混合所有制改革能有效化解国有企业产能过剩吗

在深化国有企业混合所有制改革的政策背景下,相比于采用正向逻辑来研究国有企业与其他所有制企业产能过剩的成因与化解机制异同,本文通过逆向逻辑构造反事实因果推断,即国有企业经过混合所有制改革身份属性发生变更后产能过剩能否得到化解,来探究国有企业产能过剩的制度性成因。在实证分析中,本文通过PSM—多期DID方法识别了国有企业混合所有制改革对于其产能利用率的政策影响,分析了不同市场结构下国有企业规模对产能利用率影响的非线性关系,明晰了国有企业混合所有制改革化解产能过剩的作用途径,探究了产能过剩的制度性根源与衍生因素之间的传递效应。     

Households transport-home energy conservation strategies in response to energy price policies: A stated adaptation experiment based on portfolio choices and cross effects designs

This article explores consumer investment choice in long-term energy conservation technology and assesses trade-offs in energy saving behaviour between the housing and transportation domains. The long-term energy conservation choice problem is conceptualized as a portfolio choice problem. Consequently, to measure trade-offs between investments in housing and transport options, a cross effects choice design is developed in which respondents were shown one or more alternate ways to reduce their current energy consumption: (1) investing in new technology in the house, such as solar panels; (2) exchanging the current car for a more energy efficient car; (3) buying a new energy-efficient car, such as EV or solar car; (4) moving house to reduce current travel distances. To help respondents linking these options to their current energy consumption, a new Web-based survey system (SINA) to implement and administer stated adaptation experiments was developed. The system was used to collect two sets of data. First, data about out-of-home and in-home energy consumption, together with detailed time use data, was collected. Second, using a cross effects design, respondents were asked to select a portfolio of energy-saving strategies in response to different energy pricing policy scenarios. Results reported in this paper are based on 572 respondents who completed the survey and responded to seven adaptation questions based on their current energy expenditures. A random parameters logit model is estimated to predict the probability of choosing a particular portfolio of energy-saving options. Estimation results indicate that individuals from different socio-demographic groups exhibit varied preferences. The saving option characteristics, especially cost related characteristics have significant effects on individuals' preferences. Moreover, the results also showed significant effects of choice set composition on energy saving options. Further, the energy pricing policies had showed mixed effects on individual's preferences.     

城市化进程中的“资源尾效”和“资源诅咒”——基于中国27个煤炭城市的面板数据分析

传统城市化理论往往强调自然资源对城市发展的正面作用,却对城市化的约束和反向作用问题考虑不够。文章基于"资源尾效"和"资源诅咒"两种假说,利用1997-2012年中国27个典型煤炭城市的数据对其煤炭资源开发与城市化发展的关系进行正负效应检验。结果表明:27个煤炭城市中有16个城市出现"资源尾效",其尾效数值为0.001 755;其余11个城市出现"资源诅咒",其煤炭资源对城市化发展的影响系数为-0.207 2。可见,自然资源的开发强度要处于一个合适的水平,并同时注意资本投入、教育和制度等因素才能最大程度上提高城市化水平。     

国内银行保险合作路径探析

本文通过对我国金融环境的分析,提出了在混业经营趋势下,适合我国银保合作的路径。     

Technology ladders and R&D in dynamic Cournot markets

Motivated by dramatic and unpredictable technological advances in energy production (for instance drilling and extraction of shale oil), we extend Cournot models of competition to incorporate research and development (R&D) that can lead to (stochastic) drops in production costs. Our model combines features of patent racing with dynamic market structure, capturing the interplay between the immediate competition in terms of production rates and the long-term competition in R&D. The resulting Markov Nash equilibrium is found from a sequence of one-step static games arising between R&D successes, and several numerical examples and extensive analysis of the emerging comparative statics are presented. Analyzing the relationship between current market dominance and the level of R&D investments, we find that market leaders tend to invest more, which in some sense makes oligopoly dynamically unstable. We show that anticipated market transitions have long-term impact; for example the potential of future monopoly can spur R&D investment now, even if the firm is presently uncompetitive and not actively producing. We also show that, surprisingly, random innovations have an ambiguous effect on R&D. This feature, which is driven by the Cournot framework, contrasts with the common situation whereby uncertainty lowers innovation and delays R&D investments. Finally, we demonstrate that increased competition may actually increase efforts to innovate through higher desire to achieve dominance. This would match the anecdotal evidence that the threat of market entrants forces incumbents to maintain high R&D.     

智能凝胶GD-1混堵技术在靖边气田的应用

靖边气田钻井过程中发生井漏,采用常规堵漏技术(桥塞堵漏、水泥浆堵漏)常堵漏不彻底、容易出现井漏反复等井下复杂情况。基于常规堵漏方法,引进智能凝胶GD-1混堵技术在靖边气田南部黄土表层、刘家沟组裂缝地层应用,取得了良好的防漏、堵漏效果:提高了堵漏成功率,减小堵漏反复性,二次堵漏的几率明显降低。     

Reasserting Institutionalist Insights on the Good Society: 30 Years After Petr’s Call for a Mixed Economy

In this research note, I revisit the issues raised by Jerry Petr (1987) in “The Nature and Necessity of the Mixed Economy.” The institutionalist mixed economy is still a sound model for the good society. However, Western industrialized countries have been losing ground on the goals of the mixed economy. The struggle to defend pragmatism over ideological attachment to neoliberalism, has evolved into a distributional struggle that cannot be resolved without institutional change.     

R&D,free entry,and social inefficiency

We employ a three-stage game model with cost-reducing research and development (R&D) that is subject to spillovers to consider the problem of excess entry under free-entry equilibrium relative to the social optimum. Firms choose to enter or exit a market in the first stage, choose R&D in the second stage and output in the final stage. Results show that there is socially inefficient or excessive entry in equilibrium. However, we uniquely demonstrate that research spillovers hold the key to whether established results regarding socially inefficient entry hold. Specifically, excessive entry occurs as long as research spillovers are relatively small, but this is not necessarily the case with large spillovers. Some policy implications are discussed.     

An oligopoly model of ocean liner shipping

In this paper I develop a simultaneous equations oligopoly model of the regulated international ocean liner shipping industry. The firms act as a cartel to determine price jointly and then set their own quality levels to maximize individual profits. The cartel does not attain monopoly profits, because each conference member myopically determines quality without regard for overall cartel profits. The results indicate that an increase in the number of firms in the cartel will increase both cartel price and quality level. An increase in price will also lead to an increase in quality level.I would like to thank Professors Alamarin Phillips, Robert Summers, and Bruce Allen for their helpful comments on earlier research for my dissertation in the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania on which this work is based. I am especially grateful to Professor Lawrence J. White for his encouragement and valuable suggestions at various stages of my work.