会计准则制定程序的博弈分析——以美国和欧盟为例

近年来，政治行为已经成为会计准则制定过程中的一个重要议题。以美国和欧盟为例，从博弈论角度对会计准则制定过程中的政治过程进行深入分析，发现美国和欧盟的会计准则制定主体——FASB和IASB遵循一个极为相似的程序，但它们却被植入了截然不同的政治环境中。对于一个相似的新会计准则，即使两个会计准则制定主体有着极为相似的偏好，其结果也将迥然不同。     

DID GOOD INSTITUTIONS PRODUCE GOOD TARIFFS? EVIDENCE FROM TARIFF PROTECTION IN COLONIAL VICTORIA

Were tariff rates in the Australian colony of Victoria directed towards growth‐enhancing industries or rent seekers? Recent research suggests tariffs may be welfare enhancing if they are directed at industries with positive externalities; something more likely when institutions are strong. Using disaggregated tariff data for the years 1872, 1880, and 1890, we analyse the relationship between industry characteristics and tariffs, finding little evidence that Victorian industries with positive externalities received tariff protection. Our results throw doubt on good institutions necessarily producing good tariff outcomes and suggest the relationship between tariffs and growth is more complex than current studies assume.     

中国农业国内支持乏力及其政治经济学解释

农业是天然的弱势产业,农业发展离不开政府的大力支持,但是,我国的农业却严重缺乏政府的足够支持。经济学界对此展开了广泛的讨论,本文在描述我国农业支持现状的基础上,运用政治经济学的基本分析方法,从游说成本的角度,进一步解释了造成这种严峻现实的深层次原因。作者希望通过本文的论述,能够为政府有效解决三农问题提供有益的参考。     

Public Affairs Management Activities of German Multinational Corporations in India

In this paper the importance of public affairs management in multinational corporations in India will be examined. After briefly discussing the state of the art in international business and society literature, a conceptual framework for public affairs management in multinational corporations will be developed. This framework serves as the theoretical basis for an empirical study among German multinational corporations in India. In the main part of this paper the results of this study will be presented and discussed. The paper ends with a critical assessment and some major implications for future studies.     

Corporate Political Activities and Oligopoly Welfare Loss

Businesses participate in political activities, suchas campaign contributions and lobbying, to influencepublic policy formulation and implementation. Usinga sample of U.S. food manufacturing industries, thisstudy measures the welfare impact of corporatepolitical activities in those industries. Empiricalanalysis shows that rent seeking was imperfect andcorporate political activities were higher in thoseindustries that were highly concentrated, large inemployee size and sales, and deeper in debt.     

中国企业集团多样化经营战略研究——西方近期研究成果之借鉴

Lang和Stulz (1994 ) ,Berger和Ofek (1995 )以多样化企业集团的市场价值与集团各部门所在行业中所有单一企业组合的价值之和相比较,发现企业进行多样化经营后会降低其价值。由此,引发了西方理论界对多样化经营同企业价值间关系的大讨论。目前,中国的企业集团正蓬勃发展,随着企业集团的不断强大,企业过剩的资本会流向不同的产业部门,形成多样化集团。中国作为新兴的市场,与西方的成熟市场不一样。所以在借鉴西方理论以及研究成果为我所用的同时,更要结合中国的实际情况,提出切合实际的中国企业集团多样化经营战略。     

Endogenous expropriation and political competition

We develop a game-theoretical model in which the politicians can be influenced by means of campaign contributions of special interest groups. If there is no legally binding contract, politicians have a proclivity to divert some contributions for private use. In doing so, they maximize their own utility which depends on expected election-winning premium and amount of funds misappropriated. We study the utility maximizing fraction of expropriation emerging from the equilibrium policy platform and the associated contribution level. We then compare results under alternative scenarios, namely, one single lobby group versus multiple lobby groups and one-sided lobbying versus two-sided lobbying.     

Dynamic lobbying: Evidence from foreign lobbying in the U.S. Congress

How do interest groups decide which member of Congress to target when decisions are made collectively? Do lobbying strategies change as legislation advances? Answering these questions is challenging due to a lack of systematic observations of lobbying contacts. I answer these questions using a novel data set constructed from reports submitted by lobbyists on behalf of South Korea regarding its free trade agreement with the United States for 10 years. I show that a diverse set of politicians are contacted but the timing, intensity, and strategy of lobbying contacts vary by politicians' institutional positions as well as their predisposed preferences for free trade.     

Firm-level political risk and distance-to-default

This study provides the first empirical evidence of the relationship between firm-level political risk and distance-to-default. Based on our examination of a quarterly dataset of 2727 U.S. firms covering a period from January 2002 to April 2019, we conclude that firm-level political risk is negatively associated with distance-to-default. We document three economic mechanisms through which political risk increases default risk: information asymmetry, organizational capital, and investment growth. The evidence indicates that the association is more pronounced for firms with low analysts’ forecast accuracy, organizational capital, and investment growth. Employing hand-collected data, we also reveal that firms are able to exploit their corporate lobbying to immunize themselves against default risk. Our findings are robust to different endogeneity identifications, including a natural experiment, alternative distance-to-default proxies, and different sub-samples. Overall, we present novel evidence of an adverse impact of firm-level political risk on distance-to-default and how such a negative effect can be mitigated.     

Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency

The paper examines how two targeted countries strategically deploy their counterterror forces when lobbying defense firms influence counterterror provision. For proactive measures, lobbying activities in a single targeted country lessen underprovision, raise overall counterterrorism, and reduce terrorism. Welfare decreases in the lobbied country but increases in the other targeted country owing to enhanced free riding. Lobbying influence on the targeted countries' welfare is tied to terrorists' targeting preferences and how the lobbied government weighs citizens’ welfare. Lobbying in both targeted countries may result in the first-best equilibrium. International policy coordination may lead to less efficient outcomes than the noncooperative equilibrium.