论我国土地征收补偿制度之完善

我国征地补偿标准以耕地常年产值为依据,以被征地农民的利益为代价来换取城市的发展建设,与当前我国的市场经济体制不相适应.发达国家的土地征收补偿制度为我国土地征收补偿制度的完善提供了宝贵借鉴.我国土地征收补偿制度可通过提高补偿标准、完善土地征收补偿方式、建立和完善失地农民社会保障制度等方式逐步完善.     

加强环境审计促进生态建设

在人类经济高速发展创造着现代文明的同时，其生态环境却遭受着前所未有的蹂躏与破坏，环境污染日益加剧。如何从制造污染的企业外部和内部同时寻求治理监督环境污染的有力措施，这是本文的意义所在。本文从环境审计对生态建设的作用入手，分析现阶段我国环境问题和环境审计现状，并探讨环境审计的程序与方法，以促进我国的生态建设。     

博弈论在构建生态产业链中的应用分析

构建生态产业链的目的是为了实现废弃物的再生和循环利用,从而减少污染物的排放。本文运用博弈论方法,分析了上下游企业及政府部门在构建生态产业链问题上的不同利益动机及博弈行为。通过对博弈均衡结果的分析,得出了构建生态产业链,实现废弃物再生循环利用必须满足的条件。同时,博弈均衡的结果也为企业生态成本内部化提供了一定依据,并表明了政府部门加强监督管理的重要性。在此基础上,提出了相应的措施和建议。     

我国土地征用制度探讨

国家为了公共利益的需要,可以依法对土地实行征用,但是这种征用必须符合公共利益、给予公平补偿、满足正当程序的要求。完善我国土地征用制度应该在这三个方面着手。     

Investor efficiency in the face of takings

Governmental entities at all levels are empowered to acquire private property for the public's benefit, provided that just compensation is paid. The level of compensation typically viewed by courts as just is market value, but questions arise as to whether market value compensation motivates the private owner of land, potentially subject to a taking, to improve the property to a degree that is socially efficient. Earlier works have found market value to be a compensation level too high to promote efficiency. The present paper offers an analysis, based on a simple model of investor profit maximization, that provides a unified view of models presented in some important earlier works. In a special application of the general case, it is shown that market value can be too low a level of compensation to promote efficient behavior by the land owner.     

管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的行业性差异分析--来自我国上市公司的实证证据

本文的研究以我国上市公司不同行业的实际数据为考察样本,运用实证分析方法验证我国上市公司不同类型行业管理层薪酬和持股与公司绩效之间的相关关系,分析结果表明:我国上市公司管理层薪酬和持股激励效应存在着较大的行业性差异,并提出不同行业企业应该根据自身特点和性质以及管理层薪酬和持股激励效应的大小,相机选择薪酬激励或股权激励,制定出详细周密、客观有效、切合实际的企业管理层激励方案,从而使其激励效应最大化。     

落实科学发展观 在保护生态基础上有序开发水电

阐述了为贯彻和落实科学发展观,我国电力要优先开发和加快开发水电的问题,并要做到有序开发,要按国家主管部门的规划进行开发,要在保护生态基础上开发,要切实做好水电开发的移民工作,最后提出了六点有益的建议.     

Option-based compensation: a survey

Despite empirical research and theoretical validity, there is mixed evidence on whether employee stock options align interests between management and shareholders by turning managers into owners. What used to be a functional tool introduced in the 1950s, has gotten out of hand, as perceived by the press and popular literature. The main catalyst is the accounting treatment stock options receive. This paper provides an overview of the empirical research in the field and discusses the current accounting treatment of employee stock options and impending changes. We conclude by proposing alternative compensation tools.     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

银保协作、风险自留与银行信用风险补偿——基于银保信贷系统的分析视角

在分析风险自留的内生逻辑基础上,进一步分析风险自留实现银行信用风险补偿的内在机理。研究表明：银保信贷系统通过对贷款企业个体风险与事先设定的平均代偿风险的匹配性甄别,实现对银行信用风险的分级补偿功能。针对银行超预期信用风险,先行实施银行风险拨备机制对银行平均代偿风险进行补偿,然后实施超额风险自留机制对超过平均代偿风险的银行超额风险部分再次进行补偿,超额风险自留补偿基金将由银行与担保机构依据各自的风险均衡配置阈值占比共同筹集,以此来实现银行信用风险分级补偿目标。并以此为依据,设计了银保信贷系统风险自留机制。