Introduction to Repeated Games with Private Monitoring

We present a brief overview of recent developments in discounted repeated games with (imperfect) private monitoring. The literature explores the possibility of cooperation in a long-term relationship, where each agent receives imperfect private information about the opponents' actions. Although this class of games admits a wide range of applications such as collusion under secret price-cutting, exchange of goods with uncertain quality, and observation errors, it has fairly complex mathematical structure due to the lack of common information shared by players. This is in sharp contrast to the well-explored case of repeated games under public information (with the celebrated Folk Theorems), and until recently little had been known about the private monitoring case. However, rapid developments in the past few years have revealed the possibility of cooperation under private monitoring for some class of games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D43, D82, L13, L41.     

A Model of the Representation of Interests in a Compound Democracy

This paper provides a model of democratic government as a compound of independent elective and non elective centers of power that compete in fostering the demands of voters and of interest groups. The analysis describes how interests of voters and of pressure groups are represented and under what conditions the compound democracy is more responsive to voters' or to interest groups' demands. These conditions are shown to depend on the center of power's relative opportunity costs at serving a plurality of interests and on the severeness of informational asymmetries between voters and interest groups.     

Partial International Coordination in the Great Fish War

This study extends the great fish war model of Levhari and Mirman [Levhari, D. and Mirman, L. (1980) Bell Journal of Economics 11: 322–344] by incorporating a multiple country context into the model and investigates the existence of a partial coordination Nash equilibrium. First, findings of this paper suggest that a partial coordination scheme is sustainable only in limited cases. Any coalition that has more than two member countries cannot be sustained. Second, the existence and the number of coordinating countries depend critically on the magnitude of the biological and preference parameters. Finally, if the coalition is assumed to be a dominant player, there always exist one or two welfare-improving sustainable coalitions and the size of the sustainable coalitions depends on the parameters of the problem.     

Another proof that assignment games have singleton cores only if multiple optimal matchings exist

Complementary slackness of a pair of dual linear programming problems implies the remark of Sotomayor (2003) that assignment games have singleton cores only when multiple optimal matchings exist.The author thanks Marilda Sotomayor, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee for their helpful comments. This paper was finished when the author was visiting University of Rochester. JEL Classification Numbers: C71, C78, D58     

窜货的成因及其对策研究:基于博弈论的视角

在我国企业的分销渠道建设中往往会遇到窜货现象。它是现代市场营销中经常遇到的一种行为，这种行为对渠道成员和产品制造商的伤害极大。对窜货现象进行剖析后，我们可以看出，产生窜货的原因多种多样。很多学者都对窜货现象的形成原因作了分析并撰写了文章。他们对窜货的形成原因进行分析时大多是从产品、价格、分销和促销这四个方面进行分析的。本文在对窜货的形成原因进行分析时应用博弈理论对窜货现象进行了分析并在分析的基础上提出了如何预防和避免窜货现象的对策。     

Consistency and optimality in a dynamic game of pollution control II: Monopoly

This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal (1995a). I model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I analyze the intertemporal effects of alternate pollution control measures. The principal issue here concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies.     

我国利率市场化条件下商业银行利率风险管理

利率的市场化改革在推动金融深化,促进经济发展的同时,也使得商业银行所面临的利率风险加大。文章通过对利率市场化进程中商业银行的利率风险及其类型进行分析,提出了我国商业银行利率风险管理的措施。     

垄断与产权:我国利率市场化的制度性障碍

在缺乏竞争的金融体系下，借贷价格偏离均衡价格，消费剩余减少，资源配置扭曲，金融运行效率降低。在我国，资金供应依然主要由居于垄断地位的国有商业银行及其变种组成和资金需求依然主要由国有企业及其变种组成的情况下，利率市场化会使得资金价格扭曲和变形，理论上推演的利率市场化预期效果在很大程度上无法实现。我国利率市场化的时间表只能视微观经济主体市场化的进程而定。     

新古典生产函数的质疑与货币量值的生产函数

新古典理论以生产函数和效用函数为基础,建立了技术关系的稀缺资源有效配置理论,其核心是表明商品和要素稀缺性的相对价格.生产函数在微观尚可应用,但并不能用于解释总量经济和经济增长与波动问题.尤其是总供给完全取决于实物生产函数的投入产出关系,这与总需求分析所采用的货币支出是不协调的.货币量值的生产函数的推导表明,总供给只是企业的货币成本函数而不联系到技术上的投入产出关系,而所有的国民收入核算中的货币量值都只是表明人们经济关系的名义变量而与实物的技术关系或生产函数是完全无关的.     

府谷治污怪招的理论分析

地方保护主义严重存在于我国环境保护过程中，造成这一状况的原因主要是环境保护法律制度不健全、环境保护机构设置不科学和国民的环境保护意识不强。本文就此指出了改变现状的措施：强化国民环境意识、完善环境立法和改革环境保护体制。