FDI对中国国内投资影响的实证分析

在开放条件下,FDI会对东道国国内投资产生强有力的影响,这种影响体现在FDI对东道国国内投资产生挤出效应或者挤入效应。本文对1987—2001年FDI对中国国内投资的影响进行了检验,结果表明:在最近的15年间,FDI对国内投资总体上存在显著的挤入效应;对大多数省份的投资也存在挤入效应,但在东部沿海省份挤出效应和中性效应则占一定的主导地位;FDI对不同地区投资的影响程度也存在明显的差异,呈现出由东向西渐次减弱的状态。     

Perpetual youth and endogenous labor supply: A problem and a possible solution

In the “perpetual youth” overlapping-generations model of Blanchard and Yaari, if leisure is a “normal” good then some agents will have negative labor supply. We suggest a solution to this problem by using a modified version of Greenwood, Hercowitz and Huffman’s utility function. The modification incorporates real money balances, so that the model may be used to analyze monetary as well as fiscal policy. In a Walrasian version of the economy, we show that increased government debt and increased government spending raise the interest rate and lower output, while an open-market operation to increase the money supply lowers the interest rate and raises output.     

FDI对湖南省的经济增长效应及其地域梯度差异的实证分析

通过回归分析法,实证分析外商直接投资(FDI)对湖南省经济增长的影响,并采用Q型聚类层次法进一步探讨FDI对湖南各地区经济增长影响的不平衡性。结果表明:FDI对湖南省经济促进效应显著,且主要是靠短期需求拉动经济增长,FDI的滞后期为3年,滞后的FDI对经济的贡献小于当年对GDP的贡献。FDI对省内各地区经济的贡献表现出相当大的差异性,且这种差距呈扩大态势,值得引起高度警惕。     

西部大开发税收优惠政策实施效果评估

本文通过对西部开发税收优惠政策与地区经济增长、企业生产经营行为以及地方财政收入关系的评估分析,认为西部开发税收优惠政策对经济增长具有明显促进作用,对企业资产利润率提高也具有显著正效应.但从2002年到2004年西部开发税收政策对西部经济增长促进效应不断降低.最主要的原因是政策涉及的垄断企业多,市场化企业少;能源开发、环境污染严重企业享受多,实现地方可持续发展企业享受少;优惠税额主要促进了中央大型能源开采垄断企业,大多数有利于西部地区经济可持续发展的支柱产业得不到有效支持.所以提出:西部开发税收优惠政策在覆盖面上应做有增有减,并做出延长政策时效等调整.     

绿色建筑经济激励政策分析

绿色建筑难以推广的原因是绿色建筑的经济外部性问题,而解决外部性问题的通常做法是政府干预。我们从经济学的角度,对经济激励政策的原理进行了分析,除此之外,还重点对绿色建筑的外部经济性和非绿色建筑的外部不经济性进行剖析,最后我们提出了一些促进绿色建筑产业发展的建议。     

浅论供应链集成

从供应链集成模式入手，分析了基于信息集成的传统的供应链集成模式和全面的供应链集成模式，探寻了供应链集成对企业问组织关系的要求，最后提出了构建供应链集成系统所依赖的技术。     

上海市区街道办事处功能作用调整、完善的对策与措施

本文经调查研究,从上海市区街道办事处功能作用存在的问题出发,重新定义其功能与基本职能,提出了上海街道办事处功能作用调整对策与措施。     

Estimation methods for stochastic volatility models: a survey

Abstract.  Although stochastic volatility (SV) models have an intuitive appeal, their empirical application has been limited mainly due to difficulties involved in their estimation. The main problem is that the likelihood function is hard to evaluate. However, recently, several new estimation methods have been introduced and the literature on SV models has grown substantially. In this article, we review this literature. We describe the main estimators of the parameters and the underlying volatilities focusing on their advantages and limitations both from the theoretical and empirical point of view. We complete the survey with an application of the most important procedures to the S&P 500 stock price index.     

The Case of the Missing Pollution Haven Hypothesis

One particularly vexing puzzle for economists and policymakers over the past several decades concerns the empirical significance of the theoretically predicted pollution haven hypothesis. While neoclassical theory and conventional wisdom both surmise that local economies will suffer deleterious effects from stricter environmental regulations, empirical studies have largely failed to validate such claims. This study utilizes the method of matching to show that the impact of stricter regulation is heterogeneous spatially, varying systematically based on location-specific attributes. Previous studies that assume a homogenous response may therefore inadvertently mask the overall impact of more stringent regulations by pooling unaffected and affected regions.JEL Classification: Q25, Q28, H00, L51, R1The authors wish to thank to Michael Crew, Anthony Heyes, an anonymous referee, Werner Antweiler, Randy Becker, Wayne Gray, Shelby Gerking, Michael Greenstone, Vern Henderson, and Arik Levinson. Participants at various university seminars and conferences also lent useful insights to this line of research.     

Cost Uncertainty and Unilateral Abatement

Unilateral abatement is sometimes advocated in order to set a good example that will make other countries follow. The aim of this paper is to investigate whether existence of correlated cost uncertainty provides an incentive for a country to undertake unilateral abatement. The theoretical model is driven by two main mechanisms; first, a learning effect, as the follower country might reduce its risk premium as it can observe the cost level in the leader country. Second, there is the public good effect, i.e., the marginal benefit of abatement declines when abatement is a public good and other countries contribute to pollution reductions. Results shows that unilateral abatement would be efficient in reducing uncertainty about the unit costs of abatement if a country with low cost uncertainty would undertake abatement first, while a country with initially high cost uncertainty would follow. However, countries may prefer to act simultaneously because of the larger uncertainties that are inherent in a sequential game.