财政的政策性职能何去何从？

单纯调整总量关系的财政政策定位已经不能适用需要,长期性,战略性,体制性因素巳成为影响供求平衡的主要因素。财政政策应当在资本退出的补偿援助上发挥更大的作用,对过剩生产能力可施行政策性收购。财政要“积极”承担改革成本,可用发长债的收入直接支付改革过程中的转转代价,比较少的财政资源调动更多增量资源向落后地区集中,有必要探索“地方发债、中央贴息”的方法。     

我国债券市场流动性的现状及对策浅识

债券市场是金融市场的重要组成部分,债券流动性作为具有能够迅速低市场成本交易的能力,是债券市场发展必不可少的条件。近年来我国债券市场发展迅速,但由于交易平台、交易制度、交易品种和投资者结构等方面的原因,导致我国债券市场的流动性发展缓慢。本文通过对债券市场流动性现状的分析,找出债券市场流动性缺失的原因,并结合我国的实际情况提出相应的策略。     

Preferential Regulatory Treatment and Banks' Demand for Government Bonds

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on banks' demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction‐level data, our analysis suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation significantly increases banks' demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital regulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds. We also find evidence that this “regulatory effect” leads banks to reduce lending to the real economy.     

A structural framework for modelling contingent capital

This paper develops a structural model of contingent capital. In contrast to existing approaches we explicitly link the firm’s total payout to its cost of debt, leading to a total payout that is linear in—as opposed to proportional to—asset value. In the special case that asset value evolves as affine geometric Brownian motion we derive closed-form expressions for limiting (i.e. perpetual) bond values. The proposed model is flexible, so that it can be used to gauge the relative merits of different variations of contingent capital, and parsimonious, so that it is relatively easy to implement in practice. An empirical example using data from the Canadian banking sector is provided that illustrates how the model can generate insights into problems that are of interest to both regulators and issuers of contingent capital (e.g. what range of conversion prices would be consistent with regulatory guidelines, and how expensive is contingent debt over this range).     

Return generating processes of long-term bonds and measurement of risk: Theory and empirical tests

Using a continuous-time framework, Kazemi (1992) shows that changes in prices of long-term bonds could be perfectly correlated with changes in the representative investor's marginal utility of wealth. Therefore, the equilibrium expected excess return on any security would be proportional to its covariance with changes in prices of long-term bonds. The present paper first extends the above result to a discrete time framework and shows that there are significant differences between the continuous time and discrete time versions of the model. Second, we test an empirical implication of this result; the evidence supports the theoretical model.     

Disentangling types of liquidity and testing limits-to-arbitrage theories in the CDS–bond basis

We disentangle asset-specific, market, and funding liquidity in the CDS–bond basis outside and during the 2007–9 global financial crisis. Our findings stress the importance of separating different types of liquidity, since all three measures have independently negative impacts on the basis. Funding liquidity emerges as the economically most important liquidity metric. While asset-specific liquidity is cross-correlated in both the cash and derivative markets, funding and market liquidity only matter for the cash market. We exploit the decomposition of the basis to test predictions of limits-to-arbitrage theories. We find strong evidence in favor of margin-based asset pricing and flight-to-quality effects.     

Staging of Venture Financing, Investor Opportunism and Patent Law

Abstract:  Stage financing provides a real option that is valuable when facing external uncertainty. However, it may also induce investor hold-up, if the property rights on an invention are not sufficiently protected. As a consequence, the entrepreneur may not work hard. Investor opportunism is less likely to occur, if investors' residual cash-flow-rights are contingent on verifiable 'milestones' in the previous stage. Equity-linked financing also provides high-powered incentives to the investor not to 'steal the idea' because his payoff becomes sensitive to the project value. The paper provides a new explanation for both types of contractual provisions.