以制度优势凝聚脱贫攻坚的磅礴伟力

2020是脱贫攻坚的决胜收官之年,脱贫攻坚最后的攻坚战役号角已经吹响。回首2012年,习近平总书记明确指出到2020年全面建成小康社会,脱贫攻坚工作一路走来成绩颇为亮眼。丰硕成果的背后是以习近平同志为核心的党中央的正确决策、以人民为中心的执政理念以及全国上下汇聚的合力,凸显了一系列中国特色社会主义治理体系和治理能力的优势。中国一定能够如期打赢这场史无前例的脱贫攻坚战,完成这项对中华民族乃至全人类都有巨大意义的伟业。     

Who are better monitors? Comparing styles of supervisory and independent directors

This paper compares the unobservable style effect between independent directors and supervisory directors on firm performance. Utilizing the unique Chinese board system with both independent and supervisory directors and a large panel data of 2,240 public firms from 2003 to 2017, this paper finds that both supervisory and independent style is crucial in determining variations of firm performance. The effects of both independent and supervisory director style are less significant when the “type II” agency problem is more severe in a firm. Moreover, outside independent director style is more effective when information costs are low or when firms need more outside resources, while inside supervisor director style is more effective when there are no major internal changes. Finally, the results also suggest that increasing qualified supervisor representations are beneficial to firms.     

CEO power and annual report reading difficulty

We examine the impact of CEO power on reading difficulty of corporate annual reports. We find that CEO power is positively related to reading difficulty, implying that annual reports of corporations with powerful CEOs are difficult to read and understand. More importantly, we find that the relation between CEO power and reading difficulty is moderated by earnings performance or corporate governance. Additional findings suggest that this relation becomes stronger for firms with lower financial reporting quality or for CEOs with shorter tenure. Our study not only joins the debate on the consequences of powerful CEOs but also uncovers several factors that moderate the relation between CEO power and annual report reading difficulty.     

关于可持续发展理论与实践的若干思考

可持续发展理论与实践的深入有赖于在四个方面的重新认识：首先，可持续发展是观念性、战略性实践性的统一；其次，可持续发展是层次性与阶段性的统一；第三，可持续发展是区域性与综合性的统一；最后， 制度变革与创新是影响可持续发展的关键因素。     

政府部门绩效审计评价：基于预算的视角

随着政府绩效审计在我国的逐步开展，政府绩效审计评价已成为当前理论和实务界探讨较多的领域，评价指标的设置和评价方法的选取更是焦点。本文在回顾近年来我国政府绩效审计评价研究的基础上，从预算这一独特的视角，探讨了我国政府部门绩效审计评价指标的构建和评价方法的选择。     

末位淘汰——管理中的一柄“双刃剑”

末位淘汰作为一种管理手段在企业界被广泛采用,在实践中具有优缺点,实施末位淘汰要根据企业的实际情况,选择一个部门或几个部门进行。同时要注重培育良好的绩效文化,让刚性的末位淘汰变得充“满柔性”以有利于末位淘汰制的实施。     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

我国封闭式基金折价与基金运行绩效的相关性检验

笔者以我国的封闭式基金为样本,利用面板数据建模,综合考量了基金折价率与基金绩效指标间相关关系.研究结果发现,基金绩效指标对当期折价指标有显著的负的影响;而当期的基金折价指标不能准确预测未来绩效水平,即基金折价率并没有提供对未来基金绩效的有价值信息.     

股权结构与公司绩效实证研究的发现及其评价

对中国国有企业改革的研究,主要有“委托—代理”“、法定产权与事实产权不一致”“、产业定位与产权特性相对称”等三个理论框架。对股权结构与公司绩效的实证研究,为这三个理论框架的逻辑分析提供了有力的经验证据,也为深化国有企业改革提供了明确的、有益的指导。     

企业内部组织单元绩效评价:一项有效的制度安排

企业内部组织单元绩效评价是企业绩效评价体系的重要组成部分,是连接企业整体绩效评价与员工个人绩效评价的中间环节。应用委托代理理论对企业内部组织单元绩效评价的地位在理论上进行了分析,并对企业内部组织单元绩效评价的功能也进行了系统分析,认为企业内部组织单元绩效评价是一项有效的制度安排,是解决企业内部组织委托代理链上委托代理关系的重要手段。