我国农村公共产品供给的制度困境及对策选择

农村公共产品供给效率低下是我国三农问题中的一个长期症结，这既体现了公共产品供给的一般问题，也反映了我国农村公共产品供给的特殊矛盾。本从供给制度的角度剖析了我国农村公共产品供给的困境，并初步探讨了相应的配套改革措施。     

香奈儿品牌形象对消费者购买意愿的影响分析

中国消费者为现阶段全球最大的奢侈品消费群体。自香奈儿进入中国市场以来,因其高贵、优雅、简约的设计风格受到中产阶级以上女性消费群体的欢迎和喜爱。在奢侈品行业中,品牌形象作为企业重要的无形资产,成为了品牌竞争的另一领域。基于上述背景,论文以“香奈儿品牌形象对消费者购买意愿的影响分析”为选题,以贝尔模型为研究基础,使用问卷调查法获取数据,运用SPSS 19.0统计软件对数据进行处理分析,并结合消费者行为学相关理论,研究品牌形象的不同变量对于消费者购买行为产生的影响。     

Utility Regulation and Risk Allocation: The Roles of Marginal Cost Pricing and Futures Markets

The effects on consumer welfare of requiring a utility facing cost or demand risk to use either a fixed retail price or marginal cost pricing are assessed. With marginal cost pricing and cost volatility an efficient futures market allows consumer welfare to be at least as high in every state as with the fixed price. With demand risk marginal cost pricing can benefit the consumer in every state without harming the firm if the profit difference is transferred to the consumer. A futures market can act as a partial replacement for the transfer.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

Subjective recursive expected utility

We axiomatize a subjective version of the recursive expected utility model. This development extends the seminal results of Kreps and Porteus (Econometrica 46:185–200 (1978)) to a subjective framework and provides foundations that are easy to relate to axioms familiar from timeless models of decision making under uncertainty. Our analysis also clarifies what is needed in going from a represention that applies within a single filtration to an across filtration representation.Part of this research was conducted when Ozdenoren visited MEDS in Fall 2003. We thank Tapas Kundu, Costis Skiadas, Jean-Marc Tallon and Tan Wang for helpful discussions and also thank audiences at Koc University, Northwestern University, the CERMSEM conference “ Mathematical Models in Decision Theory” at Universite Paris I, and the FUR XI conference on foundations and applications of utility, risk and decision theory     

Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000     

我国农村环境问题的经济分析及解决途径

本文分析了我国农村存在的环境问题,从经济学角度分析了农村环境问题产生的原因,并提出了农村环境问题的治理措施与途径:消除其公共物品性和外部性。     

Medical insurance with rank-dependent utility

Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU) model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets. Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002 RID="*" ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055. Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan     

公共品供给中的政府责任

在公共品供给中,政府责任是提供它需要并且能够提供的公共品。需要提供的公共品是指在现有的资源技术条件下,达到社会效用最大化所需提供的公共品。能够提供的公共品是指征到拉弗曲线隐含的最大税收量所能提供的公共品。需要并且能够提供的公共品是指需要提供的公共品与能够提供的公共品中量较小的一方。通过比较政府实际提供的公共品与需要并且能够提供的公共品,可以评价政府在这一领域称职与否。     

埃尔斯伯格悖论评析

主观期望效用理论认为个体的概率分布可以由行为的偏好导出,并且理性人的行为选择应该遵循主观期望效用理论,但是,埃尔斯伯格悖论显示了没有一个主观的概率测度,而且实际行为的选择并不总是和该理论的结果相一致。因此,围绕埃尔斯伯格悖论,展开了行为决策理论应该是规范的还是描述的争论。