Valuing ecosystem goods and services: a new approach using a surrogate market and the combination of a multiple criteria analysis and a Delphi panel to assign weights to the attributes

A new approach to valuing ecosystem goods and services (EGS) is described which incorporates components of the economic theory of value, the theory of valuation (USappraisal), a multi-model multiple criteria analysis (MCA) of ecosystem attributes, and a Delphi panel of experts to assign weights to the attributes. The total value of ecosystem goods and services in the various tenure categories in the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area (WTWHA) in Australia was found to be in the range AUD$188 to $211 million year⁻¹, or AUD$210 to 236 ha⁻¹ year⁻¹ across tenures, as at 30 June 2002. Application of the weightings assigned by the Delphi panelists and assessment of the ecological integrity of the various tenure categories resulted in values being derived for individual ecosystem services in the World Heritage Area. Biodiversity and refugia were the two attributes ranked most highly at AUD$18.6 to $20.9 million year⁻¹ and AUD$16.6 to $18.2 million year⁻¹, respectively.     

农村教育发展的财政保障

长期以来农村教育的特征，说明教育经费短缺一直是农村教育发展的突出矛盾。要对农村教育实施财政保障，须以整顿农村教师队伍为前提，在教育观念、国民经济结构、教育结构、政府预算结构及财政体制等五个方面作战略性调整，同时制止对学生的乱收费。     

制定《内部管理控制规范》的价值与整体构思

本文从制定<内部管理控制规范>的背景、制定<内部管理控制规范>的价值以及制定<内部管理控制规范>的整体构思三个方面,对制定<内部管理控制规范>问题进行了全面、系统地论证.文章对完善我国内部控制理论及内部管理控制理论,指导内部管理控制实践与操作,都具有重要意义.     

我国生态环境保护和治理的财政政策选择

环境的公共产品性质和外部性，决定了它应该成为政府财政投资的重点。因而财政政策对环境保护和治理的影响极大。从总体上看，我国的财政政策在支持生态环境保护和治理中发挥了重要作用。但由于财政政策在设计上存在着缺陷，致使其在生态环境建设中的支持作用未能完全发挥。基于此，本文提出了完善我国生态环境可持续发展的财政政策建议。     

县级财政的现状与创新

县级财政是按照“一级政权、一级财政”的原则构建起来的,在基层政权建设,为保证经济发展和社会稳定提供财力支持方面发挥着重要的作用。目前,随着改革的深入,县级财政也面临着一些困难,诸如收入总额偏低,赤字面大,负债多,风险大,部分地区存在财政空转现象等。造成这些困难的因素有很多,既有体制上的,又有管理上的,还有历史原因。为解决县级财政的困难,要理顺机制,培养财源,加强支出管理,构建符合公共财政要求的框架体系。     

Simulation Analysis of Public Debt and Fiscal Deficit in Austria – Optimal Economic Policies for the Past and the Future

The macroeconometric simulation model AMOD1 and the optimization algorithm OPTCON are used to evaluate fiscal policies for Austria since the late seventies. In particular, the question of optimal (debt stabilizing) fiscal policies for the past and for the future is analyzed within the framework of a medium-scaled simulation model. The first set of optimization experiments aims to assess optimal fiscal policies for debt stabilization for the historical period 1978–2000 while trying to maintain reasonable growth rates of approximately 2 percent of real GDP. Optimal values of the instruments and the targets are compared to empirical data for Austria. A second set of simulations calculates optimal paths for the fiscal instruments for the period 2001-2010, particularly with respect to the criteria of the Stability and Growth Pact, which is mandatory for member states of the Euro zone.     

金融自由化与双轨金融体系

经济市场化次序理论和金融约束理论都以财政平衡为改革的前提条件 ,但是 ,为政府寻求新的税收来源 ,建立高效率的金融体系正是发展中国家进行市场化改革所追求的目标之一 ,金融自由化理论颠倒了经济发展与金融抑制之间的因果关系。本文证明了财政压力内生于金融自由化改革 ,并且在对经济市场化次序理论进行评论的基础上 ,讨论了建立双轨金融体系对促进金融自由化改革和经济发展的意义。     

论我国地方财政风险的个性特征

我国地方财政风险，不同于一般的财政风险。从整体考察，它具有分散性、非均衡性和传导性；从结构考察，具有隐蔽性、发展性和内生性，同时它又受外部因素的影响很大。     

Fiscal policy and fiscal reconstruction in Japan

This paper investigates the macroeconomic effect of fiscal policy and the fiscal reconstruction movement in Japan. I first summarize Japanese fiscal policy in the recent years and discuss sustainability of government deficits. Then, I investigate the macroeconomic effect of Japanese fiscal policy and evaluate the plausibility of the Keynesian and non-Keynesian effects. I also analyze political constraints in the fiscal reconstruction attempts and the possibility of crowding-in effect of fiscal reform. Finally, I discuss some measures for the successful fiscal reconstruction reform in the near future. JEL Code H30 · H60     

Revenue Sharing versus Expenditure Sharing in a Federal System

Problems of intergovernmental policy coordination can take many forms and are becoming increasingly important with continuing economic integration. In this paper we focus on the fiscal competition problem where the non-cooperative choice of taxes and transfers among governments typically leads to a suboptimal outcome. We look at the effect of two widely used corrective policies: revenue sharing and expenditure sharing (or intergovernmental matching grants). Our main result is that these two corrective policies have opposite effects depending on the form of competition between governments, namely whether governments compete in taxes or expenditures. More precisely, for any form of competition, revenue sharing is desirable exactly when expenditure sharing is not and vice versa. The implication is that the choice of the optimal corrective policy requires a complete understanding of the underlying non-cooperative behavior among governments. Our second main result is that neither revenue sharing or expenditure sharing can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium among governments, although all governments would benefit from one of these two corrective policies. Central intervention is therefore inevitable unless governments can pre-commit to the optimal corrective policy before setting their fiscal policies.