转型经济利率市场化与我国货币市场发展

由于经济转型独特的初始条件,利率市场化不单单表现为放松利率管制,期间还交叉了一个利率定价传导机制重构的过程。利率定价传导机制取决于一国的金融制度与结构,尤其与货币市场的发育密切相关。目前,由于利率定价传导机制尚未完全成型,相应的利率市场化进程应以完善利率定价传导机制为重点,并最终完成以放松利率管制为主要特征的利率市场化改革。     

基于博弈论的建设工程投标报价研究

为使建设工程投标者能够中标并获得较高收益，就要讲究投标报价的策略和技巧。在与传统投标报价模型的比较之下，文章把博弈论运用到投标报价的决策中，建立了非合作性博弈模型和静态贝叶斯博弈模型，提出了投标者应采取的最优报价水平，进而得出了博弈思想的运用使报价更具动态性，更符合招投标实际操作的结论。     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.     

产业集群内企业之间合作创新的理论分析

集群有利于降低合作创新的交易成本、获得合作伙伴的隐性知识.企业选择合作创新,其动机主要是解决技术的外部性、分担研究开发成本和风险、获得合作伙伴的缄默性知识、实现技术转移以及获得巨大的国内和国际市场等.对合作创新的博弈分析表明,企业要形成合作创新的联盟,该联盟必须满足超可加性;否则,其成员没有动机形成联盟,已经形成的联盟也将面临解散的威胁.合理的利益分配方案是合作创新的基础.该方案是合作各方讨价还价的结果.     

Component efficient solutions in line-graph games with applications

Recently, applications of cooperative game theory to economic allocation problems have gained popularity. We investigate a class of cooperative games that generalizes some economic applications with a similar structure. These are the so-called line-graph games being cooperative TU-games in which the players are linearly ordered. Examples of situations that can be modeled like this are sequencing situations and water distribution problems. We define four properties with respect to deleting edges that each selects a unique component efficient solution on the class of line-graph games. We interpret these solutions and properties in terms of dividend distributions, and apply them to economic situations. This research has been done while the third author was visiting Tinbergen Institute at the Free University, Amsterdam. The research is part of the Research Programme “Strategic and Cooperative Decision Making” at the Department of Econometrics. Financial support from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) in the framework of the Russian-Dutch programme for scientific cooperation, is gratefully acknowledged. The third author also appreciates partial financial support from the Russian Leading Scientific Schools Fund (grant 80.2003.6) and Russian Humanitarian Scientific Fund (grant 02-02-00189a). We thank three anonymous referees for their valuable comments.     

A Suggested Interpretation of Some Experimental Results on Preplay Communication

M. Rabin (1994, J. Econ. Theory63, 370-391) proposes a model of behavior in two-person complete-information games with preplay communication, using non-equilibrium notions in the spirit of rationalizability to derive lower bounds on players' expected payoffs when players have unlimited communication opportunities. This paper adapts Rabin's model so that it can be used to analyze the results of the experiments of R. Cooper et al. (1989, Rand J. Econ.20, 568-587) on structured preplay communication in the Battle of the Sexes and the results of the unstructured bargaining experiments of Roth, Malouf, and Murnighan. Adding empirically motivated restrictions that allow the model to predict the payoff effects of changes in bounded communication possibilities like those in the experiments, it is shown that the data from both experiments are generally consistent with Rabin's model, and with the predictions of the extended model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78, C91.     

农业产业化经营中利益相关者关系、目标选择与实现方式

本文指出,农业产业化经营的利益相关者是农业价值创造和价值实现的重要影响因素,正确处理好利益相关者关系,有利于保障和提升农业利益,有利于农业价值创造与农业价值实现,这包括农户与龙头企业、政府、中介组织、合作经济组织以及龙头企业与协会之间的关系。农业产业化经营要以产业运作过程商品化、利益分配合理化等方式,实现农业价值创造最大化和农业价值分配最优化的农业产业化目标。     

食品供应链安全问题的信号博弈模型

基于食品供应链上安全信息不对称的特点以及零售企业运营状况,针对滥用食品安全标签(如无公害、绿色、有机食品标签等)的现象,以食品生产商和消费者作为博弈方,建立信号博弈模型,分析信号博弈的三种贝叶斯均衡及其条件,得出了信息不对称情况下安全食品生产商的损失函数,以及政府控制食品安全的策略。     

具缺货期不同决策支配权的两级供应链合作机制研究

从考虑市场需求固定且卖方和买方对缺货期的不同决策支配权情况,研究了两级供应链的合作机制,建立了其不完全信息的动态博弈模型,并得出其精炼贝叶斯纳什均衡,从理论上证明了卖方和买方分别占支配地位和从属地位时买方卖方应相互合作。     

中小企业研发困境的博弈分析

知识经济时代，企业自主研发是增强其竞争力的必经途径。而在国内，众多中小企业对研发投入持消极态度，尽管政府多方鼓励，但收效不大，且企业在自主研发的投入方面与发达国家有着较大的差距。可从严格保护研发成果、协作研发与加大政府的政策优惠力度等方面对中国中小企业的研发投入情况进行改进。