International Monetary Reform: A Review Article

Original institutional economics (OIE) has three significant, but apparently contradictory, definitions of institution(s) stemming from Thorstein Veblen, John Commons, and J. Fagg Foster. In this first installment of a two-part paper I address this apparent contradiction by developing an "irenic reconciliation" of these definitions using a methodological approach I call "critical institutionalism"— a synthesis of the OIE in the tradition of the Veblen, Commons, and Foster, the pragmatism theory of Charles Sanders Peirce and John Dewey, the critical realist methodology of Margaret Archer, and the critical realism of Roy Bhaskar. In so doing, I provide an alternative discussion to that of some current institutionalists who propose to replace the existing OIE definitions of institution(s) with "consensual definitions" developed in the discourse with non-OIE traditions. I propose that there is still considerable analytical value in the OIE definitions, and that replacing them with non-OIE-originating concepts would unnecessarily carry OIE away from its methodological and philosophical roots. In the second installment of this paper (yet to be published), I proceed to demonstrate the analytical value these "reconciled" definitions have for the OIE project.     

制度变迁与中国保险业增长

制度变革是推动中国保险业高速发展的最直接原因.保障制度、企业制度、收入分配制度等的变革所释放出的保险需求为保险企业的产生和发展提供了市场前提和空间,保险主体的多元化、企业行为的市场化增加了保险供给能力,两方面的共同作用形成了我国保险业的持续快速增长.而保险监管的市场化、法制化则为保险企业提供了宽松的竞争环境,保证了保险业增长的稳定性和持续性.     

The Czechoslovak Reform Movement, 1963–1968, A Study in the Theory of Socialism

This paper examines a fundamental issue in the theory of economic organization: the optimal level of market competition. Answers in neoclassical and new institutional economics are identified and critiqued. The analysis shows that selective assumptions in both fields produce distinctly market-favoring and "more competition is better than less" conclusions. The paper generalizes these assumptions and demonstrates organization-favoring and "less competition is better" positions are equally plausible. The paper also argues that part of the market-favoring bias in these fields stems from failure to distinguish between conditions of market failure and organizational success. Given these problems in extant theory, this paper develops an alternative institutional theory of economic organization, drawing principally on ideas of Walton Hamilton and John Commons. This proposed alternative shows that the optimal level of competition occurs at an intermediate level in the competition/cooperation spectrum (a mixed economy) and varies with five key determinants of the economic order.     

农民增收的制度约束及其“矫正”

当前制约农民增收的制度性因素主要表现在农村基层农民组织的缺失、城乡分割的户籍制度和由此建立的财政转移支付制度、联产承包制度、农村金融制度现有的不足等方面。要对现有制度进行“矫正”：一是提高农民的组织化程度；二是以户籍制度的改革为突破口来推进一系列的改革；三是推进农村地权改革提高土地经营的规模，四是实行农村金融体制改革。     

新制度主义的制度分析范式:一个归纳性述评

制度分析是当代社会科学领域一个重要的理论分析工具。20世纪70年代以来,经济学、政治学等重新发现了制度对解释现实问题的重要性,形成了新制度主义的制度分析范式。基于共同的逻辑起点、行为假设和理论工具,制度分析范式形成了不同的制度分析途径,如嵌入性制度分析、立宪制度分析、比较制度分析、历史制度分析和多中心制度分析等。制度分析拓展了社会科学的研究对象,增强了社会科学解释和解决现实问题的能力,越来越多的领域被囊括到制度分析中。     

二元财政的制度变迁：基于路径依赖的视角

植根于二元经济结构的二元财政制度总是执行有利于城镇部门发展,而且有损于农业部门发展的财政税收政策。这不仅造成了农村居民的长期贫困,而且还持续拉大城乡差距。基于新制度经济学的制度变迁分析结果显示,二元财政的制度安排内含自我增强机制,其变迁具有明显的路径依赖特征,所以,农村居民的贫困必然具有长期性,城乡差距也会持续拉大。因此,必须根据中国经济现实,对二元财政制度采取边际调整的改革措施和借助市场化的手段改善其赖以存在的经济环境,方可在长期内从整体上推动二元财政制度变迁,实现城乡平等的财政制度。     

Similarities and Dissimilarities between Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional Economics

Original Institutional Economics and New Institutional Economics display several similarities. However, differences in methodology and normative stance are too big to reconcile both approaches. Both approaches may keep each other sharp.     

Evolving sustainably: a longitudinal study of corporate sustainable development

This study operationalizes corporate sustainable development and examines its organizational determinants. Data for this project pertain to Canadian firms in the oil and gas, mining, and forestry industries from 1986 to 1995. I find that both resource‐based and institutional factors influence corporate sustainable development. By exploring time‐related effects, I also find that media pressures were important in early periods and resource‐based opportunities endured over time. This finding challenges the assumption that firms first adopt innovations in response to technical rewards which are later institutionalized. These counter‐intuitive results may be attributable to the unique characteristics of the dependent variable, corporate sustainable development. They raise important questions and directions for future research. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

政府补贴、机构股东与成本粘性

以2013—2017年沪深A股上市公司为样本,采用拓展的成本粘性模型,探究“八项规定”后政府补贴、机构股东对企业成本粘性的影响,以及机构股东的调节作用,研究发现：政府补贴增强了成本粘性,机构股东能抑制成本粘性,机构股东对政府补贴与成本粘性之间的关系起负向调节作用。进一步研究发现,政府补贴对成本粘性的影响与企业产权性质无关;机构股东对成本粘性的影响以及机构股东的调节作用仅在非国有企业中存在。不同地区,政府补贴、机构股东、成本粘性之间关系不同。政府补贴对成本粘性的影响仅在地方政府官员未发生变更年份时存在;机构股东对成本粘性的影响与地方政府官员变更无关,但机构股东的调节作用仅在地方政府官员未发生变更年份存在。