Frictions, Heterogeneity and Optimality in Mortgage Modeling

The purpose of this article is to provide a unified framework for incorporating frictions into a theoretical options-pricing model (OPM) for mortgages. This article presents formulation for a frictions-adjustable mortgage model that integrates borrower heterogeneity while simultaneously preserving prepayment and default financial decisions. Our model demonstrates the flexibility of the OPM by simulating separate and concurrent effects of three categories of frictions on the mortgage and mortgage components. Researchers can use our example formulation to determine the effects of specific borrower characteristics on mortgage values without destroying the options theoretic framework.     

Unit initial public offerings: Staged equity or signaling mechanism?

We investigate the use of unit (i.e., package) initial public offerings by Australian industrial firms and conclude that their use reflects their role as a signaling mechanism (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1997), as distinct from the agency–cost explanation offered by Schultz (1993). From a sample of 394 IPOs between 1976 and 1994, the 66 firms making unit offerings are typically riskier, use less prestigious underwriters and have a lower level of retained ownership than other IPO firms. While these results are also consistent with Schultz's agency cost explanation, other results we report are not. We find no difference in underpricing etween unit IPOs and other IPO firms, nor are there any significant differences in the planned uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus, post–listing failure rates or secondary equity offerings of the type predicted by Schultz. We do however, report evidence consistent with a prediction unique to the signaling explanation. After controlling for the level of ownership retained by insiders, the proportion of firm value sold as warrants is increasing in IPO firms' riskiness.     

Knowledge transfer costs and dependence as determinants of financial reporting

Abstract This paper examines the circumstances in which financial reporting exists. Jensen and Meckling (1995 ) observe that where there are high knowledge transfer costs, then decentralisation is necessary; and that where decentralisation occurs there is a control problem, which can be addressed by providing a control system. I predict that where there are high knowledge transfer costs there will be a control system; if the control system uses financial reports, these will occur for activities with high knowledge transfer costs. The ability to decentralise is reduced where dependence makes it potentially costly to allow a subordinate to make decisions about the activity. The paper predicts that high dependence will be negatively associated with the existence of financial reports. The results confirm the predictions that financial reports are positively associated with knowledge transfer costs and negatively associated with dependence.     

Complementarity, coordination and compatibility: The role of fixed costs in the economics of systems

We analyze industry equilibrium and incentive to compatibility when goods produced by different producers generate utility only when consumed as component parts of a system. We assume the presence of two systems, each composed of some basic component and a set of differentiated complementary products. The combination of complementarity between the two components of the system and of fixed costs in the production of the complementary product results in a form of network effect. We focus on the role played by the size of the fixed costs in the production of the complementary products in determining the size of this system effect and, by this means, the structure and types of equilibria that may be observed: monopolistic or duopolistic, symmetric or asymmetric. We also highlight the consequence of the same fixed costs for the private and social incentives to render the systems compatible.     

Does the cost of capital differ across countries? An agency perspective*

In this keynote speech, I ask the question: Does the cost of capital differ for firms located in different countries? I argue that there are two ways to look at the cost of capital. First, there is the neoclassical perspective, which assumes that there are no agency problems. In integrated markets, the neoclassical cost of capital is the same in every country. Second, there is the agency perspective. Agency costs increase the cost of capital understood as the expected rate of return necessary for an investment to leave the value of the firm unaffected. Adjusting the cost of capital for agency costs, I argue that it differs across countries because of differences in corporate governance. I then provide a comparison of the agency-adjusted cost of capital between Japan and the US.     

基于EVA的股票期权激励机制探讨

在委托代理关系中，企业所有者和经营者的目标函数存在差异，由此产生代理成本，需要对经营者进行相应的激励。然而，基于传统业绩评价而实施的股票期权存在一些弊端。本文探索将股票期权嫁接到EVA（经济附加值）平台之上，提出了基于EVA的经理人股票期权激励方案，以期能更有效地解决激励问题。     

A counter-example to an option pricing formula under transaction costs

In the paper by Melnikov and Petrachenko (Finance Stoch. 9: 141–149, 2005), a procedure is put forward for pricing and replicating an arbitrary European contingent claim in the binomial model with bid-ask spreads. We present a counter-example to show that the option pricing formula stated in that paper can in fact lead to arbitrage. This is related to the fact that under transaction costs a superreplicating strategy may be less expensive to set up than a strictly replicating one.     

Annual report readability and corporate agency costs

Annual reports are the main sources of information for outside investors’ investment decisions and enable shareholders to supervise the management. Difficulties with the readability of these reports may therefore have serious consequences. Using 19,221 firm-year observations of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2001 to 2015, we investigate the association between annual report readability and corporate agency costs, where readability is proxied by report file length and/or file size. We find that firms with better annual report readability experience lower agency costs, and the negative association between readability and agency costs is more pronounced in firms with higher external audit quality, internal control quality or analyst coverage. These results hold after several robustness checks. The positive effect of annual report readability is stronger in private firms than in state-owned enterprises, and becomes stronger after the implementation of new accounting standards in 2007. Readable annual reports can help in monitoring corporate insiders’ opportunistic behavior and thus reduce agency costs.     

战略采购的过程模型及其作用模式

基于交易成本／交易效益双边动态理论，本文发展了战略采购的过程模型，提出战略采购是一个由市场替代企业、优化网络节点、固化网络联结和整合网络能力四个环节构成的过程．目的是推动企业和市场向网络变迁以获得交易成本的持续降低和交易收益的持续创造。文中还指出了不同条件下的战略采购作用机理。在买方优势条件下．采购战略贡献高的能力可以通过发展单联网络来实现．而采购战略贡献低的能力可以通过发展并联网络来实现；在供方优势条件下，采购战略贡献高的能力可以通过发展外拓网络来实现．而采购战略贡献低的能力可以通过发展外联网络来实现。最后，根据我国战略采购实践和理论现状提出提高我国战略采购水平的对策和进一步理论研究的建议。     

文化因素对企业经营绩效影响的研究

本文利用霍夫斯塔德（Hofstede）和他的同事跨文化研究的相关成果，结合新制度经济学的交易成本分析工具，对文化因素与企业经营绩效的关系进行了理论研究．并利用1995年世界最大500家公司的面板数据等．对文化因素与企业经营绩效的关系进行了计量检验，结果显示，个人主义与集体主义、权力距离和合作性三个文化因素对企业经营绩效有显著的影响。在此基础上．本文分析了文化因素对我国企业经营绩效的影响．并提出了相关的政策建议．