The organisation for economic cooperation and development

The global financial and economic crisis has prompted some scholars to suggest that a fundamental regulatory shift away from neoliberalism will take place – both in general and in the field of EU competition regulation. This paper shows that so far no radical break with the neoliberal type of competition regulation is heaving into sight. It sets out to explain this from the vantage point of a critical political economy perspective, which identifies the circumstances under which a crisis can result in a regulatory paradigm shift. Contrasting the current situation with the shift in EC/EU competition regulation after the crisis in the 1970s, the paper argues that the preconditions for a fundamental shift in this issue area are not present this time around. Several reasons account for this: the current crisis has been construed by economic and political elites as a crisis within and not of neoliberal capitalism; the social power configuration underpinning the neoliberal order remains unaltered; no clear counter-project has surfaced; the European Commission has been (and remains) in a position to oppose radical changes; and finally, there are no signs of a wider paradigm shift in the EU's regulatory architecture.     

How Safe Are the Harbors?

Abstract

With the growth of e-commerce has come the need for businesses to provide protection of personal, private data collected from internet users and consumers. The United States has favored a policy of industry self-regulation, while the European Union (EU) has responded to its consumer demands for privacy protection regulations and enforcement. Faced with the critical need for a middle ground, the US has proposed “Safe Harbor Privacy Principles” as a means of compromise with the EU. This article explores the market context of the Safe Harbor Principles, the European reaction, and the probable impact on businesses.     

A positive analysis of deposit insurance provision: Regulatory competition among European Union countries

We consider the provision of deposit insurance as the outcome of a non-cooperative policy game between nations. Nations compete for deposits in order to protect their banking systems from the destabilizing impact of potential capital flight. Policies are chosen to attract depositors who optimally respond to the expected return to deposits, which depends on deposit insurance levels, systemic risk and transaction costs. We identify both defensive and beggar-thy-neighbour policies. The model sheds light on the European banking crisis of 2008 in which individual nations ratcheted up their deposit insurance levels.     

Tariff equivalents of nontariff measures: the case of European horticultural and fish imports from African countries

In the context of the Partnership Agreements between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries, this study estimates ad valorem tariff equivalents of European food safety standards on imports of key horticultural and fish products from Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. The study uses an extension of the price‐wedge method to account for imperfect substitution and factor endowment in monopolistic competition. The estimated tariff equivalents are 55% and 98% for imports of fresh peas from Zambia to the Netherlands and the U.K., respectively. They range from 39% to 64% for imports of green beans and avocados from Kenya and from 63% to 270% for imports of frozen fish fillets in EU countries from the East African Community. We also observe large variations in tariff equivalents for the horticultural and fish products over time and EU importing countries.     

中美评级机构博弈

国际信用评级市场被美国三大评级机构———惠誉,标准普尔和穆迪垄断,而三大机构的独立性,公正性和前瞻性近些年备受质疑,各主权国家的金融安全和产品定价权受到威胁。中国在国际评级市场中要承担起一个大国的责任,运用博弈论的方法分析中国评级机构能否顺利进入由美国垄断的国际评级市场,针对均衡结果提出对抗垄断的评级市场的建议。     

欧盟结构基金运行机制及其对中国区域发展基金构想的启示

欧盟各成员国经济发展不均衡,而结构基金作为欧盟区域发展政策的主体,在协调区域发展方面取得了很好的效果。本文从欧盟区域发展政策的概况入手,分析欧盟区域发展基金主体结构基金的主要运行机制,最后探讨其对我国建立区域发展基金构想的启示。     

“Set a Sufficiently Ambitious Budget Target and Let the Automatic Stabilizers Work”. Will it Really Work in the European Monetary Union?

We examine the popular recipe in the title by means of an AD-LM-AS two-country model of the EMU, controlling for asymmetry in demand and supply shocks and in the monetary-policy transmission mechanism. Unless structural symmetry holds and symmetric shock occurs, national automatic stabilizers, even though supplemented with the common monetary policy, cannot deliver optimal stabilization in each economy. Inflation and output gaps are not closed and may be divergent in sign. Considering that a federal system of inter-regional insurance is lacking, the recipe under examination is too optimistic, while serious threat to EMU cohesion may arise. The econometric estimates we present show that existing national fiscal systems work very poorly as for the minimization, after shocks, of the dispersion of national incomes around the EMU average.     

"退而更化":中国合作金融的改良之路

合作金融的现代化从社会哲学上看,涉及到如何处理现代化与传统之间的紧张关系;涉及到否定传统、移植西方体制的思维方式对错的问题.从回答这个基本社会哲学问题入手,检讨中国传统合作金融组织——舍会的珍贵遗产,申明白愿原则是合作金融的灵魂以及这个灵魂对当今中国合作金融的改良所具有的价值.在此基础上,本文提出了以组建中国农村合作银行为核心的政策建议,而中国农业银行出售非农业务、回归农村,与农村信用社进行资本重组与业务整舍,是现实可行的一条最佳途径.     

Dual VATs and Cross-Border Trade: Two Problems, One Solution?

In recent years, two distinct but related questions have been raised with respect to value-added taxes (VATs). Concern has been expressed over whether it is desirable or even possible for both national and subnational governments in federal countries such as India, Argentina, and Russia to impose VATs. One reason for thinking that such subnational VATs are unlikely to be workable on a destination basis is the problem of cross-border trade. Of course, this same problem also arises within the European Union, where there is no EU VAT. Drawing upon Canadian experience, we argue that not only is it possible to have two-tier or dual VATs on a destination basis in a single country but that the existence of dual VATs may help deal with some of the problems of cross-border trade.