How Do Ordinary Japanese Reach Consensus in Group Decision Making?: Identifying and Analyzing “Naïve Negotiation”

The purpose of this study is to investigate ways in which ordinary Japanese people negotiate in a multi-party meeting. We initially gave such a way of negotiation the tentative name of “naïve negotiation”. The analysis of the conversational data reveals three structural features of naïve negotiation: (1) at the utterance level, the participants tend to claim their opinions without providing any overt grounds, (2) at the local consensus-building level, they tend to jump to conclusions without the full examination of proposed hypotheses, (3) at the final consensus-making level, there tends to be disjunctions between discussion units. Although these features are not necessarily seen as irrational or illogical, a naïve-negotiation style can still be a trouble-source in achieving successful consensus-making. This leads us to emphasize the necessity of developing a support system for the discussants.     

Trade Reform and Manufacturing Pricing Behavior in Four Archetype Asia‐Pacific Economies*

General equilibrium models are constructed of four Asia‐Pacific economies that differ according to their levels of development, the comparative sizes of their manufacturing sectors and their patterns of comparative advantage and trade protection. The countries chosen are Australia, an industrialized importer of manufactures; Japan, an industrialized exporter; the Philippines, a developing importer; and the Republic of Korea, a developing exporter. Manufacturing industries are characterized as comprising identical oligopolistic firms producing homogeneous goods that are differentiated from competing imports. Oligopoly behavior notwithstanding, trade reforms are found to yield conventional results in that net economic gains are small while implicit transfers are substantial. More competitive (non‐collusive) pricing by oligopolistic firms, which might be achieved through reform of competition law and trade practices surveillance, yields larger net gains and these gains tend to accrue to all domestic primary factors. Such reforms also yield substantial interaction between oligopoly behavior and economic and industrial structure.     

What role should public firms play in the upstream market?

We investigate the upstream public firm's desirable option of production timing in the vertically related upstream market. We find that multiple equilibria may exist, including the Cournot-type and Stackelberg-type, with different degrees of privatization in the presence of upstream firms' efficiency gap. These equilibrium outcomes are also influenced by the intensity of downstream market competition. We further show the corresponding optimal degree of privatization in different phases of gradual privatization.     

经济中最优私有比重——经济体制改革的模型描述

文章通过构建混合寡头竞争博弈模型,在封闭经济、具有外来竞争者的封闭经济和开放经济情形下,证明经济中最优私有比重的存在性。模型假定随着私有化的深入,国有企业的生产边际成本会降低。基本结论是:(1)在封闭经济、具有外来竞争者的封闭经济和开放经济情形下,最优私有比重都是存在的;(2)在任意固定的私有比重下,存在最优关税;(3)在具有外来竞争者的封闭经济或者开放经济下,本国关税对本国企业起到了保护作用,随着关税的增加,本国企业的产量会增加,进口和市场产品总量会减少;(4)随着我国私有经济在经济总量中比例的增大,我国企业将向国外市场出口更多的产品,而且国外市场中的产品总量也随着我国私有化水平的提高越来越大。我们的结论可为我国政府进行经济体制改革提供一定的理论依据。     

Bilateral Oligopoly,Private Information,and Pollution Permit Markets

We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker determines the market-clearing price. Net supplies depend on abatement cost functions, which in turn depend on private information parameters. We calculate the increase in aggregate abatement costs due to strategic behavior and private information and show that private information attenuates the effects of strategic behavior.      

“混合所有制经济”概念与内涵的交叉科学检验——一评“资本混合型企业”的决策科学性

从市场经济理论与实践看,把发展混合所有制经济理解为建立资本混合型企业是概念上的张冠李戴,以为通过行政手段把私有资本混入国企就是发展混合所有制经济是荒诞不经的。而西方资本联合作为一个企业的(资本)组织、运作形式之一也与这种行政手段催生的资本混合型企业有本质区别。同时,任何一个企业的组织形式都必须与企业性质和根本目的保持高度一致,社会主义如此,资本主义也如此。中国国企代表全体人民的最根本利益,目的是实现这个利益的最大化。私企则是以私有资本及其所有者的利益最大化为根本目的。任何通过行政手段把私有资本直接混入国企股权资本的做法既是对国企性质、目的的背离,也是对市场经济规律的背离。     

产权清晰视角下国企混改的制度逻辑及政策启示

改革开放以来的历次国有企业改革,都涉及了产权与产权制度改革这一核心问题。混合所有制是当下国企改革重要的目标导向,产权是否清晰仍然是关乎此轮改革成败的一个关键。跳出传统认识局限,以合约完备性界定产权清晰,才能更准确理解国企混改的制度逻辑,更好地把握有效的公司治理形式的构建原则。为此,应更加重视所有权和经营权之外的其他权利安排,允许以更灵活的合约结构界定国有企业承担的政策性职能,重视非物质资本特别是人力资本的合约权利安排,尊重企业合约各方平等地位,兼顾合约各方的财产权利和多元利益表达。     

非国有股东治理与企业风险承担水平——来自国有企业混合所有制改革的经验证据

以A股国有上市企业为样本,考察非国有股东治理对企业风险承担水平的影响。研究发现,非国有股东治理能够显著提升国有企业的风险承担水平,这种影响在2013年底国有企业混合所有制改革强化之后更加明显,在地方国有企业和竞争性国有企业中更加突出。进一步研究发现,非国有股东治理对企业风险承担水平的影响机制在于提高高管薪酬和降低代理成本,提高股权混合制衡度和超额委派董事均能提高企业风险承担水平。研究结论从企业风险承担的视角证实了混合所有制改革的效果,为进一步推进混合所有制改革提供了经验证据和借鉴。     

混合所有制经济的理论阐释与发展路径选择

本文对混合所有制经济的性质、发展混合所有制经济的目的进行了阐释,尝试澄清目前对混合所有制经济的模糊认识。笔者认为,混合所有制经济在微观上是一种资本组织形式,并不是一种所有制形式,发展混合所有制经济的目的是发展生产力,发展混合所有制经济的意义在于实现公有制经济和非公经济相互取长补短、相互促进、共同发展。发展混合所有制经济应实行“四线并进”,重点是推进垄断行业改革。