财政分权与义务教育财政管理体制问题探析

我国是成功实施财政分权化的国家之一。作为公共财政框架部分之一的义务教育也实行了分权化管理,义务教育办学的责任主要地落在了县、乡两级地方政府身上。而我国庞大的义务教育事业由县、乡甚至村脆弱的财力来承担,可谓“杯水车薪”：一些农村地区和贫困山区学龄儿童无学可上,无书可读等现象屡见不鲜。可见过度分权化的义务教育财政管理体制是制约当今中国义务教育发展的症结所在。     

国库集中支付角度下行政事业单位内部控制研究

国库集中支付与内部控制具有内在的联系性,国库集中支付的目的就是加强对行政事业单位资金的监管,提高财政资金的使用效益。但是在实际运行的过程中,行政事业单位的内部控制并未实现国库集中支付的预期目标。论文立足于国库集中支付视角提出行政事业单位加强内部控制的重要性,剖析行政事业单位内部控制体系建设的原则,最后提出构建基于国库集中支付的内部控制体系的具体对策。     

Governance or reputation? Flexible tax enforcement and excess goodwill: Evidence from the taxpaying credit rating system in China

This study investigates the effect of flexible tax enforcement on firms’ excess goodwill using unique manually collected data on taxpaying credit rating in China from 2014 to 2021. We document that A-rated taxpayer firms have less excess goodwill; A-rated firms reduce excess goodwill by 0.005 vis-a-vis non-A-rated firms, which accounts for 100% of the mean value of excess goodwill. This finding holds after multiple robustness tests and an endogeneity analysis. Moreover, this negative effect is more pronounced in firms with low information transparency, that are non-state-owned and that are located in regions with low tax enforcement intensity. The channel test results suggest that taxpaying credit rating system as flexible tax enforcement reduces firms’ excess goodwill through a reputation-based effect and not a governance-based effect. This study reveals that the taxpaying credit rating system in China as flexible tax enforcement can bring halo effect to A rating firms, thereby limiting irrational M&As and breaking goodwill bubble.     

Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant

Environmental inspection agencies have limited resources. A natural response to this shortage of resources is targeting and this targeting policy leads to higher compliance than random inspections. This paper uses individual inspection data on the inspection policy of the environmental agency for the textile industry in Flanders (Belgium). We distinguish between three types of inspections and use a survival model to show that the environmental agency inspects firms in a non-random way. Even though the agency solves most environmental problems, it can increase compliance by using the deterrence effect of more stringent inspections and sanctions.      

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

东北区域创新体系建设的行政协调体系研究

在对区域行政协调体系理论进行研究的基础上，通过研究借鉴“长三角”和“泛珠三角”以及发达国家区域行政协调机制的经验，对东北区域创新体系的行政协调模式、行政协调的组织架构以及各机构职能设计做出了初步的探索，并提出了一些具体操作建议。     

浅谈少数民族地区的刑法适用

我国是一个统一的多民族国家,根据各民族政治、经济、文化各方面的特点,以及少数民族同胞的居住特点和不同的风俗习惯,结合我国少数民族地区刑法适用应遵循的思想原则,提出我国少数民族地区变通适用刑法应当考虑的几个问题.     

发展壮大县域经济的行政学思考

县域经济在我国的经济与社会发展中有着举足轻重的地位,发展壮大县域经济中的行政管理必须坚持以民为本的原则,发扬艰苦奋斗的作风;发展壮大县域经济必须处理好经济区域和行政区划的关系、省地县行政区域经济的关系、市场调节和政策引导的关系以及简政与放权的关系;要深化行政管理体制改革,创新公共行政体制,推进县域经济发展.     

Publishers, artists, and copyright enforcement

This paper investigates whether and to what extent there is a conflict of interest between artists and their publishers, regarding to whether and to what degree illegal distributions of their copyrighted recordings should be prevented. This conflict arises because artists also earn their profit from other market activities such as giving live performances, in addition to their share of profits from sales of their copyrighted recordings via the publishers.