公共项目交易中的治理模式研究

本文在对公共品供给模式分析的基础上探讨了公共项目契约的形成和交易治理模式.非经营性项目由传统的公共部门垄断经营供给模式转化为对其实行代建制,准经营性项目实行公私合作的供给模式,并针对不同的供给模式给出了两种不同的治理模式以解决公共项目契约组织中的代理人问题.     

事业单位预算管理演变的制度思考

本文从经济学角度对我国事业单位的预算管理进行了理性思考,并通过对预算管理演变历程的考察,明晰我国事业单位预算管理的发展路径,进而提出未来改革的方向。     

日本对华制造业FDI对中日制成品产业内贸易影响的实证分析

通过对日本对华制造业FDI与中日制成品产业内贸易关系的实证分析,得出了日本对华制造业投资对中日制成品产业内贸易具有正向推动作用的结论.基于此,我国应加大力度吸引日本制造业对华投资,以加快发展我国的制成品产业内贸易,这无疑有利于我国产业结构和贸易结构的升级,也有利于改善我国在国际分工中的地位.     

商品价值创造中的三种劳动及作用

商品价值创造中的三种劳动是耗费劳动、传导劳动和凝结劳动。耗费劳动是正在进行的劳动，它是价值的源泉，本身并不是价值；传导劳动表现为劳动资料，劳动资料在本期劳动过程中起着把活劳动传导到劳动对象中去的作用；凝结劳动是凝结在劳动对象中的人类一般劳动，即价值实体。劳动对象是耗费劳动是吸收器。耗费劳动与凝结劳动既不同质也不同量，耗费劳动能否成为凝结劳动或在多大量上成为凝结劳动取决于传导劳动的效能和劳动对象对耗费劳动的吸收程度。     

The Motivation and Effectiveness of Gas Industry Economic Regulation in New South Wales, 1912–39

The oldest industry in Australia subjected to economic regulation is the gas supply industry in the state of New South Wales. In this paper the aims and motivation of the New South Wales Government in establishing the regulatory regime in 1912 and the subsequent effectiveness in achieving them are determined. Initially the regulatory regime was based on ad hoc arrangements, but eventually a more permanent structure was devised that effectively defused political controversy over gas market pricing and stabilised prices rather than substantially lowered them.     

Differentiability properties of rank-linear utilities

We study the differentiability properties of concave functionals defined as integrals of the quantile. These functionals generalize the rank dependent expected utility and are called rank-linear utilities in decision theory. Their superdifferential is described as well as the set of random variables where they are Gâteaux-differentiable. Our results generalize those obtained for the rank dependent expected utility in Ref. [Carlier, G., Dana, R.-A., 2003. Core of a convex distortion of a probability. Journal of Economic Theory 113, 199–222.].     

Collective bargaining under perfect information. The negotiation of national agreements

We structurally estimate a perfect information bargaining model of collective negotiations using data on national agreements for Spain. The model is a stochastic model of sequential bargaining in which we allow for the possibility of negotiations ending without agreement, a common feature in the data. Delays in equilibrium are the result of uncertainty about the surplus to be divided among the players and not of information asymmetries. The model fits the data well regardless of the limitations imposed by the parametric specification adopted. Our results show that agents are patient and that the advantage from proposing is large.JEL Classification: J50, C73, C78We thank Fabian Marquez, Sergio Santillan and Jose Maria Zufiaur for helping us to create the data base on Spanish National Agreements. We also thank Cesar Alonso, Juanjo Dolado, Gautam Gowrisankaran, Maia Guell, Antonio Merlo and participants at the 1999 European Meeting of the Econometric Society for very helpful comments. Jose E. Galdon thanks financial support from the following institutions: European Commission for a TMR Marie Curie Fellowship, Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnologia for project BEC2002-00954 and Spanish Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte for project PR2004-0057. He also thanks the hospitality of STICERD (LSE) and the IR Section (Princeton University) where part of this work was completed. The usual disclaimers apply.