国有土地分配与转让的现状、问题与对策

近年来,国有土地分配与转让问题引起了全社会的普遍关注,成为我国国民收入分配不可或缺的重要内容。本文在简要介绍我国国有土地分配与转让现实状况的基础上,探讨了存在的主要问题,最后给出了解决问题的对策。     

硕士研究生就业政策探析

目前,硕士研究生就业局势严峻,我国现有的有关硕士研究生就业政策总体上呈现数量少和内容不具有针对性的特点,此外,早期的硕士研究生就业政策强调硕士研究对国家发展的作用,硕士研究生就业政策未能有效发挥促进硕士研究生更好就业的效果。本文对我国硕士研究生就业政策制定、执行和评价过程中存在的问题进行探析,并提出相关思考,希望能够更好促进硕士研究生就业。     

标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中的应用

论文主要分析了标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的问题。标尺竞争法是一种相对常见的对配电行业公司进行监督的方法,论文将其应用到配电行业公司的投资决策中,并运用标尺竞争法的“影子公司”概念构建“虚拟模型公司”。论文对“虚拟模型公司”的选择问题与选择对策进行分析,找出适合标尺竞争法在公司投资决策中应用的模式。     

论互联网与保险科技结合的重要性

随着互联网科技的快速发展,其影响力已深入市场经济的各个部分,保险行业依托云计算、大数据等互联网科学技术,不断推动自身发展。但在互联网科技时代,互联网保险行业也出现了诸多问题,有必要对这些问题进行探讨,并提出相应的指导策略。     

我国城市建筑垃圾资源化现状及对策研究

随着我国基础设施的大规模建设以及城镇化进程的快速推进,建筑垃圾的产生量日益增多。建筑垃圾资源化作为解决当前环境问题的一种有效途径,对实现资源的优化配置以及经济社会的可持续发展具有重要意义。论文首先阐述了建筑垃圾资源化的基础理论,并采用建筑面积估算法对我国城市建筑垃圾的产生量进行了估算,进而分析了我国建筑垃圾资源化的现状,并提出了实现建筑垃圾资源化的具体对策。     

Winner-take-all price competition

Summary. We analyze an oligopoly model of homogeneous product price competition that allows for discontinuities in demand and/or costs. Conditions under which only zero profit equilibrium outcomes obtain in such settings are provided. We then illustrate through a series of examples that the conditions provided are “tight” in the sense that their relaxation leads to positive profit outcomes. Received: April 7, 2000; revised version: September 14, 2000     

Effect of credible quality investment with Bertrand and Cournot competition

We show how credible revelation and ability to commit to quality choice effect equilibrium qualities and welfare when product market is either Bertrand or Cournot competition. We show that results depend on the type of competition but not generally on the cost of quality function. We show that with Bertrand competition, the equilibrium qualities are lower with credible commitment. Competition is moderated and producer surplus is higher and consumer surplus lower. With Cournot competition, higher quality will be better but lower quality will be worse with credible commitment. Consumer surplus is always greater with credible commitment and if cost does not increase too quickly with quality, producer surplus will also increase. Thus credible commitment is a collusive device with Bertrand competition but it can improve social welfare with Cournot competition. Received: February 8, 2000; revised version: February 14, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" The idea of this paper originated in the weekly workshops of Mordecai Kurz at Stanford. I am forever in debted to Mordecai and fellow students – Luis Cabral, Peter DeMarzo, John Hillas, Michihiro Kandori, Steve Langois, Patrick McAllister, Steve Sharpe, Peter Streufert, Steve Turnbull and Gyu-Ho Wang – for their criticism and encouragement. I also benefited from comments from Yi-Heng Chen, Jin-Li Hu, Kala Krishna, Jinji Naoto, Thomas J. Prusa, and Shyh-Fang Ueng at various later stages of this work. Last but not least, I am grateful for the detailed comments of the referee.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Unemployment insurance: The role of electoral systems and regional labour markets

Levels of insurance against unemployment vary considerably across countries. Replacement rates, the ratio relating income from unemployment to what people earned when they were employed, are higher in countries with proportional electoral systems than in countries with majoritarian systems. Also, replacement rates are positively correlated with per capita income and negatively correlated with the countries' unemployment rates. I develop an electoral competition model that replicates these stylized facts.     

Taxation of Mobile Factors as Insurance under Uncertainty

This paper considers the effects of the taxation of mobile factors, i.e., capital, under uncertainty. The wages earned by residents of a jurisdiction are uncertain due to random shocks. Since the uncertain wages in a jurisdiction depend on the amount of mobile capital employed in the jurisdiction, and since taxation alters the quantity of capital employed, taxation affects the riskiness of uncertain wages. In particular, the taxation of capital moderates the fluctuation of uncertain wages, thereby providing insurance. For this reason, jurisdictions use distortionary capital taxation even if lump‐sum taxation is available. In addition, this insurance effect counteracts the tendency toward too low tax rates on capital arising from tax competition, and possibly improves the efficiency of tax competition.