Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting

We suggest an equilibrium concept for a strategic model with a large number of players in which each player observes the actions of only a small number of the other players. The concept fits well situations in which each player treats his sample as a prediction of the distribution of actions in the entire population, and responds optimally to this prediction. We apply the concept to a strategic voting model and investigate the conditions under which a centrist candidate can win the popular vote although his strength in the population is smaller than the strengths of the right and left candidates.     

基于累积前景理论的农村环境治理决策行为演化博弈研究

从政府的角度出发,以排污企业作为研究对象,合理改进累计前景理论的价值函数,建立村民参与监督下政府和排污企业的农村环境治理决策行为演化博弈模型,进而得到使排污企业积极治理农村环境的约束条件。在综合考虑双方前景价值感知的基础上引入环境治理补贴,构建环境补贴对排污企业价值感知与环境治理决策行为的影响模型,最后运用系统动力学分析村民参与下政府和排污企业环境治理前景价值感知与治理决策行为。解决了传统博弈论完全理性假设和均衡分析方法的局限性,考虑政府和排污企业前景价值感知与环境治理补贴下积极参与农村环境治理的行为特征与规律,以及村民参与监督对政府和排污企业环境治理决策行为的影响,为构建我国农村环境多主体治理机制提供决策参考。     

Dual class shares – is India ready for it?

Market evidence suggest that a class of common stock with superior voting rights trades at systematically higher prices than an identical class of stock with inferior voting rights, as control over the firm grants the promoters some opportunity to receive a higher payoff. Differential voting rights class of shares may attract a certain class of investors who are only interested in the economic benefits of a company. It assists management in deterring potential rivals from winning a control and allows raising fresh capital for growth without giving up control. The value of controlling a firm derives from the fact that you believe that you or someone else would operate the firm differently from the way it is being run currently. Differential voting rights shares in different countries have indicated that voting rights are generally worth between 10% and 20% of the value of common stock. This article intends to create awareness about differential voting rights shares, to study the international as well as domestic experience and tries to examine the various factors that affect differential voting rights share prices.     

Heterogeneity and peer effects in mutual fund proxy voting

This paper studies voting in corporate director elections. We construct a comprehensive data set of 2,058,788 mutual fund votes over a two-year period. We find systematic heterogeneity in voting: some funds are consistently more management-friendly than others. We also establish the presence of peer effects: a fund is more likely to oppose management when other funds are more likely to oppose it, all else being equal. We estimate a voting model whose supermodular structure allows us to compute social multipliers due to peer effects. Heterogeneity and peer effects are as important in shaping voting outcomes as firm and director characteristics.     

可转换债券发行的长期股票市场价格绩效研究

应用长期事件研究法,对2000-2004年间发行可转换债券的上市公司的长期市场绩效表现进行了实证研究。研究结果表明,可转债发行前后,可转债标的公司的长期股票价格绩效在绝大多数区间上显著优于行业、规模与权益市值对面值比率的对照组,也显著优于等权加权和总市值加权的综合市场收益率;选择兼有债权和股票期权双重属性的可转债,在一定程度上可以维持标的公司股票价格长期绩效的优良表现。