The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

The Economics Of Partner Out Trading in Sexual Markets

This paper derives a model of participation in what is commonly known as ‘adultery’. Arguably the best sex survey in the world is used to produce estimates of participation functions. The results show a great deal of support for bioeconomic models and reveal some interesting similarities and differences between the male and female equations. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

贴现因子、偏好和行为经济学

本文讨论了影响人们跨时选择的重要因素--贴现因子的最新进展以及他们在经济学和金融中的重要应用,给出了目前关于改变贴现因子的模型.     

中国金融控股公司发展模式的新制度经济学分析

随着区域经济一体化和金融全球化的加强,金融控股公司混业经营所带来的规模经济性日趋强化,从而成为金融业发展的一种重要组织形式,从本质上反映了各国金融业和政府制度面向新的前景而作出的相应战略性调整,初步展开了21世纪世界银行业的市场结构与竞争态势。这种态势为中国金融业的发展和中国金融控股公司模式的选择提出了外在的要求。同时,中国的金融业将在WTO的框架下融入全球金融市场,中国的金融业也要走向世界,在国际金融市场上成长壮大,这就要求中国金融业必须与国际惯例接轨。     

超越契约理论--演化论视角的企业理论研究

企业的契约理论围绕交易成本概念解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织,但严重忽视了企业的技术和生产功能,演化经济学的企业理论通过研究企业内知识的产生、传播和利用过程,以及组织与个人的交互学习,不仅重新解释了企业的存在、边界和内部组织问题,还研究了契约理论未触及的企业异质性、竞争优势和企业家等问题.     

Cost Structures and Nash Play in Repeated Cournot Games

This paper reports an experiment designed to assess the effects of a rotation in the marginal cost curve on convergence in a repeated Cournot triopoly. Increasing the cost curve's slope both reduces the serially-undominated set to the Nash prediction, and increases the peakedness of earnings. We observe higher rates of Nash equilibrium play in the design with the steeper marginal cost schedule, but only when participants are also rematched after each decision. Examination of response patterns suggests that the treatment with a steeper marginal cost curve and with a re-matching of participants across periods induces the selection of Nash Consistent responses.     

Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation

Past field validity tests of contingent valuation have relied on voluntary contribution mechanisms to elicit actual willingness to pay, and may overestimate hypothetical bias because of free riding in the actual contributions. This paper argues that provision point mechanisms are a preferred alternative for field validity tests of contingent valuation because they increase the proportion of demand revealed in cases in which public goods can be provided in a step function. The results of a contingent valuation validity study of participation in a green electricity pricing program that uses a provision point mechanism are reported, and hypothetical open-ended and dichotomous choice responses are compared to actual participation. Calibration of hypothetical responses is also explored.     

The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers. Confusion within the Executive Branch – A Conceptual Framework

Criminal investigation and prosecution of politicians, top civil servants and other public figures are topics frequently discussed in the media. The nature of the investigating or prosecuting authority varies between countries – from the general public prosecutor, through magistrates to independent counsels or parliamentary investigation commissions. This paper analyzes the role and status of public prosecutors within the separation of powers-concept. Prosecutors are usually part of the executive and not the judicial branch, which implies that they do not enjoy the same degree of independence as judges, and are ultimately subordinated to the directives of the minister of justice or the government. Conflicts of interest may hence arise if members of government can use the criminal process for their own or partisan interests. The incentives of public prosecutors in different jurisdictions are compared.