植入"公平博弈"的委托-代理模型——来自行为经济学的一个贡献

本文通过将Rabin(1993)提出的"公平博弈"概念植入现有委托一代理模型,获得一个考虑了代理人表现出"互惠性"非理性行为的新委托一代理模型.由该模型给出来的最优委托一代理合约可以给委托人带来比现有委托一代理最优合约更高的利润水平.研究发现,现有的Holmstrom-Milgrom模型中的最优合约不是帕累托最优的.新模型可以解释企业人性化管理和许多有特色的人性化企业文化的形成.本文是行为经济学与现有激励理论相结合研究的一种初步尝试,是运用行为经济学原理重建信息经济学基本框架的原创性工作.     

基于社会责任的企业环境信息披露博弈分析

企业的生产经营活动对人们赖以生存的环境产生着重大影响，所以企业应承担向社会公众披露有关环境信息的责任。目前,企业的环境信息披露情况不容乐观．为了促使经济健康发展．本文通过建立模型来分析企业与相关入之间的博弈关系，试图达到一种经济学上的“帕累托最优”状态。     

博弈论在构建生态产业链中的应用分析

构建生态产业链的目的是为了实现废弃物的再生和循环利用,从而减少污染物的排放。本文运用博弈论方法,分析了上下游企业及政府部门在构建生态产业链问题上的不同利益动机及博弈行为。通过对博弈均衡结果的分析,得出了构建生态产业链,实现废弃物再生循环利用必须满足的条件。同时,博弈均衡的结果也为企业生态成本内部化提供了一定依据,并表明了政府部门加强监督管理的重要性。在此基础上,提出了相应的措施和建议。     

优化财政监督制度的博弈分析

财政监督中存在的问题是，不但财政监督制度执行不严，更重要的是财政监督制度本身的优化没有得到应有的重视。应通过完善财政监督制度来规范财政监督主体和财政监督客体的行为以提高财政监督效率。     

环境产权问题的博弈分析

环境产权是最广泛意义的公有产权,在环境产权的行使中,各行为主体的个体经济目标和环境目标常常存在极大的差异,运用博弈理论阐述环境产权行使中的纳什均衡,旨在说明环境资源保护的社会意义。     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 2: Formal model of the resolution process

In a drama, characters' preferences and options change under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus they undergo change and development. A formal model of dramatic transformation is presented that shows how the core of a drama is transformed by the interaction among the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process is seen to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality.     

Drama theory and its relation to game theory. Part 1: Dramatic resolution vs. Rational solution

Drama theory differs from game theory in that it does not regard actors' preferences and perceived opportunities as fixed, but as capable of being changed by the actors themselves under the pressure of pre-play negotiations. Thus characters in a drama undergo change and development. A manyperson, multiphase theory of dramatic transformation is presented, showing how thecore of a drama (in the sense of game theory) is transformed by the interaction between the characters into a strict, strong equilibrium to which they all aspire. The process of dramatic transformation is shown to be driven by actors' reactions to various paradoxes of rationality; it is proved that when all these paradoxes have been overcome, a full dramatic resolution has been reached, satisfying actors' emotional and moral demands, as well as the demands of rationality.     

Asymmetric Information,Asset Allocation,and Debt Financing

We analyze a signaling game where firms' financing announcements convey private information about their prospects but a moral hazard problem exists in that managers may suboptimally invest. Consequently, the attempt to address an asymmetric information problem exacerbates moral hazard. The equilibrium recognizes both imperfect information problems. Additionally, the firm must determine how to allocate funds between two technologies differing in cash flow timing and managerial accessibility. We define an above-average firm's comparative advantage as that technology which is most dominant relative to a firm with lesser prospects and show that the resultant equilibria follow the lines of the firm's comparative advantage. Finally, we show that separation may be achieved costlessly, i.e., with no explicit signaling cost.     

电力市场中发电商市场力的博弈分析

电力市场中市场力的存在不利于电力市场的健康发展,本文从市场力的定义出发,对影响市场力的因素进行了分析,并介绍了博弈论在竞价上网决策和降低市场力方面的应用.     

自由软件开发的模块化理论解释与启示

本文以GNU/Linux为例讨论了源代码的内部结构在自由软件开发中所起的重要作用。为此,我们考虑了源代码的模块化属性。源代码的模块化将直接影响开发者是否参与对自由软件的开发。基于模块化的自由软件开发不仅实现了劳动的分工,同时也实现了劳动价值的分割,在自由软件的开发过程中较好地解决了搭便车问题。同时,模块化理论对我国发展软件产业也有一定的借鉴作用。