面向国土资源的学科化信息集成服务模式探讨

学科化信息集成服务是图书馆一种新的服务模式和服务机制。国土资源科研信息内容的专业性、信息需求的前沿性、信息获取方式的自助性等特点,决定了面向国土资源开展学科化信息集成服务具有现实意义。面向国土资源的学科化信息集成服务,应以用户和信息需求为中心,加强学科资源建设与规划;以信息利用为目标,构建学科化信息集成服务平台;以用户及其科研过程为指导,加强研究课题与学科建设的有机联系;同时,加强国土资源管理机制建设,确保学科化信息集成服务的针对性和时效性。     

The fiscal cost of child grants in the context of high adult mortality in South Africa: A simulation to 2015

This paper investigates the expected costs of cash transfers to children in South Africa up to 2015. The child population is not expected to grow between 2008 and 2015 and thus the fiscal cost of the Child Support Grant is expected to stabilise in the near future. The other major child grant, the Foster Care Grant, is far less predictable – while it is not intended to be an orphan grant, three quarters of its beneficiaries are orphans. Because of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the number of dual orphans is expected to double between 2008 and 2015, reaching 1.3 million, and the overall number of orphans (maternal, paternal and dual) to reach 4.8 million by 2015. If the Foster Care Grant were to become a de facto orphan grant, its costs would escalate rapidly. The paper does not argue in favour of an orphan grant, but rather for greater effort in ensuring that the Child Support Grant reaches the neediest children, especially maternal orphans.     

Open-Market Stock Repurchase and Stock Price Behavior When Management Values Real Investment

This paper provides a simple explanation of open‐market stock repurchases and the stock price behavior surrounding them. There is ex ante asymmetry of information with regard to the private benefits that corporate managers can attain from real investments. In our model, open‐market repurchase announcements reveal information about the managers' private benefits when real investment opportunities are unprofitable in terms of firm values. This study differs from previous studies in that we show that announcements of open‐market repurchase programs can be believable without the restriction that the announcements are commitments. Empirically, the model simultaneously predicts that a stock price will drop prior to an open‐market repurchase announcement and will rise in response to the announcement. These predictions are consistent with stylized facts.     

会计信息真实性的法律保证

会计信息是经济信息中的重要组成部分，它的真实性决定着宏观和微观经济决策的正确性和准确性，直接影响到国家的经济发展和在国际经济交往中的形象。但长期以来，一些地方政府和企业的领导受利益驱动，提供虚假会计信息，导致会计造假现象十分严重。假数字、假报表充斥着我们经济生活的方方面面，会计打假势在必行。新《会计法》的颁布实施为规范会计行为，净化经济环境，保证会计信息的真实性提供了有力的法律保证。     

How better targeting of social spending affects social delivery in South Africa

Social spending has become a major tool of targeting resources to South Africa's poor. The poor now get considerably more than their population share of social spending, but the underlying distribution of income is so skewed that overall post-fiscal inequality has not improved much. Concentration ratios and curves show considerable shifts in social spending incidence in the period 1995 to 2006. However, the efficiency of that spending is low, resulting in limited social outcomes and consequently also limited gains to the poor from better targeting. This paper therefore calls for the South African policy discussion to shift to why the ever-increasing fiscal inputs and improved targeting of those inputs have not produced the desired social outcomes.     

The Transmission of Pricing Information of Dually-Listed Stocks

We use the daily opening and closing prices of eighteen dually-listed Hong Kong companies to investigate the transfer of pricing information between the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK) and the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Evidence shows that (1) SEHK overnight returns respond significantly to change in LSE intraday returns, but the transmission process is not completed at the opening of the SEHK; (2) LSE overnight returns respond significantly to changes in SEHK intraday returns, but the transmission process is not completed at the opening of the LSE, either; (3) the impact is stronger moving from the LSE to the SEHK. This evidence indicates that information transfer runs in both directions and that most of the transmitted information continues to be processed throughout the following trading day (JEL G15).     

Ex Ante Incentives for Earnings Management and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study examines the relation between ex ante incentives of insurance managers to engage in earnings management to meet regulatory standards and the informativeness of earnings. This study extends prior research by simultaneously examining the effects of earnings management and uncertainty about earnings as suggested by Collins and DeAngelo (1990) and Imhoff and Lobo (1992). Results from a sample of 375 quarterly earnings announcements of 41 property and liability insurers during the period 1989 to 1992 support the hypothesis that when managers' incentives for earnings management are high, earnings announcements are less informative to investors (even after controlling for uncertainty associated with exposure to large-scale catastrophes). Robustness tests suggest that our results are not attributable to firm size, time period effects, firm effects, accounting estimation error, or financial distress risk. These results are consistent with investors using publicly available information to predict P-L insurance managers' ex ante incentives to manage earnings to meet regulatory standards, and that they use this information in forming their beliefs about earnings quality.     

信息化环境下审计风险的防范

在信息化环境下,传统的会计业务流程被改变,内部控制制度发生了变更与转移,导致审计风险增加的因素也随之增多。建立健全审计准则和法规,提高审计人员的计算机应用水平,提高审计理论水平等,是控制和防范信息化环境下审计风险的必要措施。     

Informational efficiency properties of rational expectations equilibria in non-convex economies

Summary. A simple example shows that although non-convexities might prevent the existence of a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, they need not prevent the existence of a non-informative one. Indeed, the economy in this example does not possess any fully revealing equilibria, but does have a continuum of non-informative ones. Received: February 9, 1999; revised version: October 20, 1999     

Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information

The severity of the sanction for a given offense is often determined by the offense history of the offender. We establish that this policy can be welfare-maximizing if individuals are imperfectly informed about the magnitude of the sanction. Imperfect information distorts individuals’ perception of the expected sanction of the first offense. Once detected, individuals learn about the sanction applicable to their act, making this argument less relevant for consecutive offenses.