基于我国证券市场羊群行为的宏观与微观策略

证券市场的羊群行为是指投资者在证券投资中模仿其他投资者决策,在股票价格波动中追涨杀跌的行为.导致我国证券市场羊群行为的原因包括宏观和微观两个层面.为此,本文从宏观和微观两个层面提出抑制羊群行为的相应策略,即培育市场理性与培育理性投资主体两项对策.具体包括:完善信息披露制度;改善证券市场供求关系;完善合理的交易制度;规范证券公司"信息串联"行为;培育理性投资者等.以此来实现改善上市公司的信息披露质量,促进证券市场效率,以减轻羊群行为之害.     

Evaluating the Validity of Self-Reported Deviant Behavior Using Vignette Analyses

In this paper, the validity of vignette analyses of various forms of deviant behavior in the presence of opportunities is analyzed on the basis of ideas derived from cognitive psychology. Abelson’s Script Theory together with insights into human memory of visual and verbal information, allow the assumption that vignette analyses using visual stimuli are valid measures of deviant behavior in particular. The study includes an empirical examination of these ideas (n = 450). Nonparticipant observations and vignette analyses with visual and verbal material were carried out with regard to three forms of deviant behavior occurring in the presence of opportunities presenting themselves in everyday life. Observed and self-reported frequencies of deviant behavior or deviant intentions were counted and cross-tabulated. Log-linear analyses with dummy coding using observation data as reference category were run. Data analyses yielded the result that frequencies of deviant behavior were related to the techniques of data collection under consideration. Especially vignette analyses of the return of ‘lost letters’ that use both visual and verbal stimuli overestimate ‘actual’ (i.e. observed) return rates. This result is discussed with regard to the underlying methodological assumptions as well as its implications.     

The effects of internal and external sources of justice on employee turnover intention and organizational citizenship behavior toward clients and workgroup members

Abstract

Organizational justice research tends to focus on the effects of fair treatment from organizations or supervisors on employee attitudes and behaviors. Thus, there is a dearth of research on the effects of fair treatment attributable to other parties that employees interact with at work such as coworkers and clients. Controlling for organization-focused and supervisor-focused justice, results from our field study of employees working in a healthcare organization demonstrate that perceptions of client-focused fairness uniquely predicts supervisor ratings of employees organizational citizenship behavior toward clients and that perceptions of workgroup-focused justice uniquely predicts organizational citizenship behavior toward workgroups. Further, we find that client-focused justice perceptions uniquely predict employee turnover intention.     

上市公司过度融资行为及其治理研究

上市公司过度融资行为,严重损害了债权人和中小股东的利益,扰乱了证券市场的定价和运行秩序,阻碍了我国证券市场的健康发展。本文通过分析我国上市公司过度融资行为的负面影响和经济成因,提出相应的治理措施。     

基于未确知测度理论的多科性医院医疗大数据治理能力成熟度评价

为实现对多科性医院大数据治理水平的分析和评估,在数据管理成熟度模型和能力成熟度模型基础上,构建多科性医院大数据治理能力成熟度评价模型。将医院大数据治理能力成熟度分为初始级、程序级、规范级、管理级和优化级五个等级,基于医院内部大数据治理特征,建立包括三级指标的成熟度评价指标体系。然后,分别用客观赋权法及组合赋权法确定各指标权重,并结合未确知测度理论和评价方法,量化评估两个三甲多科性医院大数据治理能力的成熟度。结果表明,两种赋权方法下两家医院的大数据治理能力水平均处于规范级,与两家医院大数据治理的实际情况相吻合。未确知测度理论与信息熵权相结合,可以平衡指标测量主观性和评价结果稳定性,建立的模型能为多科性医院大数据治理提供具有参考价值的决策信息。     

不确定性情况下的居民资产组合行为与中国金融结构变迁

转轨经济的一个显著特点是各项制度不断变化,制度变迁带来的不确定性对居民资产选择行为产生重要影响,进而影响和决定了金融结构的形成与变迁.     

组织激励资源运用的效率分析

本文从企业组织整体目标利益角度出发，将组织激励资源作为稀缺性资源，探讨了组织内部员工的激励问题，同时借助经济学关于资源有效配置的理论，以及组织行为学中的公平激励理论，对组织激励经济资源运用的有效性，以及相关的影响因素进行了探讨，并在此基础上提出了组织一定经济激励资源量获得最大组织激励动力的条件，以及组织获得最大经济激励资源运用绩效效率水平的条件或原则。     

Recovering Hicksian Consumer Surplus within a Collective Model: Hausman's Method for the Household

The purpose of this paper is to describe the implications of the collective model of household behavior for the methods used to estimate the economic value of non-marketed environmental resources. After demonstrating how the separability restrictions inherent in the collective model allow individual preference and household income allocation choices to be distinguished, the paper demonstrates how the framework can be used to recover Hicksian consumer surplus. An algebraic example is used to illustrate how the framework can be used in valuing environmental resources.     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.