论股东表决权的限制

表决权是股东最本质的固有权利,原则上不得剥夺并限制。但是,决议的最终目的是公正地产生股东们普遍意愿,决议应代表全体股东或大多数股东的利益。但有时候会存在大股东滥用表决权或表决权的行使会损害公正性的危险。因此,本文将从股东表决权的限制角度,阐述如何实现对中小股东利益的保护。     

Voting in assemblies of shareholders and incomplete markets

Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at -majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a -majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that -majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D21, D52, D71, G39. Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés.     

上市公司资产重组市场效应的实证分析

从市场效应的角度来揭示重大资产重组事件对公司价值的影响。通过对2000-2003年中国上市公司的187个资产重组事件的平均股价和累计非正常收益率实证分析表明,市场对上市公司的重大资产重组有强烈的超前反应,资产重组给公司带来了一定的价值提升。     

A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem to weighted voting games with many small voters

We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role. I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.     

The role of tax regulation and compensation contracts in the decision to voluntarily expense employee stock options

We show that firms with executive bonuses that qualify for deduction under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m) were less likely to expense stock option compensation (SOC) in 2002. Additionally, the more likely it is that a qualified firm will incur re-contracting costs, the less likely it is that the firm will expense SOC. CEOs of qualified firms that also expense SOC receive smaller bonuses than CEOs of expensing firms that are not qualified under 162(m), and the lower 162(m) bonuses are not offset by higher SOC. Our results suggest that 162(m) tax incentives are an important determinant of the decision to expense SOC.     

累积投票制与投资者保护

 基于近年来频发的个股崩盘现象,本文运用2013-2018年上市公司的数据,对大股东减持前的业绩预告信息进行分析,探究业绩预告、大股东减持与股价崩盘风险之间的内在联系,并针对不同市场环境和股份性质进行实证检验。结果表明,上市公司倾向于在减持前公布积极业绩预告。其在一定程度上提高股价崩盘现象的发生率,在熊市和民营公司中作用更加明显,消极业绩预告影响不显著。本文的研究丰富了信息披露与股价反应的相关文献,对投资者和监管部门做出决策具有一定的启示意义。     

Similarly traded securities: Greek common vs. preferred stock

This paper examines the price spread between voting (common) and non‐voting (preferred) stocks during the period 1990–95 for a sample of 55 Greek companies. Because in Greece preferred stocks are not essentially different from common stocks, a number of hypotheses were tested to explain the observed differences. The data reveal an average spread of 27.5% for the entire period which, however, varies across years considerably. In cross‐sectional regressions it was found that the volatility of common stock returns, the liquidity of common shares relative to preferred shares, the ownership concentration, and the minimum dividend yield guaranteed to preferred stockholders explain a significant portion of the spread.     

Victory margins and the paradox of voting

This paper addresses a simple question: why do people vote? Though simple, this question remains unanswered despite the considerable attention it has received. In this paper, I show that purely rational–instrumental factors explain a large fraction of turnout variations, provided that the effect of the margin of victory on implemented policy is considered. I extend Myerson's models of elections based on Poisson games, and show that, when platforms are responsive to vote shares, the predictions of the model become consistent with several stylized facts, including the secular fall in turnout rates in the US.     

制度传导的累积效应与优化策略

文章以非公经济36条和新36条及其配套政策为制度背景,界定了制度传导的概念,并分析了制度传导的配套效应、及时效应和目标效应,从而构成制度传导的累积效应,其中制度传导作用的向度、强度、速度、效度和协调度是判别制度传导效率的重要指标。针对制度传导瓶颈,借鉴以非公经济36条为核心的制度传导经验,以开放、协同、高效、循环的思维构建制度传导系统,从制度协调机制、政策再制定机制、组织执行机制、认知反应机制和监控反馈机制五个方面提出制度传导优化的策略建议,以期提高以新36条为核心的民间投资制度传导效率。     

股份公司股东表决权限缩的激励分析

在股份公司的多方利益相关主体中,股东拥有表决权。一股一权是表决权行使的基本原则,但在公司实践中还存在股东的表决权由于特定原因被限缩的情形,这一现象蕴藏着深刻的激励因素,其中包括产权的赋予和责任的配置。