论企业的双重属性

本文从企业人、资产、产品、价值、环境等与企业行为相关的五方面较为全面地分析了企业双重属性的内涵,指出企业必须认识到自己所天然具有的社会及经济属性,并以此作为指导企业发展设计和规范企业行为的意识准备。     

Does seeing more deeply into a game increase one’s chances of winning?

The substantively rational value of the games studied in this paper does not help predict subject performance in the experiment at all. An accurate model must account for the cognitive ability of the people playing the game. This paper investigates whether the variation in measured rationality bounds is correlated with the probability of winning when playing against another person in games that exceed both players’ estimated rationality bound. Does seeing deeper into a game matter when neither player can see to the end of the game? Subjects with higher measured bounds win 63 percent of the time and the larger the difference the more frequently they win.     

Selection dynamics and adaptive behavior without much information

This paper uses the experimental method to investigate behavior in a coordination game when the information available to subjects is limited to their feasible choices and their experienced payoffs. In the experiment subjects converge to an absorbing state at rates that are orders of magnitude faster than reinforcement learning algorithms, but slower than under complete information. This state is very close to a mutual best response outcome. All cohorts converged to the market statistic predicted by the interior equilibrium regardless of the information conditions or the stability conditions. Eric Battalio programmed the graphical user interface. The National Science Foundation and Texas Advanced Research Program provided financial support. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation or the Texas Advanced Research Program.     

Evaluating the Validity of Self-Reported Deviant Behavior Using Vignette Analyses

In this paper, the validity of vignette analyses of various forms of deviant behavior in the presence of opportunities is analyzed on the basis of ideas derived from cognitive psychology. Abelson’s Script Theory together with insights into human memory of visual and verbal information, allow the assumption that vignette analyses using visual stimuli are valid measures of deviant behavior in particular. The study includes an empirical examination of these ideas (n = 450). Nonparticipant observations and vignette analyses with visual and verbal material were carried out with regard to three forms of deviant behavior occurring in the presence of opportunities presenting themselves in everyday life. Observed and self-reported frequencies of deviant behavior or deviant intentions were counted and cross-tabulated. Log-linear analyses with dummy coding using observation data as reference category were run. Data analyses yielded the result that frequencies of deviant behavior were related to the techniques of data collection under consideration. Especially vignette analyses of the return of ‘lost letters’ that use both visual and verbal stimuli overestimate ‘actual’ (i.e. observed) return rates. This result is discussed with regard to the underlying methodological assumptions as well as its implications.     

The effects of internal and external sources of justice on employee turnover intention and organizational citizenship behavior toward clients and workgroup members

Abstract

Organizational justice research tends to focus on the effects of fair treatment from organizations or supervisors on employee attitudes and behaviors. Thus, there is a dearth of research on the effects of fair treatment attributable to other parties that employees interact with at work such as coworkers and clients. Controlling for organization-focused and supervisor-focused justice, results from our field study of employees working in a healthcare organization demonstrate that perceptions of client-focused fairness uniquely predicts supervisor ratings of employees organizational citizenship behavior toward clients and that perceptions of workgroup-focused justice uniquely predicts organizational citizenship behavior toward workgroups. Further, we find that client-focused justice perceptions uniquely predict employee turnover intention.     

上市公司过度融资行为及其治理研究

上市公司过度融资行为,严重损害了债权人和中小股东的利益,扰乱了证券市场的定价和运行秩序,阻碍了我国证券市场的健康发展。本文通过分析我国上市公司过度融资行为的负面影响和经济成因,提出相应的治理措施。     

基于未确知测度理论的多科性医院医疗大数据治理能力成熟度评价

为实现对多科性医院大数据治理水平的分析和评估,在数据管理成熟度模型和能力成熟度模型基础上,构建多科性医院大数据治理能力成熟度评价模型。将医院大数据治理能力成熟度分为初始级、程序级、规范级、管理级和优化级五个等级,基于医院内部大数据治理特征,建立包括三级指标的成熟度评价指标体系。然后,分别用客观赋权法及组合赋权法确定各指标权重,并结合未确知测度理论和评价方法,量化评估两个三甲多科性医院大数据治理能力的成熟度。结果表明,两种赋权方法下两家医院的大数据治理能力水平均处于规范级,与两家医院大数据治理的实际情况相吻合。未确知测度理论与信息熵权相结合,可以平衡指标测量主观性和评价结果稳定性,建立的模型能为多科性医院大数据治理提供具有参考价值的决策信息。     

Dissertation abstract: “Essays in applied economics on the intervention of a third player in agency relationships”

Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent. Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments. First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on corruption. Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’ practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between physicians. Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability, strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions. We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions. Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable. JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91     

Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed.Jel classification: L43, L51I would like to thank Michael Crew and an anonymous referee for their extremely helpful suggestions.     

中国船舶制造业:SCP范式分析

以产业组织理论中哈佛学派的SCP范式为基本分析框架,考察我国的船舶制造业的产业组织状况后发现,中国船舶制造业市场结构是寡占型结构,垄断程度比较高,市场行为表现为更多的政府推动下的兼并与重组行为,而市场绩效相对效率低,技术进步和产品创新乏力.降低行业进入壁垒,鼓励民间资本进入造船业,推进产业规模经营是中国船舶制造业发展的必然选择.