全文获取类型
收费全文 | 7803篇 |
免费 | 104篇 |
国内免费 | 37篇 |
专业分类
财政金融 | 740篇 |
工业经济 | 462篇 |
计划管理 | 1005篇 |
经济学 | 1872篇 |
综合类 | 1633篇 |
运输经济 | 50篇 |
旅游经济 | 41篇 |
贸易经济 | 1116篇 |
农业经济 | 296篇 |
经济概况 | 728篇 |
信息产业经济 | 1篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 2篇 |
2023年 | 32篇 |
2022年 | 38篇 |
2021年 | 53篇 |
2020年 | 87篇 |
2019年 | 93篇 |
2018年 | 100篇 |
2017年 | 88篇 |
2016年 | 65篇 |
2015年 | 62篇 |
2014年 | 394篇 |
2013年 | 463篇 |
2012年 | 310篇 |
2011年 | 405篇 |
2010年 | 269篇 |
2009年 | 268篇 |
2008年 | 383篇 |
2007年 | 362篇 |
2006年 | 691篇 |
2005年 | 539篇 |
2004年 | 392篇 |
2003年 | 380篇 |
2002年 | 371篇 |
2001年 | 386篇 |
2000年 | 263篇 |
1999年 | 213篇 |
1998年 | 113篇 |
1997年 | 68篇 |
1996年 | 60篇 |
1995年 | 23篇 |
1994年 | 55篇 |
1993年 | 12篇 |
1992年 | 9篇 |
1991年 | 6篇 |
1990年 | 4篇 |
1989年 | 4篇 |
1988年 | 2篇 |
1985年 | 184篇 |
1984年 | 200篇 |
1983年 | 149篇 |
1982年 | 94篇 |
1981年 | 53篇 |
1980年 | 79篇 |
1979年 | 52篇 |
1978年 | 40篇 |
1977年 | 21篇 |
1976年 | 1篇 |
1975年 | 2篇 |
1974年 | 1篇 |
1973年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有7944条查询结果,搜索用时 31 毫秒
151.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
152.
Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
153.
Tapan Mitra 《Journal of Economic Theory》2002,107(2):356-376
Competitive paths which are efficient are shown to satisfy a terminal cost minimization condition, thereby providing a continuous-time counterpart to the discrete-time result due to Malinvaud. Using this result, competitive paths which are equitable and efficient are shown to satisfy Hartwick's investment rule, which states that the value of net investment is zero at each date. Our result indicates that Hartwick's rule can help to signal inefficiency of competitive equitable paths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, D90, O41. 相似文献
154.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
155.
Reiko Aoki 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):653-672
We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product
market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally
on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible
commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition,
higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater
with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus
credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition.
Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai
and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve
Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments
from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this
work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee. 相似文献
156.
Hiroyuki Nakata 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):697-727
Summary. This paper studies how communication or exchange of opinions influences correlation of beliefs. The paper focuses on a situation
in which agents communicate with each other infinitely many times without observing data. It is an extension to the ‘Expert
Problem’ in Bayesian theory, where the informational flow is asymmetric. Moreover, this paper generalizes the existing literature
of communication that employs the common prior assumption (CPA) by allowing for heterogeneous beliefs. Some basic convergence
results are shown in contrast with the results obtained under the CPA. Furthermore, several economic implications of the basic
results are provided.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: April 16, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The results presented in this paper are taken from my Ph.D. thesis at Stanford University. I gratefully acknowledge
the inspiration obtained from innumerable discussions with Mordecai Kurz about this subject. Also, I appreciate comments from
Kenneth J. Arrow, Peter J. Hammond, Maurizio Motolese, Carsten K. Nielsen, Ho-Mou Wu and the anonymous referee. 相似文献
157.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
158.
Summary. All agents have the same ordinal ranking over all objects, receiving no object (opting out) may be preferable to some objects,
agents differ on which objects are worse than opting out, and the latter information is private. The Probabilistic Serial
assignment, improves upon (in the Pareto sense) the Random Priority assignment, that randomly orders the agents and offers
them successively the most valuable remaining object. We characterize Probabilistic Serial by efficiency in an ordinal sense,
and envy-freeness. We characterize it also by ordinal efficiency, strategyproofness and equal treatment of equals.
Received: October 5, 1999; revised version: December 20, 2000 相似文献
159.
In the mid-nineties FIFA decided to increase from two to three the number of points assigned to the winning team of a soccer
match played under traditional round-robin national leagues. Since a game of soccer can be regarded as a contest, FIFA's measure
provides an interesting case-study for analysing how a change in the system of rewards (from a zero to a non-zero sum rule)
may affect the contestants' equilibrium behaviour. In this paper we try to assess, both theoretically and empirically, whether
FIFA's new point rule has changed soccer towards a more offensive game, in which teams adopt more risky strategies. In particular,
we evaluate the “na?ve hypothesis” according to which the measure would induce every team to play always more offensively,
and we explore the extent to which the change in teams' behaviour may be affected by quality differentials between teams.
Our most important hypothesis is that when the asymmetry between opposing teams is large enough, an increase in the reward
for victory induces the weaker team to play more defensively, rather than the opposite. By looking at a subset of matches
held in the Portuguese first division league, which approximate the conditions of our model, we find support for this hypothesis.
First version received: July 1999/Final version received: May 2001 相似文献
160.
In the eco-environmental governance system,the compul-sive institutions are the most important as well as the mostcommonly utilized.A nation utilizes its administrative,lawand economic power to forbid,boost,bestir and help indi-viduals’behavior concerning environmental governance toensure the realization of eco-environment conservation.The fact,however,turns out to be disappointing about theimpulsive institution’s implementation.Actually,the unsatis-factory practices sometimes even lead to“… 相似文献