金融组织强制性信息披露问题研究

由于规模经济的原因,作为信息劣势方——投资者公共利益代表者的政府必然成为强制性信忠披露的主体。政府按照参与约束原则和激励相容原则进行机制设计甄别金融组织,引导其确定合理的信忠披露边界,形成分离均衡,金融市场上的非对称信息转变为对称信息。但政府强制金融组织进行信息披露时,应尊重其利益追求和考虑金融市场发育程度等。     

Competition and Information Production in Market Maker Models

Abstract:   The microstructure literature models the mechanisms through which fundamental information is incorporated into market prices. This paper extends previous models by endogenising information production and analysing incentives for costly information production. In contrast to the existing literature, increasing the number of informed traders can result in reduced price informativeness. When prices have an allocative role this has welfare consequences: the regulatory implications of a dichotomy between private and public incentives for information gathering are discussed.     

The Long-run Effects of the Italian Pension Reforms

The paper analysesthe reforms of the Italian mandatory pension scheme for employeeslegislated in the 1990s. To assess the effects of the reforms,a microsimulation model calibrated on cross-section data is developed.The model is aimed at estimating the average income of a memberof a cohort, as well as the average per capita income of allindividuals alive in a given year. The long-run effects of thereform are analysed, comparing the characteristics of alternativefinancing schemes. A substantial improvement of the equity aswell as the long-run sustainability of the Italian public pensionschemes emerges. However, the dreary demographic scenario callsfor further tightening of eligibility rules sometime in the nextdecades if long-run sustainability of public debt is to be achieved.On the basis of sensitivity analysis, some changes aimed at hedgingthe system against unexpected shocks are suggested.     

Information Flows across Markets: Evidence from China–Backed Stocks Dual–Listed in Hong Kong and New York

Using a bivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model, we examine patterns of information flows for China–backed stocks that are cross–listed on exchanges in Hong Kong and New York. Results analyzing the dual–listed stocks indicate significant mutual feedback of information between domestic (Hong Kong) and offshore (New York) markets in terms of pricing and volatility. Stocks listed on the domestic market appear to play a more significant role of information transmission in the pricing process, whereas stocks listed on the offshore market play a bigger role in volatility spillover.     

基于Internet的多通道用户界面

提出了网络多通道界面模型、语音和指点相结合的基于上下文的查询、基于主通道的整合策略,并将受限的自然语言(汉语)理解技术应用于多通道交互中。文章给出了两个实例:汉语语音驱动的多通道文件管理器和网上购物多通道界面的ActiveX控件。结果表明,以上技术有助于提高人机交互的自然性和效率。     

图书馆应发挥信息咨询中的优势

本文分析了信息社会图书馆信息咨询,信息服务中的优势,提出了有效发挥图书馆信息咨询优势的若干要求和对策。     

浅谈会计信息供求的特殊性

会计信息作为一种特殊的商品和普通商品一样,也存在供给方和需求方,会计信息要实现其价值和使用价值,必须在供求双方之间进行交易,因此,会计信息也遵循一般商品的交换规律。但是,由于会计信息既具有公共物品的属性又具有私人物品的属性,所以在供求交换的过程中,又具有自己的特殊性。而正是这种特殊性,使得会计信息市场处于混乱状态,因此,探讨会计信息供求的特殊性具有重要的现实意义。     

西方现代股利政策理论及实证研究回顾

本文对西方现代公司股利政策方面的理论和实证研究进行了一个综合性的回顾和分析。其中包括主流的股利行为模型、股利的信息内涵、代理成本、追随者效应,也包括国内研究中较少涉及的债务约束、声誉学说、成长机会和交易成本问题,以期对国内相对落后的股利政策研究和随意性较强的股利政策制定带来一定的借鉴意义。     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Monopoly Rents and Price Fixing in Betting Markets

Betting markets provide an ideal environment in which to examinemonopoly power due to the availability of detailed information on product pricing. In this paper we argue that the pricing strategies of companies in the U.K. betting industry are likely to be an important source of monopoly rents, particularly in the market for forecast bets. Pricing in these markets are shown to be explicitly coordinated. Further, price information is asymmetrically biased in favor of producers. We find evidence, based on U.K. data, that pricing of CSF bets is characterized by a significantly higher markup than pricing of single bets. Although this differential can in part be explained by the preferences of bettors, it is reasonable to attribute a significant part of the differential as being due to monopoly power.