资产专用性与交易成本节约——论企业是信用的载体

企业的功能不仅在于节约要素(中间品)交易成本,是要素的"间接定价装置",还在于节约最终产品交易成本.信息不对称的产品市场上,企业在交易中"制造"了一个重复博弈机制,这使其更关心长远利益.它用自身专用性资产--从价值和数量两个维度--来作为其产品是合格品的担保.专用性资产单位价值越大,数量越多,企业越有谋求长远利益、放弃短期机会主义行为的激励.市场上理性的买方考虑到这一点,总是认为效益越好、规模越大的企业越有可能提供合格品.企业是信用的载体,它一定程度上避免了产品市场由于信息不对称所引致的逆向选择,从而节约最终产品交易成本.我们的分析补充和完善了企业的交易成本理论.     

Labour unions and leverage: evidence from firm-level union data

ABSTRACT

Using firm-level labour union data from Japan, this paper investigates the effect of labour unions on firm leverage. We find that as union coverage increases, both the level of and extent of change in leverage decreases. These relations remain robust when a firm falls into deficit. We also find that firms with higher union coverage have a higher interest coverage ratio. In addition, we find that firms with higher union coverage are less likely to choose issuing debt compared to issuing equity when they face financial distress. Our results imply that significant employee influence enhanced by labour unions increases fixed costs, crowds out the firm’s debt capacity and consequently reduces the firm’s leverage.     

Does support from government help firms survive? Evidence on financial and political assistance in China, 1998–2007

ABSTRACT

Using the National Bureau of Statistics data set over the period 1998–2007, this article examines the dual roles of financial assistance and strong political links on firm survival in China by applying a semi-parametric duration model. We find that generally either financial assistance or strong political links had a positive effect on the likelihood of firm survival. Furthermore, if firms received both types of support from government, their survival rate was around two times as high compared to only receiving a single support. The likelihood of survival depended on the amount of assistance a firm received. We also find firm ownership impacts on its survival pattern. Lastly, China joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) coincided with (cet. par.) higher firm failure, especially with regard to state-owned firms; however, this period also saw the authorities targeting political and financial help on the ‘better’ firms (especially SOEs) with characteristics likely to increase their chance of survival.     

Low information nash equilibria for oligopolistic markets

This paper deals with an infinite horizon n firm oligopoly in which firms are assumed to have incomplete information about one another's actions and profit functions. An equilibrium concept is defined that is similar to the Nash non-cooperative equilibrium, but is suitable for the information assumptions of the model. The equilibrium uses a type of bounded rationality which makes firms' computations relatively easy. This is due to an implicit assumption that computation is costly and a Bayesian approach is prohibitively costly. This low information Nash equilibrium is proved to exist, and, in addition, an adaptive expectations decision process is described which, if followed by all firms, leads to the low information Nash equilibrium.     

Why England? Demographic factors, structural change and physical capital accumulation during the Industrial Revolution

Why did England industrialize first? And why was Europe ahead of the rest of the world? Unified growth theory in the tradition of Galor and Weil (2000, American Economic Review, 89, 806–828) and Galor and Moav (2002, Quartely Journal of Economics, 177(4), 1133–1191) captures the key features of the transition from stagnation to growth over time. Yet we know remarkably little about why industrialization occurred much earlier in some parts of the world than in others. To answer this question, we present a probabilistic two-sector model where the initial escape from Malthusian constraints depends on the demographic regime, capital deepening and the use of more differentiated capital equipment. Weather-induced shocks to agricultural productivity cause changes in prices and quantities, and affect wages. In a standard model with capital externalities, these fluctuations interact with the demographic regime and affect the speed of growth. Our model is calibrated to match the main characteristics of the English economy in 1700 and the observed transition until 1850. We capture one of the key features of the British Industrial Revolution emphasized by economic historians — slow growth of output and productivity. Fertility limitation is responsible for higher per capita incomes, and these in turn increase industrialization probabilities. The paper also explores the availability of nutrition for poorer segments of society. We examine the influence of redistributive institutions such as the Old Poor Law, and find they were not decisive in fostering industrialization. Simulations using parameter values for other countries show that Britain’s early escape was only partly due to chance. France could have moved out of agriculture and into manufacturing faster than Britain, but the probability was less than 25%. Contrary to recent claims in the literature, 18th century China had only a minimal chance to escape from Malthusian constraints.     

家族式治理对公司理财行为的影响机制研究

家族企业已经越来越受到人们的重视。在现有文献的基础上,论文以所有权和控制权为两维对家族企业做了严格的定义和划分,并把研究对象界定在拥有高控制权的家族式企业。通过将家族式治理和公司理财分析范式结合分析,家族式治理中的网络式组织结构、封闭式的股权结构和作为家族意愿体现的董事会治理机制对家族企业理财行为产生影响。家族式治理对公司理财行为产生正面影响,但由于其自身的局限性和家族企业所处环境的变化,家族式理财必须进行变革:非家族化的理财方式变革,家族规则与现代市场游戏规则的融合,引入有效专家理财制度,以及对家族式理财的扬弃。     

一种项目采购模式的博弈分析

本文试图用经济学理论 (主要是博弈与信息经济学的理论 )来分析目前工程项目建设中采用的一种工程设备、材料的采购模式。文章首先提出这种模式的内容与特征 ,然后就制度内各参与方 (主要为业主、承包商、供货商 )之间的博弈进行分析 ,分不完全信息博弈、完全信息博弈两种情况来分析这种采购制度下达到的均衡。     

物流服务市场供求关系研究

从认识物流服务市场的供求现状出发,使用经济学理论、竞争理论、物流业固有特性三个分析方法进行物流服务市场供求关系研究,对揭示我国物流服务市场的运行规律有一定的引导作用。     

基于博弈论的二层供应链网络竞争与结盟模型

就两个制造商和一个零售商所组成的供应链模型进行研究,运用博弈论方法来研究制造商间的竞争及制造商与零售商间的竞争和协调决策问题,给出了两种决策下相应的数学模型,并比较了制造商与零售商间有无联盟关系时对各自收益的影响。     

立式双面研磨机变形机理探讨

文章通过对立式双面研磨机运动机理分析,探讨了研磨盘产生伞状变形原因,提出如何针对实际情况消除变形,提高加工精度。