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161.
162.
Pascal Frantz Norvald Instefjord Martin Walker 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2013,40(9-10):1184-1220
Recent public policy debates have led to increased calls for full transparency of executive compensation. However, in practice, many firms are reluctant to disclose the full details of how they link executive compensation to performance. One possible reason for lack of full disclosure is that managers use their power to hide the details of their compensation plan in order to disguise opportunistic rent extraction. If this is the reason for secrecy, then public policy designed to force firms to provide full disclosure is unlikely to be resisted by shareholders. However, another possible explanation for less than full transparency is that some degree of secrecy about executive compensation may be in the interest of the company and its shareholders. If this explanation is correct, then public policy moves to increase transparency may be met by counter moves designed to protect managers and shareholders from such policies. In this paper we investigate if full disclosure of executive compensation arrangements is always optimal for shareholders. We develop a model where optimal executive remuneration solves a moral hazard problem. However, the degree to which the moral hazard problem affects the shareholders depends on hidden information, so that disclosure of the executive compensation scheme will typically reveal the hidden information, which can be harmful to shareholders. The model derives, therefore, the optimal disclosure policy and the optimal remuneration scheme. We find that the shareholders are better off pre‐committing not to disclose the executive compensation scheme whenever possible. Executive directors are shown to be better off too in the absence of disclosure of executive compensation schemes. An argument for mandating disclosure is that it provides better information to shareholders but our analysis demonstrates that disclosure does not necessarily achieve this objective. The results suggest that less than full disclosure can be in the interest of shareholders, the reason for this being that disclosures cannot be made selectively to shareholders but will also be made to strategic opponents. This will be the case if the board of directors and the remuneration committee includes enough independent directors. Whether or not non‐disclosure to shareholders is in their interest is however an empirical matter involving a trade‐off between the proprietary costs associated with disclosure to shareholders and the costs of potential collusion between executive and non‐executive directors associated with non‐disclosure. 相似文献
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164.
Kaili Peng Hongbo Li 《美中经济评论(英文版)》2006,5(6):36-39,57
According to the amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the 5^th article stipulates governmental entities expropriation of private property in particular land for public purposes, must pay reasonable compensation, and with due process of law. This paper analyzes features of the USA's fair compensation system of land takeover, discusses governmental actual process of land takeover and compensation approaching to specific issues. Finally, comparing with serious loss of farmland in our country, four onlightenments are drawn from USA's compensation system of land takeover. 相似文献
165.
论保险代位求偿权行使的范围限制 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
王乐宇 《内蒙古财经学院学报(综合版)》2007,5(1)
保险代位求偿权当然有其行使范围.时至今日,理论界有很多学者认为:"代位求偿权只在财产保险中适人身保险中不存在代位求偿权."但依有些学者的态度,保险代位求偿权不只适用于财产保险.我国<保险法>的有关规定(第68条)虽有力地支持了否定说,但亦留下了一些缺憾.笔者建议将<保险法>第68条修改为:"人身保险的被保险人因第三者的行为发生保险事故的,保险人向被被保险人或者受益人给付保险金后,不得享有向第三者追偿的权利.但被保险人或者受益人仍有权向第三者请求赔偿."这样,肯定说就难有立锥之地了. 相似文献
166.
曹波玲 《湖南财经高等专科学校学报》2012,28(6):28-33
我国社会抚养费征收管理工作在制度建设、解缴入库、统筹管理、征管秩序、监督检查等方面均已取得长足进步,但仍存在征收到位率普遍偏低、管理混乱等问题。导致这些问题出现的原因是多方面的,应通过修订完善现行法规、深入宣传、改变征收管理方式、加强部门协调、强化资金管理、加大考核力度等途径不断完善社会抚养费的征收管理工作。 相似文献
167.
吴宏斌 《广东财经职业学院学报》2012,3(4):53-59
“十二五”时期,广东的节能潜力即单位GDP能耗下降率的潜在空间在13.3%~19.2%之间,为实现国家下达的5年单位GDP能耗下降18%的节能目标,需在全省范围内建立合理的能源消费增量补偿与调节机制。 相似文献
168.
Zheng Gu 《The Service Industries Journal》2013,33(7):995-1005
This study empirically investigated the determinants of cash compensation for chief executive officers (CEOs) for US airlines in the post-9.11 period. After an analysis of 53 firm-year observations from 2002 to 2004, we found that the airline CEO cash compensation was positively correlated with the size and revenue efficiency of an airline firm whereas growth, debt use, profitability, and stock performance were irrelevant to the compensation. Larger airlines with better revenue-generating ability tended to offer high cash compensation to their CEOs. Our findings suggest that the pay-for-performance principle has yet to be fully implemented in the airlines industry. To minimize agency problems and enhance the firm value of US airlines, CEO compensation should be based not only on revenue efficiency but also on profitability and stock performance. 相似文献
169.
城市景观设计不能简单的停留于功能性美观性的层次上,而更多的应该上升到对受众者的心理,精神需求。接受美学这一方法论对城市特色景观塑造有着积极的启示意义。 相似文献
170.
私有财产权是一种与市场经济相伴相生的法律现象,宪法和法律对私有财产权的界定越清晰,保障越有力,市场机制的作用越能得到有效的发挥,从而最大限度地加快经济的发展和增加社会财富。 相似文献