债务融资的契约分析

从契约的角度分析企业存在的债务融资。通过三类具体的债务契约分析各类债权人对企业约束和监督存在的差异,并对如何提高我国债权人的监控效率,提出了四项制度安排。     

Regulatory Protection and Opportunistic Bankruptcy*

We document controlling shareholder (insider) opportunism in an insolvency regime that uses an accounting rule to determine bankruptcy eligibility. Our study sheds light on managerial incentives induced by weak investor protection laws. Using unique data on bankrupt firms from an emerging market, consistent with our prediction, we show insiders intentionally manage earnings downward to understate firm net worth so as to be able to file for bankruptcy. Downward pre-bankruptcy earnings management is associated with more payments to insiders and weaker performance, post-filing. A battery of tests suggests our results cannot be fully explained as an artifact of financial distress. Rather, they are consistent with insiders exploiting weak investor protection to extract private benefits at the expense of lenders and outside shareholders. Our study serves as a cautionary tale for all insolvency regimes that use a balance sheet test in an environment with weak creditor protection.     

Stock market,credit market,and heterogeneous innovations

The relative importance of credit market development and stock market development in boosting innovation remains a long-standing debate issue. In this study, we document how different types of financial markets development affect heterogeneous innovations. Using a broad sample across 42 developed and emerging economies and a generalized difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that stock market development leads to significantly higher substantive innovation, especially in young and small firms, but has negative impact on incremental innovation. Conversely, credit market development promotes incremental innovation, especially in mature and large firms, but has negative impact on substantive innovation. Further analyses indicate that stronger shareholder protection enhances the positive impact of stock market on substantive innovation, while stronger creditor rights enhance the promoting effect of credit market on incremental innovation, and even turn the negative impact of credit market on substantive innovation into positive. Our paper provides new insights into the heterogeneous effects of credit market and equity markets on the real economy.     

Investment–cash flow sensitivity and investor protection

We examine the role of country-level legal investor protection (i.e., shareholder and creditor protection) on firm investment–cash flow sensitivity (ICFS). Using underexplored research data on investor protection across 21 countries and working with a conservative empirical design, we extend prior literature on the relation between investor protection and ICFS and provide new evidence on how these country-level attributes interact to explain a firm's ICFS. We find that either the strong legal protection of minority shareholders or the strong legal protection of creditors reduces the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. However, in countries with strong levels of both minority shareholder and creditor protection, ICFS increases. Our results remain robust after controlling for several alternative explanations. The results support the argument that overregulation arises when policymakers increase investor protection at levels that lead firms to avoid external sources of finance, hampering firm investment. Our findings suggest that countries face a regulatory trade-off such that increasing investor protection (either shareholder or creditors protection) enhances financial markets efficiency, but excessive regulation can indeed lead to financial markets inefficiencies.