Do ‘Good Governance’ Codes Enhance Financial Accountability? Evidence from Managerial Pay in Dutch Charities

This paper examines the initial impact of a ‘good governance’ code for charitable organisations that was promulgated in the Netherlands in 2005. Data are gathered from publicly available annual reports of 138 charities in the post‐implementation phase of the code (2005–2008). We first examine whether the code altered charities’ governance structures. Next, we investigate managerial pay as a key aspect of discharging financial accountability because prior literature focused on ‘excessive’ compensation. The findings indicate that a strengthened governance structure positively affects the likelihood of disclosing information concerning managerial pay, as well as mitigating managerial pay level.     

浅析我国当前通货膨胀的成因及治理对策建议

稳定物价已成为政府宏观调控的重中之重。为避免由于种种原因形成的通货膨胀给我国经济发展带来较大的负面影响,我们必须采取相关措施,要持续的将总量政策和结构政策相很好的组合起来,进行短期应急计划和措施与建立能长期保证制度正常运行并发挥预期功能的制度体系相结合,综合的采取各种各样的政策组合,比较有指向性地使用各种各样的措施在一定程度上减少对造成物价上涨的各种不利因素,抑制通货膨胀蔓延,使我国经济稳定的发展。     

对美国公司丑闻事件的若干思考

美国近期发生的一系列公司丑闻，暴露出其公司治理方面还存在着诸多缺陷。本文对其中的代理问题、中介机构的公正性、市场自我修、经济模式孰优孰劣，以及我国可借鉴之处等问题进行了探讨。     

国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究——基于双重型、叠加式委托代理的视角

国有跨国公司境外企业股权结构的相对集中或高度集中和产权关系的延伸,使其委托代理呈现出双重型、叠加式的特征。基于此特征,文章确立了双重型、叠加式委托代理理论并作为国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理研究的分析框架。研究结果表明,完善国有跨国公司境外企业公司治理的前提和基础在于委托代理链能否形成有效的传导机制以及各级委托链的委托人和代理人是否明确。在公司治理结构与机制优化的基础上,文章提出应从控股股东或大股东对经营者和中小股东对其代理人两条途径同时降低公司治理成本,并通过模型对控股股东或大股东获取租金的合理界限与范围进行了界定。     

Pro-cyclical effect of sovereign rating changes on stock returns: a fact or factoid?

This article examines the effect of changes in sovereign credit ratings and their outlook on the stock market returns of European countries at different phases of business cycle. Using standard four-factor model, it records a significant average marginal effect of credit rating announcements on stock market returns. Both magnitude and significance of the effect vary with business cycle and across announcement types. However, we do not find evidence of pro-cyclical effect of sovereign rating and outlook changes on stock returns. Our results show that stock markets react more negatively to rating downgrades in recovery phases and more positively to rating upgrades in contractionary period. Both results are statistically significant and robust to various sensitivity tests.     

负债制度阈值下债务结构对公司成长性的影响

在证监会IPO申请审核标准的约束下,中国存在70%和20%负债制度阈值。以2001-201 0年中国A股9860家上市公司为样本,研究发现,当负债小于20%时,长期债务或银行借款对公司增长起限制作用,而且银行借款对公司价值造成负面影响;当负债超过70%时,由于债权人的预算软约束,长期债务不减反增,助长了公司非理性高速增长,以及银行放任公司高风险高增长,造成公司价值毁损;当负债在20%与70%之间时,预算软约束状况得到改善,但负债的正面治理效应仍不显著。     

The impacts of SOX and SEC investigation on the corporate governance of option backdating firms

This study investigates the combined impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) and the subsequent related Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) initiatives on the corporate governance characteristics of firms that had historically backdated stock options. Our results show that backdating firms had both weaker board-level and committee-level corporate governance characteristics than control firms in the pre-SOX period. In contrast, backdating firms dress up their board-level governance to meet regulatory requirements but still feature weaker committee-level corporate governance in the post-SOX era.     

价值链空间形态演变下的治理模式研究--以集成电路(IC)产业为例

伴随经济发展、市场变化、技术演进，价值链的分离与整合在不同空间尺度中上演。其组织形态发生了巨大的变化，相应的其治理模式也随之改变。本文首先界定了价值链治理的概念，分析了价值链层级型、市场型、网络型、半层级型治理模式的特点。然后从独特的空间视角，研究价值链的形态演变，以及与其形态变化相对应的治理模式的改变。并以集成电路产业（以下简称IC产业）为例．系统地分析了IC产业价值链治理模式变化的过程．     

Is earnings management opportunistic or beneficial? An agency theory perspective

Earnings management has been cast into negative light due to the recent corporate scandals and, therefore, is viewed as detrimental to the firm. Enron and Worldcom represent two of the most egregious cases of opportunistic earnings management that led to the largest bankruptcies in U.S. history. However, some argue that earnings management may be beneficial because it improves the information value of earnings by conveying private information to the stockholders and the public. We offer agency theory as a tool to distinguish between the opportunistic and beneficial uses of earnings management. The empirical evidence suggests that firms where earnings management occurs to a larger (less) extent suffer less (more) agency costs. Moreover, a positive relation is documented between firm value and the extent of earnings management. Taken together, the results reveal that earnings management is, on average, not detrimental.