Experienced versus decision utility: large-scale comparison for income–leisure preferences*

Subjective well-being (SWB) data are increasingly used to perform welfare analysis. Interpreted as “experienced utility”, it has recently been compared to “decision utility” using small-scale experiments most often based on stated preferences. We transpose this comparison to the framework of non-experimental and large-scale data commonly used for policy analysis, focusing on the income–leisure domain where redistributive policies operate. Using the British Household Panel Survey, we suggest a “deviation” measure, which is simply the difference between actual working hours and SWB-maximizing hours. We show that about three-quarters of individuals make decisions that are not inconsistent with maximizing their SWB. We discuss the potential channels that explain the lack of optimization when deviations are significantly large. We find proxies for a number of individual and external constraints, and show that constraints alone can explain more than half of the deviations. In our context, deviations partly reflect the inability of the revealed preference approach to account for labor market rigidities, so the actual and SWB-maximizing hours should be used in a complementary manner. The suggested approach based on our deviation metric could help identify labor market frictions.     

Advantageous redistribution with three smooth CES utility functions

We present a parametric example of three-country advantageous redistribution with two Cobb–Douglas utility functions and one CES utility function for which the elasticity of substitution is 1/2. This paper indicates that the possibility of advantageous redistribution strongly depends on the three countries’ taste patterns, endowment distributions, and the elasticity of substitution. In particular, we will show with specific examples that greater difference between the donor and recipient’s taste patterns and a lower elasticity of substitution can increase the chance of advantageous redistribution.     

A strict expected multi-utility theorem

This paper integrates two key approaches to the representation of incomplete preferences over lotteries. The main result strengthens the conclusion of the expected multi-utility theorem in Dubra, Maccheroni, and Ok (2004) by ensuring that all utility indices involved are Aumann utilities (i.e., yield a strictly increasing expectation). The advantages of the method are demonstrated by parametrizing maximal elements and by providing a novel characterization of Aumann utilities.     

Kuhn’s Theorem for extensive form Ellsberg games

We propose the notions of mixed and behavioral Ellsberg strategies for extensive form games and prove that these strategies are outcome-equivalent if and only if mixed Ellsberg strategies satisfy a certain rectangularity condition. In addition, we show that not only the profile of Ellsberg strategies must be appropriately chosen but also the extensive form must satisfy further restrictions beyond those implied by perfect recall in order to ensure that each player will respect his ex ante strategy choice with the evolution of play.     

Do people consider an acceptable travel time? Evidence from Berkeley,CA

This paper explores the extent to which people identify an acceptable travel time for each trip they want to make and investigates the primary characteristics of this behavioural threshold. We assume that an acceptable travel time is defined through utilitarian processes that are related to cognitive and affective evaluations of travel that develop throughout a person’s lifetime. We apply a mixed methods approach to explore our hypothesis, based on semi-structured in-depth interviews with a stratified, according to commuting mode, random sample of 20 individuals living in Berkeley, CA. Our results support the validity of the acceptable travel time concept and offer (a) initial evidence on its variation to the travel mode and sociodemographic characteristics and (b) insights into people’s perceptions, attitudes, feelings and experiences about their travel. Thus, our results can contribute to a better understanding of individuals’ travel decisions and valuation of travel time and can inform time–space and accessibility research.     

Value creation through stakeholder synergy

Our “stakeholder synergy” perspective identifies new value creation opportunities that are especially effective strategically because a single strategic action (1) increases different types of value for two or more essential stakeholder groups simultaneously, and (2) does not reduce the value already received by any other essential stakeholder group. This result is obtainable because multiple potential sources of value creation exist for each essential stakeholder group. Actions that meet these criteria increase the size of the value “pie” available for essential stakeholder groups, and thereby serve to attract exceptional stakeholders and obtain their increasing effort and commitment. The stakeholder synergy perspective extends stakeholder theory further into the strategy realm, and offers insights for realizing broader value creation that is more likely to produce sustainable competitive advantage. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

关于深化农电体制改革的建议

总结了我国农电体制改革在构建农村供电所或营业所、促进农业经济发展等方面的成效,分析了县级供电企业存在的政企未完全分开、股份制改革困难较多、产权关系复杂等问题,提出在深化农电体制改革的过程中,应优先考虑上划方式结束对县级供电企业的代管,明晰农电资产所有权,对农电工管理采用农电业务外包方式,建立有效的农电投融资机制及合理的农村电价形成机制。     

基于非线性效应的第三方支付平台兼容性研究

本文在设定网络外部性效用为符合梅特卡夫法则的非线性函数条件下,构建双寡头支付平台兼容和不兼容两种情况下的优化模型,探讨双寡头支付平台的兼容性策略选择问题。研究发现,规模对称的双寡头支付平台兼容之后,两家支付平台的利润、消费者效用及社会福利均会增加;银联成立后中国工商银行的银行卡业务利润得以提升也验证了模型结果。建议政府借鉴银联的成功经验,使银联在线成为各支付平台的聚合型平台,提高第三方支付清算系统的效率。     

论经济学价值论的三个基本问题

价值本质、价值源泉和价值尺度是价值论的三个基本问题,它们决定价值论的性质,并通过价值论决定经济学的性质。古典政治经济学对这三个问题的回答有两种路线,逐渐演化出两种对立的价值论和经济学体系。两种经济学在理论和实践中的隔阂和对立使价值论以不同的方式退出了经济学的研究范围。中国建设社会主义与市场经济的社会实践对两种经济学的融合与突破提出了迫切需要,也提供了现实条件,这就要求对价值论展开广泛深入的研究。     

One size may not fit all: Welfare benefits and cost reductions with optional differentiated household electricity rates

We consider optional time-of-use (TOU) pricing for residential consumers, offered by a publicly regulated electricity supplier, as an alternative to a single TOU or flat rate structure. An equilibrium model explores and quantifies the effects of such pricing on welfare, consumption, and production costs. The supplier offers to each household a menu of possible rate structures obtained by maximizing a collective welfare function subject to three restrictions: Pareto efficiency, incentive compatibility, sufficiency of supplier revenue to cover costs. Simulations based on realistic calibration of the model demonstrate that optional pricing can increase overall consumer welfare and reduce average cost.