The structure of bias in peer voting systems: lessons from the Eurovision Song Contest

This paper assesses whether and how common characteristics of jury members or peer voters affect the outcomes of voting systems. In particular, we analyze to what extent these common features result in voting bias. We take as a case study the Eurovision Song Contest for which an extensive amount of historical data is available. In contrast to earlier studies we analyze the impact of common factors on the bias individually for each country, which is necessary to substantiate the publicly debated accusations of regional block voting by certain groups of countries. We establish strong evidence for voting bias in the song contest on the basis of geography, even after correction for culture, language, religion and ethnicity. However, these effects do generally not correspond to the usual accusations. We believe that our findings extend to all instances where groups of jury members or peer voters share certain common factors, which may cause voting bias. It is important to identify such structures explicitly, as it can help avoiding bias in the first place. The authors are grateful to Marieke van Dijk for excellent research assistance and to Laurens Swinkels, Ieva Pudane, Gijsbert van Lomwel, Jelena Stefanovic, and Bas van den Heuvel for useful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.     

累积创新中的内生许可证

This paper analyzes the endogeneity of licensing arrangements in cost-reducing cumulative innovation. There exists the following results. First, for the first-generation patentee, ex post licensing matters for rent extraction while ex ante licensing matters for efficiency. Second, if the second-generation innovator does not exit, then the firms’ profits as well as social welfare are all irrelevant to whether ex ante licensing is allowed. Third, costly litigation can occur on the equilibrium path and its occurrence is also irrelevant to ex ante licensing. Interestingly, the conditional probability of the first-generation patentee winning litigation first decreases and then increases in patent breadth. Fourth, optimal patent breadth depends on the tradeoff between litigation costs and antitrust effect. Translated from Shijie Jingji Wenhui 世界经济文汇 (World Economic Papers), 2006, (6): 1–29     

上市公司资产重组市场效应的实证分析

从市场效应的角度来揭示重大资产重组事件对公司价值的影响。通过对2000-2003年中国上市公司的187个资产重组事件的平均股价和累计非正常收益率实证分析表明,市场对上市公司的重大资产重组有强烈的超前反应,资产重组给公司带来了一定的价值提升。     

Capital gains lock-in and governance choices

Differences in accrued gains and investors’ tax-sensitivity induce variation in a capital gains lock-in effect across mutual funds even for the same stock at the same time. Exploiting this variation, we show this effect influences funds’ governance decisions: higher capital gains decrease the likelihood a fund exits prior to contentious votes and increase the likelihood a fund votes against management. Consistent with tax motivation, these findings are concentrated among funds with tax-sensitive investors. Further, high aggregate capital gains across funds holding a stock predict a higher likelihood management loses a vote and a lower likelihood a contentious vote is proposed.     

Political budget cycles and voting within a federal country: The influence of political alignment

We study how distributive politics affects political budget cycles and voting within a federal country. Our model predicts not only that the president favors politically aligned governors with larger transfers, but also that voters favor gubernatorial candidates aligned with the expected presidential incumbent because larger transfers are expected in the future. These predictions are upheld by the data from Argentinean provinces during the 1984–2014 period. Our findings imply that political alignment can trump the selection effect of voting the most competent candidate. This can help explain in particular coattail effects when gubernatorial and presidential elections are concurrent.     

Effects of runoff voting rules on number of parties and candidates' political experience: Evidence from a law change in Peru

We study the effect of a change in electoral rules on political competition, measured by the number of candidates and their political experience. We explore the effects of a change in legislation, introduced a year before the gubernatorial elections in Peru on the number of parties that participated in these elections. We also investigate how the legislative change affected the political experience of the candidates. Given that the legislative change did not apply to elections for provincial mayors, we use those elections as a control group, in a difference-in-differences design. Our estimates show the number of parties registered increased by a margin of around 2.2 after the legislative change. The change also increased the candidates' years of accumulated political experience, particularly in the subsequent gubernatorial elections.     

Economic transition and elections in Poland1

Poland's economic and political transition, one of the most successful, has depended very heavily on job creation in new firms to replace the jobs lost in the formerly state‐owned enterprises. This paper uses survey and aggregate data from three Polish elections to suggest that these de novo firms, the individuals they employ, and the residents in the local areas where they exist become an important constituency supporting pro‐reform political parties and constraining the actions of parties less sympathetic to the reforms. The creation of this political constituency helps explain how countries can successfully pursue both economic and political reforms. JEL classification: D72, P26.     

阿马蒂亚·森的价值限制定理研究

在简单介绍投票悖论的基础上 ,较系统地阐述了阿马蒂亚·森解决投票悖论问题的对策———价值限制定理 ,并对其进行了较为客观的评价。