Migration Effects of Welfare Benefit Reform

This study tests for a migration response to the implementation of stricter rules for receiving welfare benefits (means-tested social assistance for individuals who lack sufficient work-related income), in the form of mandatory participation in activation programmes in Stockholm town districts. The results give no indications that activation programmes affect the moving choices of recipients of welfare benefits.     

Labour mobility and wage inequality in the presence of endogenous foreign investment

This paper examines the impact of labour mobility and increased competition on skilled–unskilled wage inequality and foreign investment. Unlike the existing literature this paper considers a model where foreign investment is endogenously determined. The paper shows that in the shortrun, inflow of either skilled or unskilled labour has no effect on wage inequality but increased competition increases wage inequality. Inflow of either type of labour increases foreign investment but the impact of increased competition on foreign investment cannot be unambiguously determined. Inflow of skilled labour increases wage inequality in the longrun and its effect on foreign investment is positive. Increased competition in the longrun increases wage inequality, foreign investment and welfare.     

The Welfare State, Budgetary Pressure and Labour Market Shifts

Public debate about the welfare state in OECD countries has emphasized the need for reform to meet a twofold set of shocks: budgetary pressure and a labour market shift against unskilled workers. The aim of the paper is to set out a framework for examining the implications of these shocks for the optimal scale of social transfers and, in particular, the impact on different societies, distinguishing a restricted welfare state, labelled "the United States" and a more extensive welfare state, labelled "Continental Europe".     

地区本位的新政治经济学分析

本文从新政治经济学角度，对中国经济转型过程中出现的地区本位现象进行了分析。建立了一个综合本地区居民福利、本地区生产企业福利、政府职能代理人（官员和公务员）本身的利益以及本地区政府财政收入四大块组成地区总福利函数模型．并解出了最优市场保护率。分析认为．地区本位现象的出现是地方政府基于多种利益关系考虑而实施的一种不合理却是必然的举措。     

Growth and welfare effects of stabilizing innovation cycles

We consider a simple model of innovation where equilibrium cycles may arise and show that, whenever actual capital accumulation falls below its balanced growth path, subsidizing innovators by taxing consumers has stabilizing effects, promotes sustained growth and increases welfare. Further, if the steady state is unstable under laissez faire, the introduction of the subsidy can make the steady state stable. Such a policy has beneficial effects as it fosters output growth along the transitional adjustment path, and increases the welfare of current and future generations.     

动物福利壁垒及其对国际贸易的影响

近年来,动物福利壁垒作为一种新的贸易壁垒开始出现,并已对动物源性产品的国际贸易产生了现实的影响。本文分析了动物福利壁垒的主要特征、动物福利壁垒的主要应用措施,并探讨了动物福利壁垒对国际贸易的影响。     

New Labour at work: long-term unemployment and the geography of opportunity

New Labour has placed great faith in active labour market policiesto address problems of long-term unemployment and poverty. Thispaper considers the effectiveness of welfare-to-work programmesin light of persistent regional employment disparities withinthe UK. It is argued that the government has proceeded froma flawed analysis of the causes and magnitude of long-term unemployment,framing the issue in terms of ‘worklessness’ andneglecting demand-side concerns of job availability and jobquality.     

开放条件下的R＆D与比较优势的动态变化

文章探讨了比较优势实现动态变化的路径问题，并着重讨论专业化的研发投入（R＆D）对比较实现动态变化的影响，认为绝对的研发效率是比较优势实现动态转化的条件。在此基础上，讨论了动态比较优势与福利增长之间的关系，结论表明，比较优势实现动态变化对于保证福利水平的长期增长来说是必不可少的。     

Auditor Reputation Under Different Negligence Regimes

Do auditor reputation effects evolve the same way under precise negligence as under vague negligence? Or are there differences? We assume that investors update their beliefs on unobservable auditor quality when an auditor discloses an inaccurate report. We call this a reputation effect. A necessary condition for reputation effects to occur is that, ex ante, investors expect ‘good’ auditors to take more care than ‘bad’ auditors such that ‘good’ auditors are less likely to issue an inaccurate report. Consistent with empirical evidence, we assume that wealthier (‘good’) auditors tend to take more care than less wealthy (‘bad’) auditors. We find that under vague negligence, reputation effects will occur, inducing both types of auditor to increase the level of care taken. A ‘good’ auditor is likely to exert excessive care. Then, even in the absence of auditor risk aversion, a (properly defined) liability cap is necessary to induce efficient incentives. A contractual liability cap is preferable to a legally fixed liability cap. Under precise negligence, a ‘good’ auditor will exert the standard of due care. However, a ‘bad’ auditor will also do so if sufficiently wealthy. Consequently, ex ante, investors do not expect different levels of care to be taken or reputation effects to occur. A liability cap is not desirable. This paper highlights the importance of non‐legal sanctions in auditor liability. Finally, it links the ‘reputation’ and ‘deep pocket’ hypotheses, both of which have attempted separately in the past to explain the positive correlation between auditor size and auditor quality.