公司债务期限结构问题研究综述

本文对国内外公司债务期限结构间题的理论和经验研究进行了全面、系统的回顾，包括两方面内容：一是公司债务期限结构与公司价值之间的关系，二是公司债务期限结构的影响因素。本文评价了现有文献存在的问题和不足之处，为中国上市公司债务期限结构问题研究提供了依据和方向。     

创业企业资本融资:相机治理的研究视角

由于创业企业的信息不对称,易产生逆向选择,导致创业资本市场低效率,因此创业企业融资难众所周知。本文从相机治理的角度,通过一套制度安排,实现了创业投资家对创业企业家的激励与约束,成功地解决了创业投资家与创业企业家之间的委托代理问题,使创业企业获得了创业资本的支持。     

资源类上市公司的价值评估方法探讨

现有“利润加储量”的评估方法应用于资源类公司仍在某些环节出现悖论。本文认为，资源类上市公司的价值构成应包括矿权重估溢价、正常开采投资收益及个别公司的超额利润。其中，采矿权重估溢价的潜在收益应是在矿权未市场化之前的资源类企业获得的特有收益，但其收益期和相应的折现期也因矿权的逐步市场化而受到采矿权有效期的限制。本文用简单模型估算了主要资源类上市公司的基本价值。     

价值链空间形态演变下的治理模式研究--以集成电路(IC)产业为例

伴随经济发展、市场变化、技术演进，价值链的分离与整合在不同空间尺度中上演。其组织形态发生了巨大的变化，相应的其治理模式也随之改变。本文首先界定了价值链治理的概念，分析了价值链层级型、市场型、网络型、半层级型治理模式的特点。然后从独特的空间视角，研究价值链的形态演变，以及与其形态变化相对应的治理模式的改变。并以集成电路产业（以下简称IC产业）为例．系统地分析了IC产业价值链治理模式变化的过程．     

组织信息体制、制度化关联与高技术企业集群治理效率

高技术企业集群是一种网络式中间体组织，其组织结构更多的表现为组织之间垂直方向和水平方向的信息关联关系。不同的信息关联形成不同的信息体制。高技术企业集群治理合约分为VC捆绑武治理合约、转换者式治理合约、主导企业式治理合约等三种典型形式．其治理合约的选择受制于信息体制的交易费用大小。信息体制有其特定的制度生存环境，并且具有不同的交易费用结构特征．必须使制度环境与信息体制相匹配。制度化关联与信息体制的耦合互动可以弥补组织信息体制内生的体制缺陷．降低总交易费用。制度环境的扰动和制度的历时关联影响治理合约的治理效率．治理合约需要做出相应的调遣．     

The Original Maturity of Corporate Bonds: The Influence of Credit Rating,Asset Maturity,Security, and Macroeconomic Conditions

We examine the determinants of the new issue maturity of corporate bonds. As credit rating decreases, new bond issues have longer maturities, but substantial variation in maturity within each rating class remains. We seek to explain the variation of new issue maturity within credit classes. We find that asset maturity, security covenants, and macroeconomic conditions influence the new issue maturity of bonds within rating categories.     

Corporate governance in a major British holding company: BSA in the interwar years

This paper uses a case study of BSA to examine corporate governance in a holding company during the interwar years. Recognised as generally progressive in its policy towards financial disclosure, nevertheless BSA attracted hostile criticism from its shareholders, showed little evidence of developing administrative coordination and provided limited detailed information concerning the performance of its subsidiaries. Voice did have an effect in changing the pattern of financial reporting, but even under the pressure of its banker, when financial circumstances deteriorated in the early 1930s, BSA was only prepared to change personnel while organisational structures remained in place.     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.     

我国银行业改革与引进外资的开放竞争策略

针对我国银行业面临的问题和外资银行进入后的竞争压力,本文通过分析几种不同改革思路后认为,我国银行业改革的核心问题是产权和公司治理,两者紧密相连,产权改革是为了获得良好的公司治理,私有化和引入外资都是可供选择的产权改革方式之一,理论上不存在何者更优.国有商业银行改革的关键在于改变国有独资所有权结构为多元投资结构,可供选择的方案有不改变所有权性质的多个国有投资主体的单一所有制和引进包括国有、民营、外资参股的多元所有制.鉴于我国银行业目前的特点,外资参股并不是一种最优的选择,引进外资银行的正确策略是:独资优于合作,合作优于合资.