An emerging market multinational Company's internationalization: From original equipment manufacturer to global brand leader

We examine an emerging market multinational company's (EMNC's) transformation from an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to an original brand manufacturer (OBM) and global leader. Our longitudinal study of Hisense—China's largest TV company (and the world's third largest) spans three decades and involves detailed interviews with over 50 executives. We study how the company's global value chain network evolved, how it reconfigured its organization, upgraded its capabilities, and enhanced its brand reputation. We develop propositions that may contribute to improved explanations for an EMNC's internationalization sequence, development of competitive advantages, overseas management practices, and brand building.     

Crypto quanto and inverse options

Over 90% of exchange trading on crypto options has always been on the Deribit platform. This centralized crypto exchange only lists inverse products because they do not accept fiat currency. Likewise, other major crypto options platforms only list crypto–stablecoin trading pairs in so-called direct options, which are similar to the standard crypto options listed by the CME except the US dollar is replaced by a stablecoin version. Until now a clear mathematical exposition of these products has been lacking. We discuss the sources of market incompleteness in direct and inverse options and compare their pricing and hedging characteristics. Then we discuss the useful applications of currency protected “quanto” direct and inverse options for fiat-based traders and describe their pricing and hedging characteristics, all in the Black–Scholes setting.     

利率市场化背景下银行系统性危机的实证研究

从利率市场化的国际经验来看,无论是在发达国家还是发展中国家,其实施过程都容易导致不同程度的银行业危机。采用1973~2012年42个国家的面板数据,对利率市场化背景下的银行业危机进行的实证研究表明：利率市场化的推进将增加银行系统性危机发生的机率,特别是在存款利率市场化阶段,而严格的银行监管是抑制银行系统危机发生的有效方法;显性存款保险制度的设立无助于利率市场化后银行系统性风险的防范,甚至有可能会增加危机发生的机率;资本账户开放下进行利率市场化会增加银行系统危机发生的机率。利率市场化进程中允许开设民营银行不会增加银行系统危机的发生机率。     

Corporate Lobbying and Firm Performance

Corporate lobbying activities are designed to influence legislators, regulators and courts, presumably to encourage favorable policies and/or outcomes. In dollar terms, corporate lobbying expenditures are typically one or even two orders of magnitude larger than spending by Political Action Committees (PAC), and, unlike PAC donations, lobbying amounts are direct corporate expenditures. We use data made available by the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 to examine this more pervasive form of corporate political activity. We find that, on average, lobbying is positively related to accounting and market measures of financial performance. These results are robust across a number of empirical specifications. We also report market performance evidence using a portfolio approach. We find that portfolios of firms with the highest lobbying intensities significantly outperform their benchmarks in the three years following portfolio formation.     

Too-Big-To-Fail: Why Megabanks Have Not Become Smaller Since the Global Financial Crisis?

ABSTRACT

More than ten years after the global financial crisis, what has happened to the ‘too-big-to-fail’ (TBTF) banks whose reckless behavior was among its preconditions, but which received public support and guarantees in the midst of that crisis? Insofar as this too-big-to-fail status helped create the crisis and then imposed costs on the rest of society, we would expect these banks to have shrunk. We investigate the evolution of 31 global-TBTF banks and find that their overall size has hardly recorded any substantial change. However, there is no sense of urgency in the flourishing post-crisis literature on TBTF banks about the need to contain their size; the prevalent view therein is that if properly regulated, the risks that arise from a financial system dominated by TBTF banks are manageable. This view rests on the same overly narrow theoretical underpinnings whose flaws were exposed in the crisis. We argue that too-big-to-fail banking is embedded in a set of self-reinforcing policies—consolidation, balance-sheet support through quantitative easing, favorable regulations, bank lobbying, and geo-economic and geo-political considerations—which explain why these banks have not shrunk and why they remain a threat to financial stability, well after the lessons of the crisis should have been learned.     

Do Sovereign Re‐Ratings Destabilize Equity Markets during Financial Crises? New Evidence from Higher Return Moments

This study investigates the effects of S&P's sovereign re‐ratings on the higher moments of equity market returns over recent financial crises. Using a set of intraday stock market index prices and sovereign credit ratings for a sample of 36 countries that experienced sovereign rating changes over the period from 1996 to 2013, we find that the higher moments of stock market returns are significantly more responsive to sovereign re‐ratings during financial crises, but the effects on stock markets are not the same across different financial crises. The effects during crises are, however, magnified for large downgrades and those that are associated with a loss of investment grade status. We find that there are asymmetric effects during financial crises in that downgrades are consistently more significant than upgrades in increasing realized volatility and realized kurtosis. Both upgrades and downgrades affect realized skewness in times of crises in the expected direction.     

The accountable governance of provincial governments of a Pacific island country

ABSTRACT

Using the theory of indigenous alternatives and a benchmark of indigenous financial reporting expectations, this paper examines the challenges to accountable governance of the nine provincial governments of the Solomon Islands for the years 1998 to 2017. Every provincial government consistently received disclaimed or qualified opinions from the state auditor. The author explains why the regional development of all provinces of the Solomon Islands could be improved if rudimentary forms of financial reporting were to be addressed.     

Institutional Monitoring: Evidence from the F‐Score

The extant literature shows that institutional investors engage in corporate governance to enhance a firm's long‐term value. Measuring firm performance using the F‐Score, we examine the persistent monitoring role of institutional investors and identify the financial aspects of a firm that institutional monitoring improves. We find strong evidence that long‐term institutions with large shareholdings consistently improve a firm's F‐Score and that such activity occurs primarily through the enhancement of the firm's operating efficiency. Other institutions reduce a firm's F‐Score. Moreover, we find evidence that, while monitoring institutions improve a firm's financial health, transient (followed by non‐transient) institutions trade on this information.     

科技革命与粮食安全

文章运用投入产出现价序列表 ,对安徽 10年间需求结构变动特征 ,以及投资对消费需求的拉动作用作了定量分析 ,指出结构调整需注意的问题 ,主张继续实行积极的财政扩张政策。