Disclosure Practices by Family Firms: Evidence from Swedish Publicly Listed Firms

Abstract

I investigate the effect of family ownership on firms’ disclosure practices in their annual reports. In specific, I study Swedish publicly listed firms, which are typically characterized by controlling owners that have a strong influence in the corporate governance decisions of the firm, including corporate disclosures. To measure disclosure, I construct a comprehensive disclosure index covering information on (1) corporate governance, (2) strategic and financial targets and (3) notes to the financial statements. The results reveal that overall, family firms provide less disclosure in annual reports than non-family firms do. The finding is consistent with the premise that through their management positions, family owners can directly monitor managers and avoid costly public disclosures. Overall, the results suggest that ownership structure of firms is important to consider in understanding firms’ disclosure incentives, particularly in settings where controlling owners play a significant role in the governance of the firm.     

资本化研发支出减值传递了什么信号

研究以2007-2019年进行过研发支出资本化的A股上市公司为对象,从上市公司、外部投资者和交易所监管者三个维度,对开发支出减值的经济后果进行了检验。结果显示开发支出减值传递了开发支出质量较低的信号,监管者能在减值年度有效接收信号并发放含相关问题的年报问询函进行监管,但投资者未能正确解读减值信号。进一步分析发现减值计提并未达到提升开发支出质量的目的,而信息环境优化有助于投资者正确接收开发支出减值所蕴含的信息。以上发现对于研发支出资本化会计准则的细化完善、开发支出减值机会主义行为的治理、资本市场对开发支出信息解读和吸收效率的提升等,具有一定的借鉴意义。     

代理成本与内部控制自我评价报告的自愿披露——基于2010年沪市A股上市公司数据

使用2010年沪市A股公司数据,对代理成本与内部控制自我评价报告自愿披露的关系进行实证分析,结果表明内部控制自我评价报告的自愿披露水平与管理费用率负相关,与总资产周转率显著正相关。此外,公司的规模显著正向影响自愿披露水平,资产负债率与公司上市年限显著负向影响自愿披露水平。因此,监管部门有必要强制要求上市公司披露内部控制自我评价报告。     

媒体负面报道对审计延迟的影响研究

利用2012—2020年我国A股非金融类上市公司相关数据，通过中国研究数据服务平台手工搜集整理中国上市公司财经新闻数据库（CFND）中的网络媒体负面报道次数，实证检验了媒体负面报道对审计延迟的影响。研究发现，媒体负面报道会增加审计延迟，这一效应在非行业专长子样本（Expert=0）的样本中显著存在。在控制了内生性偏差后，结论依旧不变。进一步研究了媒体负面报道对审计延迟的影响机制，发现媒体负面报道会通过提高审计师的风险感知度对审计延迟产生影响，具体表现为，当企业面临的媒体负面报道次数增加时，审计师为降低审计风险会选择加大审计资源的投入，审计延迟随之增加。     

Effect of audit report disclosure on auditor litigation risk

Internationally, the escalating number of cases levelled against auditors and the costs of defending such actions has led to the auditing profession calling for measures to reduce their liability burden. Relatively few measures have been taken by the auditing profession by way of adapting the disclosure contained in the audit report to mitigate their litigation risk. This study examines whether the issuance of an audit opinion with a going concern related ‘emphasis of matter’ paragraph or work practices disclosure has any effect on potential litigants' likelihood of pursuing litigation against the auditor. An analysis of 69 responses from advanced law students and 18 practitioners working in corporate liquidation demonstrate that a modified (but not qualified) audit report effectively acts as a ‘red flag’ and reduces potential litigants' propensity to initiate litigation. However, work practices disclosure did not significantly alter potential litigants' inclination to recommend litigation. Despite this finding, respondents (particularly liquidators) indicated that work practices disclosure was an important factor in their litigation decision. These results suggest that further investigation into how to effectively disclose the work done on audit and assurance engagements is needed. This has implications for standard setters and the auditing profession, especially considering recent changes in the disclosure contained in audit and assurance reports.     

Audit Qualifications of Income‐Decreasing Accounting Choices*

In this study we conduct an experiment to examine how qualifying an income‐decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects financial report users' assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and future financial performance (performance over the next three years). We find that without the qualification, users viewed the income‐decreasing accounting change as relatively nonstrategic and that user assessments of current and future performance were not different. In the presence of the qualification, users believed that the accounting change was relatively strategic, and they discounted the income effect of the accounting change. We find further that their assessments of future performance were below their assessments of current performance but no different from the assessments of future performance in the absence of the qualification. Although our findings suggest that audit qualifications encourage users to be skeptical of income‐decreasing accounting changes, we find no evidence that they impose negative consequences on management in terms of lower assessments of financial performance.     

The civil justice system and going concern audit reports: Comments on “Auditors’ decision-making under going concern uncertainties in low litigation risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong”

Lam and Mensah [Lam, K., Mensah, Y.M., 2006. Auditors’ decision-making under going concern uncertainties in low litigation risk environments: Evidence from Hong Kong. J. Account. Public Pol. 25 (6), this issue] provide some valuable insight on auditors’ choice of going concern audit reports in an environment where the civil justice system affords, from the standpoint of the plaintiff, fewer remedies and is more difficult to file a complaint than it is in the US. Hence, from the auditor’s standpoint, this environment can appropriately be described as a “low litigation risk environment”. In this comment, I first question whether a disclaimer of an opinion is any indication of either a quality audit or professionalism. Secondly, three alternative explanations for the empirical regularities are discussed. The Gatekeeper Story suggests auditors are simply not willing to risk reducing their reputational capital by acquiescing to clients that are not likely to survive their own financial distress. The Herding Story suggests that, when auditors are faced with uncertainties or a gap in the authoritative literature, auditors will herd together to form a common response that mimic one-another. The Value of Incumbency Story holds that as the value of incumbency declines with the client’s inability to survive, auditors will have fewer incentives to incur the incremental costs to gather sufficient competent evidential matter necessary to support an unqualified opinion.     

“权责发生制”在养老保险基金会计核算中的必要性

"收付实现制"是以现金的流入和流出作为确认收入和支出的依据,这种记账基础下,基金财务收入或支出只包括以现金或银行存款已实现收入或支出的部分,不能反映那些定期已经产生的应收未收账,应付未付账.在收付实现制基础上形成的这部份隐性债权或隐性债务,在基金会计账务核算和会计报表中得不到反映,使基金财务状况不能得到全面真实的反映,新增设部份应以"权责发生制"为基础的会计科目,实现基金会计报表区分,可以参照金融机构的会计报表并反其道而行之,分为表内科目(收付实现制)和表外科目(权责发生制).     

Expert reports in Australian takeovers: fees and quality

Target firms in Australian takeovers are required to commission the preparation of an independent expert report in circumstances where there is a perceived conflict of interest with the bidder. As approximately half of these reports are prepared by firms with which the target has other business dealings, concern has been expressed over the quality of these reports due to the suggestion that such reports are provided at lower fees. We examine the 191 independent expert reports provided in all 649 Australian takeover bids initiated in the period 1990 to 2000 inclusive. Using an expert-fee model, we find that the fees for reports by experts with other business dealings with the target are not lower than those of unrelated experts. In addition, the results indicate that experts with other dealings with the target provide reports with a significantly smaller valuation range, consistent with these reports being of higher, rather than lower, quality. Our findings are inconsistent with the U.S. and New Zealand experience of prohibiting audit firms from providing valuation advice in takeovers.