Public-private sector wage differentials in Germany: Evidence from quantile regression

This paper measures and decomposes the differences in earnings distributions between public sector and private sector employees in Germany for the years 1984–2001. Oaxaca decomposition results suggest that conditional wages are higher in the public sector for women but lower for men. Using the quantile regression decomposition technique proposed by Machado and Mata (2004), we find that the conditional distribution of wages is more compressed in the public sector. At the low end of wages, differences in characteristics explain less than the raw wage gap when it is the opposite at high wages. Separate analyses by work experience and educational groups reveal that the most experienced employees and those with basic schooling do best in the public sector. All these results are stable over the 80s and 90s.I thank Michael Lechner and the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Mannheim, for letting me work with the full sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). I am grateful to an anonymous referee and particularly to the editor, Bernd Fitzenberger, for providing me detail comments and suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. I have also benefited from discussions with Michael Lechner and Ruth Miquel.First version received: April 2002/Final version received: June 2004     

Rent Seeking with Efforts and Bids

We introduce bids in a rent-seeking contest. Players compete for a prize. Apart from exerting lobbying efforts, they also submit a bid which is payable only if they win the prize. We show that our model has a unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, in which each active player submits the same bid, while the sum of all efforts equals that bid. In equilibrium there is underdissipation of rent.     

Open access,common property and scarcity rent in fisheries

Open access resources are frequently not managed efficiently, resulting in falling stock levels and a declining income for fishermen. In the late 1970's, the policy response to this problem was the implementation of 200-mile fishing zones, which enabled the European Union to formulate and implement the Common Fisheries Policy, aimed at (among other things) conservation and distribution of available stocks. In Germany, this shift from an open access regime towards a common property regime had favourable outcomes. The trend of falling prices was reversed. The conclusion was that intertemporal efficiency had increased as a result of (inter)governmental policy. Apparently, a wedge was formed between price and marginal harvesting costs, implying that scarcity rent had returned as a component of prices.     

Natural resources, capital accumulation and the resource curse

Early concern by economists for the effect of natural capital on economic growth gave way to complacency and neglect during the nineteenth century. Evidence has emerged, however, that since the 1960s the economic performance of low-income countries has been inversely related to their natural resource wealth. This relationship is not a deterministic one so policy counts. SEEA can help improve the policy and performance of resource-abundant low-income countries by reinforcing the rationale for the sound management of natural resources and also by providing an index of policy sustainability in the form of the net saving rate. This policy index, along with other measures such as a capital fund for sterilizing the rent, initiatives to increase the transparency of rent flows and the rigorous evaluation of alternative uses of additional public sector revenue can improve the efficiency by which natural resource rent is transformed into alternative forms of capital to sustain rising social welfare. Chad and Mauritania provide case studies to illustrate how SEEA and net saving can be used to diagnose policy failure and improve economic performance.     

家族企业中的歧视现象 --作为非正式治理机制的歧视

歧视现象普遍存在于家族企业，本文认为，歧视是家族企业在正式治理机制弱化情况下实施的一种非正式治理机制。家族企业扩张和管理的复杂化，要求雇佣高能力的外部代理人开展专业化分工，但是，现有的正式治理机制难以抑制外部代理人的寻租行为，过高的代理成本阻碍了分工的深入。业主会利用家族代理人和外部代理人共享的“准私人信息”，以及代理人之间信息租金的不同分布，根据血亲关系和私人关系在不同代理人之间实施歧视，通过给与家族代理人优厚待遇，达到抽取外部代理人的信息租金，降低代理成本的目的。     

“Itô's Lemma” and the Bellman Equation for Poisson Processes: An Applied View

Using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, we derive both a Keynes-Ramsey rule and a closed form solution for an optimal consumption-investment problem with labor income. The utility function is unbounded and uncertainty stems from a Poisson process. Our results can be derived because of the proofs presented in the accompanying paper by Sennewald (2006). Additional examples are given which highlight the correct use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation and the change-of-variables formula (sometimes referred to as ``Itô's Lemma'') under Poisson uncertainty.     

Joseph A. Schumpeter’s contributions in the area of fiscal sociology: a first approximation

Fiscal sociology deals with the ramifications of the fiscal activities of the state into areas which are not their primary target. These effects may occur in sectors not directly affected such as related markets, but they may also occur outside the economic sphere proper, such as in politics, culture, religion, or society at large. Schumpeter contributed to the research project of fiscal sociology throughout his life. In this first approximation, his contribution is discussed in terms of his appreciation of three important scholars who all made landmark contributions to fiscal sociology: Franz Oppenheimer, Werner Sombart, and Gustav (von) Schmoller.JEL Classification: B15, H39     

Nonpoint Source Pollution Taxes and Excessive Tax Burden

If a regulator is unable to measure firms’ individual emissions, an ambient tax can be used to achieve the socially desired level of pollution. With this tax, each firm pays a unit tax on aggregate emissions. In order for the tax to be effective, firms must recognize that their decisions affect aggregate emissions. When firms behave strategically with respect to the tax-setting regulator, under plausible circumstances their tax burden is lower under an ambient tax, relative to the tax which charges firms on the basis of individual emissions. Firms may prefer the case where the regulator is unable to observe individual firm emissions, even if this asymmetric information causes the regulator to tax each firm on the basis of aggregate emissions.     

Managing the international commons: Resource use and pollution control

The simultaneous management, in an international context, of free-access renewable resources and transboundary pollution, is examined in a dynamic game framework. First-best outcomes under international cooperation are determined and compared to noncooperative outcomes when countries follow linear Markov strategies. An international policy consisting of taxes on emissions and harvesting, with international redistribution of tax receipts, is used to achieve the cooperative solution. In addition, side payments may be required to prevent free riding and thus make the international policy implementable.Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the International WorkshopEconomic Aspects of International Water Resources Utilization in the Mediterranean Basin, Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei, Milan, October 1993, and the Fifth Annual Conference of EAERE, Dublin, June 1994. I would like to thank Peter Berck, Charles Kolstad, Mordechai Schechter, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

手扶拖拉机运输操纵性能的改进设计

文章从东风-12型手扶拖拉机入手,针对手把式手扶拖拉机在运输操纵性能方面的缺陷,讨论在原机结构允许的情况下,用差速器及差速锁取代牙嵌式离合器,对其相应机构进行改进,改造为差速器式手扶拖拉机,从而提高运输操纵性及安全性,并保证较低的改造成本。