隧道掘进自动定位系统的应用

文章通过研究隧道掘进方向、断面形状自动定位系统的特点及在黄家湾隧道出口的应用效果,介绍了隧道掘进方向、断面形状自动定位系统在隧道施工中的优点。     

中国家族企业核心竞争力识别与测评

中国家族企业核心竞争力的培育与提升,是促进中国家族企业快速发展必须解决的一重大理论和现实问题。本文试图探索一条新的识别与测评中国家族企业核心竞争力的途径。首先我们对家族企业的内涵进行了科学的界定,对中国家族企业的经营特点进行了系统的分析;然后通过采用文本信息挖掘的方法,提炼出中国成功家族企业的核心竞争力的若干要素;最后模糊综合评判网络方法构建了一个中国家族企业核心竞争力的自我判别模型,以期待帮助中国家族企业经营管理者对所属企业进行科学定位,从而达到采取有效措施提高企业治理水平,提升企业核心竞争力的目的。     

互联网时代的高职英语教学

本文通过阐述互联网对高职英语教学所起的积极作用,提出了网络环境下的高职英语教学新模式的构建设想,指出教师应在网络环境下对自己的角色重新定位。希望可以引起高职英语教师和学习者对于网络环境的重视,以及对于网络条件下高职英语教学新模式的思考。     

基于组合熵权的军事工程物资保障中心优化选址模型研究

针对军事工程保障中心选址问题,首先通过分析影响军事工程物资保障中心选址的12个指标,在此基础上,运用熵权理论圈定各评判指标的客观权重,最后利用贴近度算法对各选址方案进行排序,实现保障中心的优化选址。     

投资者监督、政府干预与企业价值——基于机构投资者的经验证据

文章通过模型证明大投资者(Blockholders)与个人投资者相比对上市公司实施更多的监督,并且大投资者的监督行为能够增加企业价值;但模型也表明机构投资者是否实施监督及其为企业带来的价值增量取决于监督的成本和收益。文章利用中国资本市场的机构投资者数据,检验了理论模型的四个基本结论。结果表明:机构投资者比个人投资者更积极地监督上市公司,并有助于提高企业价值;政府干预(用上市公司最终控制人为政府代表)减少了机构投资者监督的收益,降低了机构投资者对企业价值所起到的正面作用,削弱了机构投资者监督的积极性。研究结论表明,发展机构投资者有助于改善上市公司的治理水平,提升企业价值;但是政府干预限制了机构投资者的积极公司治理作用。     

表“处所”的“许”的地域色彩

《世说新语》中“许”之“处所”义用得最多，而在同时期的“北魏三书”中却使用很少。通过探究“许”语源，观其在魏晋六朝以后文献中的使用情况，并结合“许”其他用法的大语言背景，认为袁“处所”的“许”有可能是南方的一个方言词。     

Product Location with Foresight

Traditional location literature concludes that firms will optimally differentiate in order to alleviate a tendency toward competitive pricing. However, it has recently been shown that firms will minimally differentiate if they (correctly) anticipate an absence of price competition. This paper examines the relationship between product location and the sustainability of cooperative pricing, in horizontally and vertically differentiated markets. Further, it describes equilibrium locations when firms are able to choose their locations jointly and when they must choose independently.     

Entrepreneurship in the Theory of the Firm

This paper develops micro-economic foundations for a theory of entrepreneurship and growth, focusing on innovation and opportunity as intermediate linkages between the two. Expanding upon points of tangency between Schumpeter and Coase, the paper argues that transactions costs are the glue that holds together entrepreneurial “new combinations.” Technological/organizational complexity of production is defined as the extent to which a technical decision by one unit within the firm affects the productive efficiency of other units. Where decreasing transactions costs tend to pull incumbent organizations apart, the possession of difficult to imitate production practices by the same organizations keeps them together. The dissolution of incumbent firms creates opportunities for entrepreneurs; the prospect of Schumpeterian rents provides the incentive to realize those opportunities.      

Do Company Directors Underestimate the Adoption of Corporate Governance Provisions？ A Survey Approach

This paper examines whether company directors underestimate the adoption of corporate governance provisions within Ghanaian listed firms. Using a survey approach, the respondents, who were company executives and non-executive directors with knowledge of the Ghanaian Code and its provisions, regard the code as a benchmark for good corporate governance practices within Ghanaian listed firms. They also report some improvement in the standard of corporate governance in their companies since the introduction of the Code. Many of the company directors indicated their preparedness to comply with further corporate governance requirements, such as the adoption of a formal nomination committee something not been currently included in the Ghanaian Code. However, the directors noted that they receive inadequate support from the regulatory and institutional bodies for the implementation of the Ghanaian Code provisions. Many of the directors also supported the review of the Ghanaian Code by an independent committee. With regard to the adoption of the Ghanaian Code and its influence on firm performance, the respondents indicated that the adoption of the specific governance provisions in the area of chief executive officer （CEO）/chairman roles separation, having a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board, the establishment of audit and remuneration committees, and the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions were all influential in determining firm performance. They, however, did not support the adoption of the board size provision as influential to firm performance. This raises questions about the usefulness of the range of board size as recommended by the Ghanaian Code.