retailer's differentiated product is more popular with customers than the t-retailer's product. However, in the price matching scenario, the o-retailer also has the opportunity to benefit from product differentiation when the o-retailer's differentiated product is less popular with customers than the t-retailer's product, and product differentiation can be a win-win strategy for the two retailers under certain conditions. Considering the o-retailer's product differentiation decision, the t-retailer is only likely to execute price matching if the non-digital attributes of the product category sold by two retailers are not very obvious.     

中国国防预算制度非均衡态分析

现阶段我国国防开支的规模和结构显现出明显的低效配置特征 ,表明国防预算制度运行处于非均衡态。实现国防财政资源配置效率的主要制度障碍 ,来自于国防预算制度的主体缺陷 ,即主体缺位和主体多元并存。由此造成了我国国防预算运行中的利益主体结构不均衡 ,形成了利益主体的动力结构与资源的合理、有效配置之间不一致。     

药品招标采购最优合同分析

在新医改方案出台后,药品招标采购又成为了热门话题,根据药品招标采购近10年来的运行情况,分析了药品招标采购存在的问题并运用博弈论的方法分析在药品招标采购中投标方与招标方的关系,运用信息博弈的视角分析如何才能达到最优的药品采购,并根据模型提出了相关的建议。     

游戏教学法在大学英语教学中的应用

在大学英语教学中融入游戏教学法,通过传话、猜词、单词接龙、故事接龙等游戏,调动学生学习英语的积极性,激发学生的学习兴趣,提高英语学习效率。     

军民融合技术协同创新行为分析

以军工企业和民用企业为研究对象,利用演化博弈模型研究军民融合协同行为的动态演化过程,分析双方在有限理性条件下的互动机理与策略选择,探寻支配双方协同创新的制约因素及影响机理。在此基础上,通过政府激励与契约惩处情景的设定,引入约束体系,构建奖惩机制下军民融合协同博弈理论模型,确定最优发展策略（协同创新,协同创新）状态稳定时奖励金与惩罚金的范围,对于构建军民融合协同创新体系具有一定参考价值和现实指导意义。     

Why is Price Dispersion Higher Online than Offline? The Impact of Retailer Type and Shopping Risk on Price Dispersion

When physically similar products, of similar quality, are offered by retailers both online and offline, we often observe that the dispersion in prices of these products online is greater than the price dispersion offline. This observation runs counter to early theories that suggested price dispersion online would be smaller than that offline due to the ease of search and information availability online. This paper investigates and provides an explanation for this puzzling phenomenon by examining the impact of two important drivers of price dispersion: retailer type and consumers’ shopping risk. Retailer type refers to whether a retailer is a pure offline, pure online, or dual channel retailer. Shopping risk is defined as the product of consumers’ perceived risk of shopping and the transaction uncertainty related to shopping at different types of retailers.A game-theoretic approach is adopted to model consumers’ price search and product purchase, as well as price competition within and across retailer types in online and offline markets. Equilibrium pricing strategies are derived for different retailer types competing for different consumer segments with different levels of perceived shopping risk. The impact of retailer type and shopping risk on online versus offline price dispersion are quantified, and conditions when price dispersion is greater online than offline are identified.Results indicate that price dispersion is greater online when the number of pure online retailers is sufficiently large and is increasing in the number of pure online retailers. In addition, a reduction in online shopping risk may actually increase online price dispersion. Results further suggest that even without any online sales, dual channel retailers should maintain their online presence for the purpose of information dissemination, which justifies the importance for pure offline retailer to incorporate webrooming strategies, where consumers can search for prices online but purchase offline.     

众创背景下高校学生创新行为演化系统动力学分析

“互联网+”和“大众创业,万众创新”环境为高校学生参与创新创业提供了机会,而高校学生的创新行为又有益于推动我国创新驱动型经济发展。在分析众创模式下高校学生创新决策和创新行为演化的基础上,构建了创新需求者和高校学生创新行为演化博弈模型,采用系统动力学方法进一步描述博弈双方的动态决策过程。仿真结果表明：高校学生创新行为与需求者参与度相互影响,如果只有一方选择纳什均衡策略,双方无法达到演化均衡状态;当需求者选择参与策略概率大于0.2,或高校学生创新成果被采用的几率大于0.5时,系统会最终达到演化均衡状态。最后,从高校学生与政府视角,提出提升大学生创新创业水平的建议。